

INTERNATIONAL THIRD WORLD STUDIES

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FOREWORD

The various articles and reviews assembled for this issue are a reflection of the diversity within Third World studies. It includes articles featuring an alternative view of weapons of mass destruction, a comparison of Gandhi and King, and an assessment of South Africa's transition to democracy.

The opening article is Michael J. Siler's "The Global Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: A Counter-Argument to the Western Interdisciplinary Viewpoint," which is nothing less than a Kuhnian "paradigm" shift within the Western debate on global nonproliferation policy. At a time when policy makers use certain mental models or maps that allow them to organize and interpret information in ways that absolutely prohibit the rational justification of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities by Third World states, Siler tilts the traditional Western paradigm on its head by proposing the question of whether it is in the national security interests of some Third World states to acquire such weapons and capabilities, given the resistance of the nuclear weapons states to protect them against a nuclear or WMD attack from some belligerent. As Siler notes, the cost to major Third World states linking proliferation with their long-term national security interests may be severe, given that U.S. national security decision-makers have proposed using not only diplomatic, but also military means to ensure that the acquisition does not take place.

In "Gandhi and King: A Comparison," Michael J. Nojeim sets the stage for the oft made claim that Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., were the greatest advocates and practitioners of nonviolent resistance in the twentieth century. By delving into the lives of these two proponents of social change, Nojeim's article contributes to a fuller understanding of the lives and works of Gandhi and King's by comparing them as activists committed to nonviolence, as leaders, as religious devotees, as men, and as heroes. The article ends with a brief analysis of Gandhi and King's legacy in their respective countries. Although Gandhi and King's nonviolent visions do not dominate Indian and American society in the twenty-first century, their example and influence permeate these societies, as well as the rest of the world.

In "Miracle or Model? South Africa's Transition to Democracy," David T. Jervis takes issue with the view that South Africa's transition to democracy was simply a miracle. If the "miracle thesis" holds true, then there is no need to learn from it in order to apply its truths to similar situations in Africa and elsewhere. On the other hand, if South Africa's transition was less of a miracle and more a result of certain practices, then its transition could serve as a model for similar situations. Jervis considers the extent to which the transition should be considered as a one-of-a-kind miracle or as a model for other cases. He concludes that there were elements of both the miraculous and practice derived from theory, and that both were crucial to South Africa's transition. Although this transition would not have been successful without a number fortuitous events and circumstances, those events and circumstances were fortuitous largely due to how the transition process was designed by the participants. Jervis is unwavering in his claim that South Africa's emergence as a peaceful, multiracial democracy should be considered as both a miracle and a model.

This issue includes review essays by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Richard R. Super. Benjamin-Alvarado reviews Jorge Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, and Lorena Barbería's new book *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century* (Harvard University Press, 2005) and Max Azicri and Elsie Deal's *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival, and Renewal* (University Press of Florida, 2004). Super reviews Steve J. Stern's *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998* (Duke University Press, 2004) and *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973–2002* (Duke University Press, 2004) edited by Peter Winn. The Book Review section concludes this issue with five reviews. Paul A. Williams reviews Tim Couzens' *Murder at Morija* (Random House, 2003); David T. Jervis reviews Witney W. Schneidman's *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (University Press of America, 2004); Ann R. Tickamyer reviews Vinson H. Sutlive Jr.'s *Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies* (The Borneo Research Council, 1991); Cynthia Cook reviews Charles Zenner's *Culture and the Question of Rights: Forests, Coasts, and Seas in Southeast Asia* (Duke University Press, 2002); Teresa Trumbly Lamsam reviews the United Nations' *The State of the World Cities 2004/2005* (Earthscan,

2004); Owen G. Mordaunt reviews John L. Daly's *Training in Developing Nations: A Handbook for Expatriates* (M.E. Sharp, 2005); Melanie Lewandowski reviews Nigel Eltringham's *Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda* (Pluto Press, 2004); and Ghaleb Darabya reviews John Quigley's *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective* (Duke University Press, 2005).

The editorial staff of the *Journal* invites you to continue manuscript submissions for consideration in future issues. As always, the *ITWSJ&R* is a refereed publication and is open to articles and book reviews addressing any aspect of Third World studies. Articles examining the concept of the Third World are equally solicited. In addition, future issues will include reviews of films, translations, book notes, discussion notes, and interviews. Submissions should be mailed to the address printed in the Information for Contributors section of this issue.

In an attempt to make the journal more readily accessible, the editors have offered an on-line version of the journal. Whether the journal moves to an on-line only format will be gauged by the success of this experiment.

The contents of the last four volumes and the Information for Contributors can be found on the journal's website at <http://www.unomaha.edu/itwsjr>. The journal's homepage is maintained by the Department of Philosophy and Religion at <http://www.unomaha.edu/wwwphrel>. For information on the upcoming Global Studies Conference at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, go to <http://www.unomaha.edu/world/twsc/>.

—Rory J. Conces

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

International Third World Studies Journal and Review (ISSN 1041-3944) is an annual interdisciplinary journal of scholarship in the field of Third World studies. The Editors welcome submissions that contribute to the understanding of the Third World. *International Third World Studies Journal and Review* publishes research conducted in several disciplines including economics, history, literature, philosophy, religion, political science, anthropology, environmental studies, and public health.

Articles and book reviews intended for publication should be sent to Dr. Rory J. Conces, Editor, *International Third World Studies Journal and Review*, Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-0265. Books for review should be sent to Dr. Owen G. Mordaunt, Book Review Editor, *International Third World Studies Journal and Review*, Department of English, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-0175. Manuscripts should conform closely to *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed., and be typewritten in English on one side of white paper (8-1/2" x 11") using 1" margins on all sides. Contributors should submit the original and four copies. Computer-generated manuscripts *must* be of letter quality (*not* dot-matrix). All text, including notes and block quotations, should be double-spaced. The manuscript should be reasonably subdivided into sections, and if necessary, sub-sections. First-level subheadings should be in full capitals, boldface type, and typed flush left; second-level subheadings should be in initial capitals, boldface type, and flush left; and third-level should be in initial capitals, boldface type, and set at the beginning of the paragraph and followed by a period. Subheadings, except the third-level, are each set on a line separate from the text. Notes, kept to a minimum, should be marked in the text at a point of punctuation, and listed consecutively at the end of the article in a section entitled "Endnotes." **Do not use the automatic footnote feature of your word processor.** Bibliographical references will not be published unless they are given as endnotes. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of all quotations and for supplying complete references. Manuscripts should be accompanied by biographies of no more than 200 words describing each author's current and recent academic and professional affiliations, research interests, and recent publications, as well as an abstract of the article (not exceeding 200 words). All manuscripts accepted are subject to editorial modification.

The Editors prefer articles of 15-25 double-spaced, typewritten pages (approximately 250 words per page). Longer articles will be evaluated in terms of whether their scholarship and importance warrant the additional space required for publication. Book reviews as well as film reviews will be considered, especially if they are under 10 double-spaced, typewritten pages (approximately 2000 words).

The Editors regard submission of a manuscript to *International Third World Studies Journal and Review* as an implied commitment to publish in the journal. Authors submitting manuscripts should not simultaneously submit them to another publication, nor should manuscripts have been published elsewhere in substantially similar form or with substantially similar content.

To help defray the costs of publishing the journal, a nonrefundable submission fee of \$45.00 is required for each unsolicited manuscript. Checks should accompany the manuscripts and be payable to the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

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The *Journal* is a peer-reviewed publication. All manuscripts considered appropriate for the journal are reviewed externally by at least two referees. In order for the referees to review manuscripts without knowledge of the author's name or institutional affiliation, the Editors request that information be provided in the cover letter, and not on the manuscript itself. The Editors attempt to inform authors of their decision within eight months of receiving a paper. Authors of accepted submissions will be asked to provide a final version on a 3.5" disk (IBM formatted-WordPerfect 5.1-8.0 is preferred) together with the hard copy typescript. Galley proofs are sent directly to the author. Typescripts of rejected articles and book reviews will not be returned. Contributors of articles (in case of joint authorship, the primary author) will receive a copy of the *Journal*; book and film reviewers will receive an offprint of their review.

The deadline for manuscript submissions for Volume XVII (2006) is April 1, 2006.

For further information concerning the journal, please contact Dr. Rory J. Conces, Editor, *International Third World Studies Journal and Review*, Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-0265. (402) 554-2947. FAX: (402) 554-3296. rconces@mail.unomaha.edu

The University of Nebraska at Omaha is pleased to announce the 29th Annual Global Studies Conference, an interdisciplinary format devoted to the widest possible combination of scholars, practitioners, and participants. It will take place October 2006.

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Participants are encouraged to submit their papers for publication in the *International Third World Studies Journal and Review*.

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The Global Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: A Counter-Argument to the Western Interdisciplinary Viewpoint

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Introduction

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the two-tier international security system has formally legitimized the possession of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of the five nuclear weapons states (i.e., the United States, France, Britain, the Peoples' Republic of China, and the Russian Federation).¹ The strategic political problem in the increasingly tense relationship between the nuclear have states and the nuclear have-not states is that the international security system is inherently unfair and structurally unequal. On the one hand, the obligations of the nuclear have-not states to abide by international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes continue in full legal force.² On the other hand, the nuclear weapons states continue to modernize their strategic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities (while the United States pursues a grand strategy that includes the militarization of space, building a national missile defense system, developing mini-nuke [and bunker-buster] systems, and improving related advanced nuclear, WMD and ballistic weapons systems). The long-standing historical accusations of discrimination against the legitimate national security needs of the nuclear have-not states are embedded in these international security realities.

In this context, the dominant Western debate on global proliferation policy has not fully investigated an important theoretical question: Is it in the national security interests of some major Third World states to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, given the resistance of the nuclear weapons states to protecting them against a potential nuclear or WMD attack from a rogue Third World state, a global terrorist group, or in certain counter-instrumental scenarios, from a "crazy" nuclear weapons state?³ While the global proliferation system has different drivers in the various Third World regions (i.e., Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa), an important minority of major Third World states remain focused on advancing their supreme interests under (and in some cases in spite of) the current international and regional nonproliferation enforcement protocols and safeguards treaty regime(s).⁴

This nonproliferation research study posits that the limited negative (and positive) security assurances extended by the nuclear weapons states (combined with their collective unwillingness to significantly reduce their impressive strategic nuclear weapon inventories towards the goal of

real nuclear disarmament) to the nuclear have-not states are not very reliable. Because of this and other negative international security conditions, the unintended policy consequence is that some major Third World states have increased strategic political incentive(s) to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in order to secure their long-term security interests and protect their national sovereignty.

However, this global nuclear security argument does not have a sympathetic voice in the U.S. and Western nonproliferation and security literatures or among U.S. national security decision-makers. In the post-September 11th environment, U.S. defense neo-conservatives and defense conservatives as well argue that major Third World states with or seeking nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities must be disarmed, diplomatically if possible, or with overwhelming military force if necessary.⁵ The U.S. and Western nonproliferation and security literatures are not overly sensitive to the alternative viewpoint that some (but not all) major Third World states may acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities for legitimate (and not illegitimate) national security reasons.⁶

For that matter, some major Third World states may acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities not to directly or indirectly threaten U.S. or Western security interests, but to secure their supreme national interests and sovereignty. Moreover, the Western nonproliferation literature is biased in understanding why nuclear have-not states do or do not acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities and in overestimating the nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities of nuclear have-not states.⁷

Currently, U.S. political leadership and national security decision-makers promote counter-proliferation strategy and pre-emptive offensive strikes, to either diplomatically disarm or win military conflicts against major Third World states with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁸ In a real sense, nuclear and WMD nonproliferation studies have become a subset of counter-proliferation and anti-proliferation analysis because the Western security community (especially in the United States) contends that it is both strategically dangerous and morally unacceptable for major Third World states to possess nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁹ The debate on whether democracies and non-democracies with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are ethically or morally equivalent is irrelevant in the realism universe where power capabilities define what is right and what is wrong. In the Western security literature, it is assumed that democratic states with nuclear weapons and

WMD capabilities exercise by definition a higher moral authority in matters of war and peace and that non-democratic states with or seeking nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities do not.¹⁰

While these debates are compelling and organized (informed by prevailing American and Western international relations theories and international security models), they do not satisfactorily examine the underlying political, security and cultural dynamics driving the global proliferation problem from Third World perspective(s).¹¹

This nonproliferation policy study suggests that it is in the long-term strategic interests of major Third World states to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities given: 1) the unreliable and limited negative (and positive) security guarantees provided by the nuclear weapons states; 2) the continued modernization of the nuclear weapons states' nuclear and WMD capabilities; 3) the unwillingness of the great powers to move towards significant levels of nuclear disarmament as agreed to in the 1969 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its continuously negotiated protocols agreed to by the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states alike; and 4) the aggressive counter-proliferation policies and pre-emptive military behavior of the United States towards Iraq and continued U.S. diplomatic threats made against other major Third World states with or acquiring nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.¹²

The central issue examined is: do major Third World states have an implicit strategic justification to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities; if they do, what is the nature of their insecurity dilemma, how are they acquiring nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, what are their nuclear and WMD guidance doctrines, what are their nuclear and WMD acquisition and deployment policies, and where do they hide their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities?

This study posits that nuclear and WMD thinking and practices emerging from the Third World are conceptually different and politically divergent from the prevailing Western strategic nonproliferation and counter-proliferation paradigm(s), the latter based on a double standard praxis dedicated to supporting "friends" and attacking "enemies" with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities or advancing towards these very lethal capabilities. They are conceptually different in the special sense that they are historical reactions by the weak states against the great powers' continuing discriminatory nuclear and WMD policies and unwillingness to downgrade the high currency placed on strategic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities as a central attribute of national and international power. The political examination of the global nuclear weapons and WMD threat from a strictly U.S. and Western security perspective is incorrect. These prevailing Western security perspectives downplay divergent global (and regional) nuclear weapons and WMD trends, in effect invalidating non-Western non-proliferation thinking and practices.¹³

By way of organization, Section 1 examines the political origins of the Third World's resistance to global nonproliferation treaties and safeguards regimes. Section 2 dis-

cusses the complex insecurity dilemma faced by some major Third World states as it relates to the nuclear weapons and WMD issue. Section 3 examines the central elements of the global proliferation threat within the diversified Third World framework. Section 4 outlines the directions in nuclear weapons and WMD acquisition and deployment practices in the Third World. Section 5 explores various nuclear weapons and WMD concealment practices in the Third World. The nonproliferation policy study concludes with some observations on proliferation and non-proliferation transformations and trends occurring throughout the international security system.

The Whys of Third World Resistance to International Nonproliferation Treaties and Safeguard Regimes

Major Third World states are caught between two powerful international forces, the counter-proliferation and pre-emptive-minded United States and the nonproliferation dedicated four nuclear weapons states. The political tensions between the nuclear weapons states and some major Third World states are complicated by the former bloc's preference for strictly enforcing their non-nuclear and non-WMD objectives through crippling political, diplomatic, economic, financial, trade, and military sanctions.¹⁴ Under these unequal policy conditions, the widening division between the nuclear have states and the nuclear have-not states has become an important and divisive driver in increasing both the intensity and lethality of the global proliferation threat. The compelling resistance of some major Third World states to the prevailing American and Western-driven nuclear and WMD nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes are deeply embedded in this historically unequal and unjust relationship; and it is the long-term strategic military basis for the proliferation threat to international stability and peace.¹⁵ This relationship has created a symbolic (but temporary) rift between nuclear and WMD-capable major Third World states and non-nuclear and non-WMD major Third World states in arriving at an agreed consensus on the future relevance of international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes in light of the emerging counter-proliferation strategy and the pre-emptive military threat postures by the United States to use massive military force (as it already has in Iraq), if necessary, against "enemy" major Third World states and enemy non-Third World states with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, or advancing to acquire those globally and regionally destructive capabilities.¹⁶

Politically, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Brazil, Egypt, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Iran, and North Korea have traditionally complained that the cold war and post-cold war nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes are unfair to the non-nuclear weapons states. They have argued that

current international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes are discriminatory and benefits the nuclear weapons states and their “friends” (i.e., major Third World and non-Third World states that have nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities not subject to the constant international recriminations or negative sanctions due to alliance commitments).¹⁷ They posit that the permanent division of the international security community into nuclear-have states and nuclear have-not states invites instability leading to systemic disorder.¹⁸

These states have refused to follow the dictates of the international community in strict adherence to these global and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes with the notable recent exception of Libya, who has decided to forego advancing the development of its embryonic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in exchange for normal diplomatic, political, economic, financial and trading relations with the United States and the international community.¹⁹ In this context, India and Pakistan have become “unofficial members” of the Club of Five, and they have decided to seek strategic political relations with the United States while modernizing their growing nuclear weapons and WMD stockpiles.²⁰

In the first instance, some major Third World states (North Korea and to a lesser extent, Iran) are secretly acquiring access to or indigenously developing nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, even at the risk of being shut out of the international political economy and foregoing the alleged benefits of positive (or friendly) relations with the United States and the nuclear weapons states.²¹ At a deeper political level, their political behavior suggests that they will not entrust their supreme national security interests to the five nuclear weapons states or to the UN Security Council (including Pakistan and India and to a lesser extent South Korea), in the event of a major escalation or crisis affecting their national independence.

In the second instance, a majority of Third World states are compromised by their low power status in the international security system. They are compelled (especially targeted are the non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear and WMD potential) to adhere to international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes by the nuclear weapons states’ threat(s) of negative sanctions or military force, led by the United States.²² These states have entered the twenty-first century in an extremely vulnerable national security position, while the rapid expansion and modernization of the nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities by the nuclear weapons states continues in full force. Under any normal national security scenario, if a major Third World state is attacked by a rogue Third World state or a global terrorist organization with nuclear weapons or WMD capabilities (or even by an advanced nuclear weapons state like the United States), they must either wait for the UN Security Council to act, or they must plea to the five nuclear weapons states to intervene to save what is left of their state and society.²³

It is highly unlikely that the UN Security Council or the nuclear weapons states will come to their rescue in a time-sensitive manner (if at all), resulting in either their partial devastation or their annihilation as sovereign states. The security benefits alleged to be part of the NPT bargain for major Third World states are not sufficient in and of themselves to provide minimum deterrence structures for national defense.²⁴ Presently, non-nuclear weapons states must depend on the rationality of an enemy not to use nuclear weapons or WMD capabilities, a very dangerous and high-risk national security planning scenario with possibly fatal national consequences. Moreover, major Third World states’ reliance on arms control mechanisms to prevent an enemy nuclear and/or WMD attack is also not dependable.²⁵ In the first case, if we assume that some nuclear and WMD-capable Third World states are rational unitary decision-makers, their decision not to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities cannot continue indefinitely, without a significant degradation in the high levels of threat emanating from the international and regional security environment. The critical assumption here is that they will ignore as long as it is tolerable the insecurity dilemma that the majority of Third World states face in the first decade of the twenty-first century.²⁶

In the second case, if we assume that some nuclear and WMD-capable Third World states are counter-rational or “crazy” decision-makers (as implied in the U.S. counterproliferation and non-proliferation security literatures), their historical decision not to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities will be of short time duration in order to meet the high levels of threat coming from international and regional security environments with survivable minimum deterrent forces. The critical assumption here is that they will address the insecurity dilemma they face by acquiring nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.²⁷ In either case, the national policy decision to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities will (can) occur under conditions of rationality or counter-rationality, even if it goes against the direct national security interests of the United States, the great powers, and powerful regional enemies.

Insecurity Dilemmas Faced by Major Third World States

The theoretical development of a new national security model in the nuclear and WMD proliferation domain(s) for major Third World states has not occurred yet, in regards to addressing their special insecurity requirements (and security) needs in the first decade of the twenty-first century.²⁸ The nuclear insecurity dilemma facing major Third World states is quite compelling: they must either depend on the positive security assurances offered by the nuclear weapons states or offered by the UN Security Council to successfully deter a nuclear or WMD attack from a nuclear

weapons state, a powerful regional enemy, a sophisticated global terrorist organization or a capable insurgent non-country group, or they must develop their own nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities to secure their national defense and permanent interests.²⁹

Historically, major Third World states' dependency on conventional military instruments—even at the higher end of the military technological spectrum—cannot guarantee them a minimum deterrence posture or for that matter, a positive war-fighting position in the international or regional threat environments of the future. The meaning of deterrence for major Third World states parallels in a sense the intellectual and philosophical debate in the U.S. strategic security literature on what deterrence means for the United States in the post-cold war threat environment.³⁰

Higher-end conventional military instruments are insufficient to deter or delay a determined attack by an enemy armed with nuclear weapons and/or WMD capabilities. However, higher end conventional military instruments allied with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities provide a sufficient minimum deterrence. There are two central military defense positions that major Third World states must consider in determining whether they will acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, assuming they have the available human, financial, and technological resources: the less is better nuclear rule and the more is better nuclear rule.³¹

Less is Better Nuclear and WMD Thinking

In the first case, “less is better nuclear and WMD thinking” dominates in the Third World. Major Third World states that purposely forego nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities have concluded that their supreme national security interests must take a back seat to the political, economic, trading, financial, and technological exchange benefits of having harmonious diplomatic relations with the nuclear weapons states, especially with the United States.³²

It is a precarious security position to be locked into, since the United States and the nuclear weapons states have not traditionally shown a dedicated willingness to intervene to protect major Third World states from external aggression, let alone from a potential nuclear and WMD attack from states with dedicated nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. The real deficit of security assurances for this category of major Third World states (except those coming from the UN Security Council, which is controlled by the nuclear weapons states' discriminatory voting regime) is not reassuring. While the majority of Third World states support the international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes (i.e., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the Comprehensive Test Ban Accord, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Warfare Convention, and related nonproliferation and WMD treaties and safeguard regimes), their long-term national security interests are profoundly threatened by the current modernization of strategic nuclear

weapons and WMD capabilities by the nuclear weapons states, as well as the near-total absence of security guarantees (positive or negative) from them.³³

The pursuit of self-help by major Third World states and the security benefits it brings has been stifled because of the absence of security guarantees (and confidence-building measures) from the nuclear weapons powers. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1970 NPT was supposed to provide definite “security benefits” to the non-nuclear weapons states in the Third World, the post-September 11th international and regional threat environments have degraded those “security benefits” because of the new U.S. strategic counterproliferation policy with its pre-emptive military option(s), which theoretically and practically threatens the sovereignty and interests of major Third World states.

Nonetheless, most major Third World states have opted to rely on the unreliable promises of the nuclear weapons states and/or the UN Security Council to come to their national defense, if a nuclear-armed and WMD-armed adversary attacks their homelands. They have decided to “forget” the minimum deterrence option and secure the positive political and economic benefits of nuclear and WMD non-proliferation cooperation with the nuclear weapons states. However, these strategic political decisions may well be temporary decision phenomena in the Third World, especially for those states who have the domestic capacity to produce nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities and who face legitimate global and regional security threats (i.e., Brazil, Iran, South Korea, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Egypt, and at the first world level, Japan and Germany).

In this context, the U.S. pre-emptive offensive strategy with its accompanying massive military strike at the Iraqi homeland in March 2003 clearly signaled to the Third World the real strategic value of a minimum deterrence posture (witness North Korea and potentially Iran).³⁴ The political consequences of the Bush administration's counter-proliferation strategy may in all likelihood encourage a real acceleration (not a de-acceleration) in the growth of secret nuclear and WMD proliferation initiatives among some insecure major Third World states with the domestic material resources, technical know-how, and international black market access, despite the recent political movement by Libya to allow the United States and the West to remove its developing nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.³⁵

It can be argued that Libya is a unique case in the non-proliferation debate since it was under severe U.S. and international sanctions for a long time because of its acts of terrorism worldwide and support for international terrorism. After it was revealed by U.S. and Western European intelligence sources that the West knew that Pakistan's Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was routing critical nuclear weapons design(s) and related nuclear weapons technological know how to Libya, its leadership decided to use its “potential” nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities as negotiating leverage to end crippling international sanctions and begin the bargaining to attract U.S. and Western political and economic assistance to rebuild Libya's shattered economy, crippled in-

dustrial economic infrastructure, and anemic oil industry.³⁶

There is some evidence to suggest that Libya has not really benefited from ending its nuclear weapons and WMD research development activities. Moreover, the United States and the West did not provide Libya with positive security assurances, and it still faces crippling restrictions in its political, economic and military relations with the United States.³⁷

More is Better Nuclear and WMD Thinking

In the second case, the view that “more nuclear and WMD is better” is closely held by some major Third World states.³⁸ Their national policy determination is that the security promises of the United States, the nuclear weapons states, and the UN Security Council are not strong or compelling enough to act as a “firewall” deterrence to externally-based nuclear and WMD aggression from known or unknown foes in the future.³⁹ Specifically, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities by this group of major Third World states is viewed as a natural policy development in meeting both minimum deterrence needs and general national security requirements, and it is not viewed as an “irrational” national policy decision to increase their influence in the international and regional security systems.

The nuclear weapons states’ negative (and, in some cases, positive) sanctions on this category of major Third World states are seen as unacceptable infringements on their national security interests and sovereignty.⁴⁰ Their decision calculus is that the economic and financial benefits of cooperation with the nuclear weapons states is outweighed by the strategic requirement(s) to advance their national security interests above all else. In their view, negative sanctions, although not desired or wanted, are necessary evils to be endured.⁴¹ While the functional utility of targeted and comprehensive sanctions is being debated in the United States and in the West, this minority of major Third World states has consciously ignored the debate by pursuing activist policies which increases (and not decreases) their nuclear and WMD options.⁴² Labeled as rogue states or worst, they are unaffected by such self-serving characterizations made by some of the nuclear weapons states, witness the counter-instrumental behavior of Iraq and the massive U.S. political and military reactions.⁴³

But unlike the Iraqi case, these major Third World states utilize “calculated ambiguity” to hide their nuclear weapons and WMD research design developments (and actual capabilities) from the international community, especially the United States.⁴⁴ They have not forcefully engaged the United States or the international community in obnoxious political ways to bring global attention to their nuclear weapons and WMD activities (except North Korea and to a lesser extent, Iran), which has allowed them to quietly build their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. The Gulf War I and the negative sanctions’ aftermath taught them not to publicly advertise their nuclear weapons and WMD capa-

bilities to the United States or the international community, or to act in a manner which would bring undue attention to their nuclear and WMD research and development activities.⁴⁵

In the current conflict between the United States and Iraq, the “calculated ambiguity” strategy followed by some major Third World states has been beneficial, although dangerous in the long run. Iran’s utilization of the calculated ambiguity strategy while allegedly pursuing nuclear energy research and development activities is viewed by the United States and Israel as a deceptive smoke screen to hide its development of nuclear weapons and other WMD capabilities. These types of secret actions have been the basis of recent western intelligence predictions that global proliferation is long-term threat to stability and peace.

Strategic Dimensions Driving the Nuclear Weapons and WMD Proliferation Threat

As outlined, this minority of major Third World states is the advanced guard of what will be an extremely unique nuclear and WMD security development in the early twenty-first century.⁴⁶ The creeping expansion and broader sophistication of the global proliferation threat beyond what currently exists will be the cardinal rule and may well threaten international security as it is now broadly defined. This section discusses the Western and Third World arguments against and for nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation. It concludes by outlining central elements of the global proliferation threat.

The Western Nuclear Weapons and WMD Argument

In the United States and the West in general, there are two conflicting views on the nature of the global proliferation threat. First, it is argued that the global nuclear and WMD threat is an incremental phenomena caused by either organized authoritarian systems or robust military security communities in the Third World.⁴⁷ It is posited that this Third World phenomena is best addressed by the enforcement and strengthening of existing international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes and through other legal and extralegal means. In this context, encouraging all non-nuclear weapons states in the Third World to strictly adhere to the central articles of the 1970 NPT and associated negotiated nonproliferation protocols is encouraged by the nuclear weapons states, encouraging major Third World states to return as signatories to the NPT (North Korea), as well as bringing into the NPT framework major Third World states who are presently not signatories of the treaty (Pakistan, India and Israel).⁴⁸ Furthermore, it is argued that a strongly enforced containment policy of positive sanctions, which distributes time-sensitive economic, financial, and trading benefits, as well as strengthening the security ben-

efits provided by the NPT will together maintain the international and regional nonproliferation line of defense.⁴⁹

The second argument is that the global proliferation threat is a national security state phenomenon, encouraged by cooperative political and military communities led by a “crazy leadership elite” within the major Third World state. The “crazy leadership elite” is usually depicted as dictatorial, brutal and a major danger to American and Western security interests. The historical and policy record indicates that the United States labels such regimes in the worst possible language and utilizes a dynamic political and diplomatic campaign to encourage international condemnation of the targeted Third World state with the goal(s) of initiating international economic sanctions or if necessary to implement a pre-emptive military strategy against it. This neo-conservative defense view posits that the threat of negative sanctions or the active use of massive military force will minimize the development of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in targeted major Third World states, and thereby reduce their direct threat to the security of the United States, the Western alliance, and international security in general.⁵⁰

However, neither argument is entirely correct because it is apparent that the nuclear weapons states’ nonproliferation approach has not deterred all major Third World states from seeking nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁵¹ On the one hand, states that do not seek nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities cannot do so because of either structural economic or technological constraints, among other important national reasons. Their lack of financial resources keeps them from sustaining access to the international black and grey markets to acquire nuclear materials and WMD technologies. On the other hand, states that acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities do so because they can; and they are not limited by economic, financial, technical or technological constraints. In addition, they can financially sustain access to the international black and grey markets to acquire nuclear materials and fuel and WMD technologies, or they can go overseas and steal these nuclear materials and fuel and WMD technologies and “rent” or kidnap the scientific and technological research personnel.⁵² It can be argued that major Third World acquiring nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are doing it for the same strategic political, policy, and operational reasons as Israel, including:

- to deter a conventional attack;
- to deter all levels of unconventional (chemical, biological, nuclear) attacks;
- to preempt enemy nuclear attacks;
- to support conventional preemption against enemy nuclear assets;
- to support conventional preemption against enemy non-nuclear (conventional, chemical, biological) assets; and
- for nuclear war-fighting (using neutron nukes, tactical nukes, micronukes, and tiny-nukes).⁵³

There are other U.S. and Western arguments to explain why states acquire or don’t acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities includes national prestige, leadership

changes, bureaucratic coalition building, technological modernization, and domestic electoral politics. These cold war and post-cold war arguments have long dominated the U.S. and Western debate on why states do or do not acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, to the point of intellectually excluding alternative explanations.⁵⁴

Major Third World Nuclear Weapons and WMD Argument

There is an intellectual argument from the Third World competing with the West’s primary position on why major Third World states pursue nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. This argument has a greater intellectual and moral legitimacy in the Third World, although it does not have the same intellectual persuasiveness in the American and Western nonproliferation and nuclear security literatures. Basically, it contends that the global proliferation issue is an ever evolving anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-status quo process strongly driven by maturing strategic cultures in some major Third World states and solidified by their search for national security. This strategic political process is a natural reaction by these maturing strategic cultures to many centuries of humiliation, degradation, embarrassment, exclusion, unequal treatment (and unequal treaties) and high levels of economic, political, cultural, and military subjugation to the West, and more recently, to the United States.

The search for global respect and power underlies the nuclear and WMD cultural dynamic in the Third World, especially in the case of states like Pakistan, India, North Korea, and increasingly by some important sectors of the Iranian strategic community.⁵⁵ The goal of this minority of Third World states is to find maximizing political solutions to advance their nuclear and WMD security interests in order to completely “reverse” the negative Western impact on their national independence and freedom of nuclear and WMD decision.⁵⁶ In their decision calculus, prevailing international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes are “artificial creations” of the nuclear weapons states and consequently are viewed as real impediments to both the expression and actualization of legitimate national nuclear security interests.

Paradoxically, national self-help is an integral component of this non-Western argument, and its policy currency is rising fast in the Third World. Its central prominence rests in the fact that the five nuclear weapons states have refused to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons and WMD arsenals towards nuclear disarmament levels as spelled out in the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related nonproliferation treaty protocols. Moreover, they have collectively resisted implementing robust policies to substantially accelerate their nuclear and WMD disarmament activities. At the same time, they have also decreased the benefits of self-help for non-nuclear weapons states by the active threat of negative sanctions, sweetened by publicly voiced cycles of positive sanctions. This imposed cold war compromise was accepted by most non-nuclear weapons states because of the contest between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

In the post-cold war period, complaints of nuclear weapons states practicing nuclear and WMD neo-colonialism are growing ever present among many major Third World states. The double standard in the global proliferation paradox is that the nuclear weapons states continue to modernize their extensive strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and unique chemical, biological, bacteriological, ballistic missile systems and other exotic advanced weapons capabilities, while at the same demanding that non-nuclear weapons states refrain from similar extended nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation activities, or move towards complete disarmament.⁵⁷ More specifically, the proliferation double standard also has political and diplomatic dimensions wherein states with nuclear and WMD capabilities are not humiliated or asked to reconsider their nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation positions (and become signatories of the 1970 NPT and abide by its central articles) by the United States and the nuclear weapons states if they are viewed as “friends” or “geopolitical allies” of convenience (including Israel, Pakistan and India), while other major Third World states are either humiliated and forced to move towards a non-proliferation policy position supported by the nuclear weapons states despite the prevalence of external national security threats.⁵⁸

The strategic cultural paradigm emerging among some major Third World states is generating concern among high governmental circles in the United States. There is the tacit understanding that the international security system is approaching the “window” of a multidimensional nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation threat, which is much more complex than previously acknowledged (especially given the recent Pakistani role in selling nuclear weapons technology and materials to other major Third World states, and the evidence of a highly secretive global nuclear weapons technology and fuel trading regime utilized by interested major Third World states).⁵⁹ This global proliferation threat will be a watershed in future international security relations between the nuclear-have states and the nuclear have-not states. The threat has been aggravated by asymmetrical global and regional nonproliferation treaties, which the United States and the nuclear weapons states have enforced through unequal treaties, negative sanctions, unbridled nationalism, and naked force.

In truth, a larger minority of major Third World states have not accepted these standing global and regional non-proliferation rules and values, including: 1) vertical proliferation has political hegemony over horizontal proliferation activities (i.e., we know what is best for the world rule); 2) vertical proliferation is legitimate and horizontal proliferation is illegitimate (i.e., we morally dictate what is best for the world rule); 3) vertical proliferation is an accepted security property in the international security system, while horizontal proliferation is not (i.e., we sanction what the rules are in the world); and 4) vertical proliferation is “good,” while horizontal proliferation is “bad” (i.e., we determine what the military basis of international peace and stability is in the world rule).⁶⁰ The Bush administration’s political

support for strengthening global and regional nonproliferation treaties (its central articles) and safeguard regimes includes the following demands:

- strengthen the treaty and the regime to prevent future noncompliance problems.
- perform a comprehensive review of all Treaty articles to untangle the co-mingling of the Treaty’s obligations and benefits (security).
- bring states outside the Treaty with nuclear weapons (with either un-safeguarded or safeguarded nuclear weapons programs, Israel, Pakistan, and India) back into the Treaty’s obligations.
- strengthen the Treaty so that non-nuclear weapons states that violate its principal Articles are encouraged to comply with their nonproliferation obligations (North Korea and Iran).
- strengthen the Treaty so that non-nuclear weapons states that withdraw from it are encouraged rejoin it (North Korea), terminate their nuclear weapons and WMD programs (Libya and South Africa) and observe all of the Articles of the Treaty.
- eliminate any conceptual or policy difference in the interpretation of the Articles in the Treaty with the strategic purpose of preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
- encourage the IAEA Board of Governors to create a special committee of the Board to strengthen compliance with safeguards agreements.
- affirm and reinforce implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.⁶¹

From a major Third World perspective, these standing U.S. and Western rules and values prevent the prudent search for a permanent nonproliferation consensus between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states. The bottom line is that the deep political tension created by the double standard has begun, on the part of some major Third World states, a strategic reevaluation of their adherence to even “acceptable” international nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes, despite their public diplomatic voice.

Specific Elements of the Nuclear Weapons and WMD Proliferation Threat

The reaction of some major Third World states to the Western double standard has sat into motion an array of sophisticated and covert counter-responses. These responses are not entirely hardware oriented, but they have more to do with the more important human (or software) elements in the maturing global proliferation threat, including:

- the emergence and growing maturation of nuclear and WMD strategic culture(s) in the Third World where strong internal debates on the merits of acquiring, deploying and exporting nuclear weapons technology and personnel are encouraged.

- the rise in the Third World of innovative nuclear and WMD scientific and technological research environments, the cultivation of advanced nuclear and WMD human resources expertise, the creative utilization of the Global Internet system for nuclear and WMD research and increasingly advanced and secret development of nuclear and WMD manufacturing capabilities.⁶²
- the broad development of strategic conceptual abilities by major Third World states' nuclear and WMD decision makers.⁶³
- the development of mini-max deterrence postures and related military doctrinal systems in the Third World; and
- the growth of a national political will to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in the Third World.⁶⁴

These important policy developments driving the emerging Third World strategic discourse requires a fuller explanation. First, the slow rise of nuclear and WMD strategic culture(s), practices and analysis is a revolutionary development in the Third World.⁶⁵

Its evolution has been triggered by nationalistic, racial, ethnic, and religious realignments in some major Third World states, as a healthy (or unhealthy) national security adjustment to the historically intrusive policies of the nuclear weapons states. Strategic culture is defined here as national decision-making authorities' ideological interpretation of and political behavior towards the external strategic political and military security environment, with the expressed goal of developing a geopolitical doctrine to guide future policy actions. A recent example of this new phenomena is the Pakistani nuclear military elite's nearly decade long distribution of nuclear weapons technologies and enriched fuel to countries in both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds for reasons of ideology, religion, and cash.⁶⁶ It is clear that these major Third World states are developing a compelling geo-security vision; and it is both anti-American and anti-Western in its content and direction.

Second, the institutional support of nuclear and WMD scientific, technological, and manufacturing research environments, the training of advanced nuclear and WMD research personnel in elite foreign and domestic universities and research institutes, the innovative scientific and technical exploitation of the global Internet system for nuclear and WMD information gathering and applications, and the funding of national nuclear and WMD manufacturing capabilities (hidden deep in state military security budgets) have arisen from the state's strategic culture guiding political decision making.

The ideological basis of major Third World states involved in nuclear weapons and WMD research and acquisition activities rests on all of the above elements. While future U.S. counter-proliferation planning and pre-emptive military actions will be targeted at convincing major Third World states to stop developing nuclear and WMD capabilities (destroying hardened nuclear and WMD sites if required), the future basis of nuclear and WMD development in major Third World states will be in possessing, utilizing,

and protecting a critical mass of expert scientific, technological and policy personnel, as well as in maintaining access to the international black and grey markets to acquire nuclear and WMD technologies and materials secretly and quickly, if geopolitical external events threatens their supreme security interests.

Third, the strategic conceptual abilities of decision-makers in the Third World have grown because of their involvement in regional wars, their close study of western strategic cultural behavior and military actions over time, and long-standing joint command and training exercises with the militaries of the great and medium powers. Close interaction (and secret cooperation) between the military establishments of major Third World states has also increased their strategic conceptualizing abilities to both learn and apply new military doctrines and tactics, especially in the nuclear and WMD domain. States that have cooperated with the United States include Israel and to a lesser extent, India and Pakistan. In any case, these combined activities over time have strengthened the decision-making foresight and planning capabilities of those national authorities concerned with satisfying their national nuclear and WMD security requirements.

Notwithstanding the gross strategic mistakes made by the Iraqi leadership during and after Gulf War I and in the current contest with the United States and the United Nations in the post Gulf War II era, major Third World decision-makers have "learned" to both formulate and implement their nuclear and WMD policy positions with prudence and foresight.

Fourth, some major Third World states have decided that the pursuit of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities is of the highest political priority (including Pakistan, India, and North Korea).⁶⁷ Presently, Iran continues to suggest that it is not developing nuclear weapons but is engaged in nuclear energy research. It is very possible that Iran, if it continues its present course, could develop a full-blown nuclear energy program while a member of the NPT community and rapidly developed a minimum deterrent nuclear force.⁶⁸ Despite the virulent objections of the international community and of the nuclear weapons states, these states are developing a broad and diverse array of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities (along with advanced conventional military forces) driven by a national political will to succeed.⁶⁹

On a related front, there is a group of major Third World states (Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea) with the national political will (and the human, economic, scientific and technological resources) to develop nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. They have decided not to do so because of extreme pressures from the United States, the international community in the past, and domestic political problems. Negative changes in the international or regional security environments could, however, trigger a major nuclear and WMD capabilities buildup on their part, absent active American counter-proliferation intervention to stop them.⁷⁰

Fifth, a small minority of major Third World states realize that nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities have an intrinsic defensive (and offensive) function which closely fits in with their national political priorities.⁷¹ In the Third World, the defensive doctrine of minimum deterrence, wherein a small but survivable nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities may be sufficient to deter an external nuclear or WMD attack from the hegemon, the great powers or regional enemies, is gaining increasing policy importance. Minimum deterrence requires that a major Third World state possess advanced military capabilities of a kind which would force a potential attacker to reconsider a threat of nuclear blackmail or a nuclear attack (e.g., India's concern about Pakistan and the Peoples' Republic of China or Iran's concern about Israel's sophisticated nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities).⁷² Fear would force the potential attacker to assess the level of unacceptable national damage that would occur, if he went through with the nuclear blackmail threat or launches a lethal nuclear strike. Iraq is as an example of a major Third World state that did not have operational nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities when it attacked Kuwait during the Gulf War I. If it had, a minimum deterrence status might have prevented its national devastation by the United States and the international community and later on its invasion and countrywide occupation by American military forces in 2003.

Finally, the national will to acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are part and parcel of the emerging Third World realities already discussed. National will is the strategic willingness of non-Western national decision-making authorities not to adhere to international and regional nuclear and WMD nonproliferation norms and safeguard regimes and to act only in the supreme national interests of the state. Specifically, it requires that national decision-making authorities secretly pursue nuclear and WMD acquisition policies to their logical end (and at all costs), in order to acquire the nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities consistent with the state's minimum deterrence needs, thereby informing its overall national security objectives. There is no available evidence to suggest that all or some of these nuclear weapons and WMD policies are not being pursued in the present international security climate and in all likelihood, they may will accelerate in the decades ahead.

The total (or partial) dismissal of these new strategic developments by Western security experts, intelligence officials, and strategic policymakers ignores the compelling fact that some major Third World countries are rapidly advancing in these areas, whether there is "tangible evidence" or not.⁷³ This is not a surprising finding. The recent discovery of elite elements in the Pakistani scientific and military establishment distributing nuclear technology, nuclear know how, and enriched uranium worldwide to major Third World states for over twenty years without being closed down by Western intelligence agencies shows how serious (and destabilizing) these new strategic developments have been.⁷⁴ Recent U.S. political demands to control these global and

regional nuclear weapons and WMD activities includes the following:

- address the central issue of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations.
- significant expansion of intelligence sharing among military and law enforcement organizations to shut down illegal laboratories (Proliferation Security Initiative).
- freeze the assets of rogue scientists, and aid in their capture.
- stricter international border controls.
- more generous funding for legitimate scientists working in sensitive areas to ensure they are not corrupted by potential nuclear traffickers.
- that states sign the International Atomic Energy's Additional Protocol on inspections are allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs.
- that the 40-nation Nuclear Suppliers' Group not sell uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing equipment to any country that does not already possess such technology, and for all states currently working to acquire such enrichment capabilities renounce those efforts.⁷⁵

There is a prevailing strategic ethnocentrism and policy arrogance on the part of the United States (and by Western countries in general) that assumes major Third World states would not dare do what they do, cannot do what they do well, cannot strategically think as they do, cannot plan for their unique nuclear and WMD security needs, cannot develop sophisticated nuclear and WMD technologies or develop accompanying national authority decision structures to use these exotic military technologies effectively. This Western operational bias also posits that these actual (or potential) nuclear and WMD developments are long-term and are really not worth worrying about or planning for right now because they are just too "outlandish." This form of false thinking is dangerous.⁷⁶

The Unaccepted Truths Behind the Nuclear and WMD Acquisition and Deployment Strategies of Major Third World States

Unnoticed in the global proliferation debate is that some major Third World states' quest for nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities has gained increasing support from domestic strategic elites and important military leadership, religious and ideological elements in the state and civic society. In the post-Gulf War and U.S./Iraqi crisis periods underlying the international security environment, this quest is informed by increasing fear and growing insecurity: fear of the "neo-imperialist" intentions and massive military capabilities of the United States and of the great powers;

and driven by national insecurity in part generated from internal domestic pressures and regional enemies. The domestic strategic elite(s) is composed of the central ruling group, including various political, security, economic, scientific, religious and cultural organizations. The military leadership includes the armed services, including Special Forces, special intelligence and counter-intelligence groups, and in some cases, secret nuclear and WMD assault formations. On the one hand, domestic strategic elites basically support the acquisition (and deployment) of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities to both protect the state and maintain their political legitimacy. Their self-interests are aligned with the national security ethos of the state. The primacy of sovereignty and independence is the basis of these permanent self-interests, as well as the basis of their power and privileges within the state.

The military leadership supports both the acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in order to expand their high technology military budgets and broaden their national security mission statement; and it is consistent with their stated security mission, as well as in encouraging a stronger “bond” with the domestic strategic elite. In some cases, this power relationship may be reversed, with the military leadership acting as the central political authority in the state, with the domestic strategic elite operating in a subordinate decision-making capacity. In this circumstance, there is much more political incentive for the military to pursue nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.

This national consensus between the domestic strategic elite and the military leadership of the state is mutually beneficial, and it allows for the development of a broader agreement between other important sectors of the nation on the nuclear and WMD issue as well. In this context, the prohibitive costs of geo-economic, geo-psychological, and geo-cultural warfare sanctions by the nuclear weapons states is integrated into the calculus of the targeted nation’s long-term nuclear and WMD decision-making. Even in scenarios where military force by the United States is used to either disarm or destroy the initial nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities of a major Third World state, the latter may have in strategic reserve nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities for either defensive or offensive purposes. Again, the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean cases are demonstrative of this growing consensus in the Third World.

The dynamic strength of the nuclear weapons and WMD programs in North Korea, India, Pakistan (and to a lesser extent Iran), among others major Third World countries, is reflected in the rich variation of acquisition, concealment and counter deception practices being pursued by these powers. Their nuclear and WMD practices are unique because of the country-by-country variation arising from the particular strategic culture and because of the special nature of the national leadership of the state. The similarities in the nuclear weapons and WMD acquisition practices of major Third World states may include but are not limited to:

- the covert manipulation of the international arms market (black and gray).
- the promotion of secret nuclear and WMD trading relations with global arms marketers and high technology corporations in the Western world and non-Western world.
- the encouragement of bilateral technology and scientific relations with the great and medium powers interested in doing (secret) business with them, as well as with major Third World states or groups with major Third World states willing to trade, sell or barter their nuclear weapons, WMD and ballistic missile technologies.
- indigenous efforts to develop nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities by importing (or buying) foreign scientists and militarized high technology systems from friendly (and enemy) states.
- the development of interlocking (and top secret) military technological and scientific cooperation among major Third World states.⁷⁷
- the secret encouragement of nuclear and WMD high technology thefts from both friendly and enemy countries (the recent U.S. intelligence reports that Russian nuclear military research centers and nuclear arms despoths have lost “unknown” amounts of enriched uranium).⁷⁸
- sophisticated reverse engineering of imported (or stolen) of nuclear and WMD high technology systems and high technology sub-systems.⁷⁹

During the Cold War, these increasingly sophisticated practices and relations were commonplace. What is very different in the first decade of the twenty-first century is that their utilization are now integral elements in the nuclear weapons and WMD acquisition policies of some major Third World states and, they are potentially accessible to major Third World states who chose to use them in the future.

Present and Future Directions in the Nuclear and WMD Concealment Policies by Major Third World States

The nuclear and WMD concealment (and counter-deception) policies of some major Third World states are increasingly sophisticated since the end of Gulf War I.⁸⁰ The reasons for these deep stealth practices include: 1) grave uncertainty about their national security and political economic futures; 2) strong fears of the intentions of nearby friendly and enemy states; and 3) irrational (or extra-rational) strategic calculations of the long-term military, technological, and economic threats posed by the United States and the great powers (recently aggravated by U.S. counter-proliferation policy and pre-emptive military invasion of Iraq and to a lesser extent the rising levels of diplomatic and military threats aimed at North Korea and Iran). The secret acquisition of nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities,

without regard to international and regional nuclear nonproliferation treaties or associated safeguard regimes may well become commonplace events in the twenty-first century.⁸¹

On these basis, U.S. counter-proliferation strategy and pre-emptive military planning will face extremely difficult security challenges from some major Third World states beyond what is currently imagined or what is now being heatedly argued.⁸² These strategic military challenges will come from major Third World states pushed to the far margins of the international security system and with some of them operating within nuclear and WMD security “alliances.” These alliances will be closed-ended, well financed, well managed, and dedicated to acquiring nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁸³ Moreover, these alliances will be integrated learning entities, capable of extracting, sharing, and applying strategic military lessons, advanced dual technologies, and strategic concealment practices gleaned from the activities of nuclear weapons states.

Concealment practices are a very important component in the nuclear and WMD acquisition and development architectures of some major Third World states. Their singular purpose is to deceive, frustrate, distract, hide, cloak, delay, and confuse the technological and human-tasked surveillance methods and intrusive intelligence activities of the nuclear weapons states and their regional enemies.⁸⁴ These advanced “black arts” are refined, redeveloped, and repackaged to prevent the nuclear weapons states and their regional enemies from penetrating their unique deception and counter-deception systems. The defensive ability of these systems to prevent external discovery is extremely robust, since the national security of the state is involved.

Iraq is clearly the ultimate deception and counter-deception model for future trends in this important area.⁸⁵ Given the mixed inspection and verification record of United Nations officials, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and Western intelligence services (i.e., the CIA and Mossad) in ferreting out nuclear and WMD programs in that country, the Iraqi model is now being rigorously studied in major Third World states’ policy sciences and specialized military academies.⁸⁶ The present and future deception practices of some major Third World states may include the following:

- the non-inclusion of nuclear and WMD research articles in domestic refereed and non-referred scientific or technological journals, while accessing and monitoring all U.S. and other high technology countries’ scientific and technological journals. This informational strategy also includes the transfer of all internal written nuclear and WMD documents to computer disk technology, to prevent location and discovery by extra-national intrusive agents.⁸⁷
- the protection of all high-valued nuclear and WMD scientists and technicians in securely dispersed national, regional, and local research sites. This human resource personnel strategy also includes the secret abduction of foreign scientists and technicians from their home countries or the direct purchase of the skills of foreign

scientists and technicians with highly valuable nuclear and WMD expertise.

- the countrywide distribution of all strategic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in mobile and irregular urban and rural concealment patterns.
- hiding large and medium sized nuclear weapons and WMD research and development manufacturing systems (as well as their numbers) deep underground, under river systems, inside large mountains, inside super hardened bunkers, or in artificially created urban and rural environments.
- erecting sophisticated “dummy” nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities to (temporarily or permanently) fool U.S. and Western surveillance during periods of critical testing or during the initial development of a major crisis event.
- the wide displacement of critical nuclear weapons and WMD technology components for real-time “total or partial assembly” before or during expected major crisis events.
- the utilization of advanced deception and misinformation methods to test nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.
- the monitoring of U.S. and Western surveillance practices to develop counter-surveillance strategies, in order to develop all nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities in secret.
- the sophisticated manipulation of advanced computer and cyber warfare technologies to mislead U.S. and Western counter-information and counter-cyber efforts on domestic nuclear and WMD activities.⁸⁸
- the increasing utilization of both psychological warfare and propaganda activities to convince international publics that domestic nuclear and WMD activities do not exist, and
- the use of advanced political diplomacy techniques to manipulate stronger powers, win allies, and prevent external military attacks against domestic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁸⁹

These “cloak and hide” practices are only suggestive of the ways in which some major Third World states are both acquiring and concealing their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities at all levels of development. More imaginative practices will be developed and are being developed, as a direct and indirect function of the increasingly robust counter-acquisition and counter-concealment technological and intelligence gains made by the United States and the West against them. The political implications of these evolving practices — given the current proliferation intelligence deficit in the United States (and in the West) and the seeming inability of its central intelligence community to close it — may evolve into such a high level of extreme sophistication that the application of successful anti-acquisition and anti-concealment strategies may prove very difficult and costly to maintain.

Conclusion

This study has essentially argued that minimum deterrence is the new praxis informing nuclear and WMD decision-making and acquisition in some major Third World states, in order to maintain their security and freedom of action. The creation of an ancillary knowledge paradigm based on understanding non-Western theories and practices influencing the global and regional proliferation threat phenomena is required. The emerging strategic security literatures developing in India, Pakistan and in other major Third World states may well become the intellectual and ideological foundation of this new paradigm for reengaging them to return to the NPT and safeguard regimes.⁹⁰

The strict reliance on the theories and approaches informing American and Western nonproliferation (and counter-proliferation) policy analysis and decision making, which has failed to anticipate where non-Western nuclear and WMD trends are headed and what they mean, is both paternalistic and self-serving in fully explaining current and emerging proliferation trends in the Third World. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, the pursuit of very sophisticated conventional and non-conventional land, air, and sea warfare systems will be part and parcel of their desire to strengthen both overall national security planning and improve the quality of their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, given the real lack of WMD cooperation and nuclear technology and fuel export controls agreement between these states and the nuclear weapons states.⁹¹ This strategic trend is consistent with some major Third World states building a compelling minimum deterrence posture to deter the great powers from attacking them in the post U.S./Iraqi environment.

Moreover, some major Third World states (or sub-actors within the state including the military, scientists and other important elites as we have seen with the Pakistan nuclear proliferation crisis) will continue to assist other major Third World states through the secret sharing or selling of critical nuclear design technology, nuclear materials and uranium fuel and WMD technologies. They will do so to satisfy their particular strategic ideological, religious, political, cultural and profit-making reasons and because of their fear, anger and dissatisfaction with the United States and the West.⁹² There is also a danger of the secret transfer of nuclear weapons and WMD technology to global terrorist groups from certain major Third World states as well.⁹³

At this writing, there is no convincing empirical evidence that the nuclear weapons states will “rapidly build down” their strategic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities towards significant nuclear disarmament levels as outlined in the NPT and related protocols or fundamentally alter the international military system towards less dangerous levels of threat for the weak powers.⁹⁴ Although it is argued that the SALT, START, Moscow Treaty (2002) and related arms reduction processes indicates a strong willingness on the part of the United States and the Russian Federation to continue to “build down” strategic nuclear weapons sys-

tems and accelerate battlefield and tactical nuclear systems reductions in the future (while Britain, France, and the PRC modernize their strategic nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities), it is still the case that their strategic nuclear weapons and WMD inventories suggest power, prestige, and security to those states without them. In this context, the evolving national nuclear and WMD decision-making abilities of some major Third World states will continue to develop and mature. These states do not possess the sophistication of the great powers’ strategic nuclear and WMD systems, and therefore remain very vulnerable (even with minimum deterrence) to the great powers’ massive retaliatory and precision-oriented nuclear and WMD strike forces. The bottom line is that these states are (temporarily) deterred from attacking the great powers, given their weak nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities.⁹⁵

At the same time, they will react defensively using their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities as an integral component of an active deterrent defense posture.⁹⁶

However, some major Third World states will pose a serious strategic challenge to the international security system (and the great powers) by the middle of the twenty-first century, precisely because they want to both reduce their national security vulnerability and increase their minimum deterrence posture.⁹⁷ If the history of military conflict between the West and the Third World is anywhere suggestive, the latter will not be significantly deterred from future military conflicts with the United States or with the other nuclear weapons states when their supreme national security interests are severely threatened.⁹⁸ A most likely strategic consequence of this multiple-level military threat from the Third World (a nuclear-armed North Korea, for example) may well be a real alteration in the “deep structure” of the post-cold war international and regional security system(s), tilting it towards increased crisis instability and, in some cases, towards strategic instability.⁹⁹

Endnotes

1. The international problem of nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation ranks as the number one security challenge to the global community of nations. The potential threat of an international nuclear holocaust occurring because of the spread of nuclear weapons grows more ominous as time goes on. This international nonproliferation security analysis lays out the political and policy problems facing and confounding relations the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states, outlining their contending views on the fairness and benefits of international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes, as well as the long-term implications of U.S. counterproliferation strategy and pre-emptive military policies towards major Third World states. See Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, eds., *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States*

- and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945–1970 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2004) and Bernard I. Finel, *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003).
2. Paul Richter, “Bush, El-Baradei to Discuss Safeguarding Nuclear Technology,” *Los Angeles Times*, 15 March 2004, p. A3. See Jason Ellis, “Beyond Nonproliferation: Secondary Supply, Proliferation Management and US Foreign Policy,” *Comparative Strategy* 20 (January 2001): 25–43 and Christophe Soule, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons,” *Futuribles* 290 (October 2003): 63–66.
 3. The debate on “rogue nations” has been defined in the United States and in the West as those state actors who have or are acquiring nuclear (and radiological) weapons and WMD (chemical, biological, bacteriological, and ballistic missile) capabilities threatening international security and stability. See Wyn O. Bowen, *The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Although there is a semantic distinction between rogue behavior and rogue states, this distinction falls into obscurity depending on who is doing the defining. See Guarav Kampani, “Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 9 (Winter 2002–2003): 107–116 and Sumit Garguly, “Pakistan, The Other Rogue Nation,” *Current History* 103 (April 2004): 147–50. At the same time, the Bush administration’s “axis of evil” is a logical rhetorical continuation of the “rogue nations” definition. For in-depth analysis, see Noy Thrupkaew, “Tilting on the Axis (of Evil),” *American Prospect* 14 (February 2003): 34–36; Ahrari M. Ehsan, “Rogue States and NMD/TMD Policies in Search of a Rationale?” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12 (2001): 63–100; Eric Herring, “Rogue Rage: Can We Prevent Mass Destruction?” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 23 (2000): 188–212; and Raymond Muhula, “Rogue Nations, States of Concern, and Axes of Evil: Examining the Politics of Disarmament in a Changing Geopolitical Context,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 14 (2003): 76–95. For an earlier series of articles on rogue states and rogue state behavior see Oleg Bukharin, “Problems of Nuclear Terrorism,” *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control* 2 (Winter–Spring 1996): 3–4; Richard T. Cupitt, “Target Rogue Behavior, Not Rogue States,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 3 (Winter 1996): 46–54; Martyn Pipper, *Deterrence, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Security Assurances: A European Perspective* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1996); Kim Murphy, “‘Rogue Nation’ or Terrorist Poses Serious Nuclear Threat, Perry Says,” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 January 1995, p. A4; and Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
 4. There is much misinformation on which major Third World or non-Third World states are pursuing nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities and which are not. However, it is clear that improved nonproliferation enforcement and nuclear weapons states’ decision to strengthen the NPT and safeguard regimes is clashing with a frantic search by non-nuclear weapons states for national security based on a credible minimum deterrence in an increasingly threatening international security environment. See Richard Butler, “Improving Nonproliferation Enforcement,” *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (2003): 133–45 and Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Proliferation and ‘Realistic Deterrence’ in a New Century,” *European Security* 11 (2002): 33–47.
 5. In the second Bush administration, the “nuclear hawks” include Jack Crouch, Deputy National Security Adviser; Robert Joseph, Undersecretary for Arms Control; and John Rood, White House Special Adviser. See Guy Dinmore, “US Allies Fret at Hard Line of ‘Nuclear Hawks’,” *Financial Times*, 5–6 February 2005, p. 5. Current nuclear weapons planning and design activities organized by the U.S. Defense Department and conducted in various U.S. nuclear weapons research laboratories to build more lethal and accurate nuclear armaments for battlefield, tactical, and heavy strategic targeting objectives in Third World and non-Third World threat environments may actually encourage an acceleration of negative nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation events in the Third World. While a majority of these new nuclear systems are in the research and design stage(s), there is a strong likelihood that some if not all of these systems may be mass-produced in the future to reinforce U.S. strategic deterrence and pre-emption military capabilities. For an excellent history on U.S. efforts to discourage strategic nuclear proliferation, see Henry D. Sokolski. *Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2001).
 6. Charles L. Thornton, “The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 9 (2002): 135–52 and Michael Barletta, “After 9/11: Preventing Mass Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation,” *Nonproliferation Studies* 4 (May 2002): 1–74.
 7. The prevailing view that major Third World states acquire nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities to directly threaten the United States and the Western alliance fails to take into full account the

former's strategic interests. See Gawdat Bagdat, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq and Iran," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 28 (Winter 2003): 423–49; Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security," *The Nonproliferation Review* 7 (Fall–Winter 2000): 106–22; Henry F. Cooper, "The Rising Threat of Missile Proliferation," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 21 (Winter 1996): 371–82; Lewis Dunn, "Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear Powers," *Washington Quarterly* 17 (1994): 5–25; and Lewis Dunn, *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).

8. See Derek D. Smith, "Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Security Studies* 12 (Summer 2003): 152–97. The counterproliferation strategy of the Bush administration towards Iran in 2005 may well have to reconsider its hard-line policy and provide positive incentives to convince Iran to mothball its dynamic nuclear weapons programs, recommending Iran's entry into the World Trade Organization and underwriting significant economic, financial, and trading benefits to Iran in alliance with the European Community (Britain, France, and Germany) (Sonni Efron, "U.S. Weighs Change of Tactics to Discourage Iran's Nuclear Aims," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 March 2005, p. A8).
9. There is a robust cottage industry in the United States and Western Europe focused on developing the advanced military means (and the intellectual justification) to confront and disarm major Third World states with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities or those states secretly and rigorously moving in that direction. While Western alliance policy is the central construct for maintaining and advancing international and regional nonproliferation treaties and related safeguard regimes, the United States has taken the strategic counterproliferation leadership in the Western alliance by arguing for the use of extraordinary military and political/diplomatic/economic measures to either convince or force major Third World states to give up their nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. The Bush administration's approach to major Third World states pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities has its historical and intellectual origins in the 1990s (some analysts argue even earlier) when a veritable cascade of journal articles and authoritative books were produced in the United States by defense neo-conservatives and conservatives alike arguing for a more interventionist U.S. policy to prevent nuclear and WMD proliferation. For a wide-ranging discussion on the policy origins on of U.S. counterproliferation doctrine and its pre-emptive military strategy, see Ashton Carter, "Overhauling Counterproliferation," *Technology in Society* 26 (April–August 2004): 257–69; Martin Butcher, "What Wrongs Our Arms May Do: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation," *Physicians for Social Responsibility* (August 2003): 18–108; Robert Litwak, "Non-Proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change," *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003–2004): 7–31; and Daryl G. Kimball, "Turning Away From Nuclear Weapons," *Arms Control Today* 33 (July–August 2003): 1–2. For an earlier set of well-argued analysis on the U.S. counterproliferation focus and pre-emptive military strategies, see Angelo Cordevilla, "Counterproliferation and Beyond," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1995): 142–93; Pete V. Domenici, "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (1995): 145–52; Natalie J. Goldring, "Skittish on Counterproliferation," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 52 (March 1994): 12–13; Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspective on Counterproliferation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1995); Walter L. Kirchner and Joseph F. Pilat, "The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (1995): 153–66; James Kitfield, "Counterproliferation," *Air Force Magazine* (October 1995): 56–59; Steven M. Kosiak, *Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation: Investing for a Safer World?* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, 1995); Thomas W. Lippman, "If Nonproliferation Fails, Pentagon Wants Counterproliferation," *The Washington Post*, 1994, p. A11; Angus McColl, "Is Counterproliferation Compatible with Nonproliferation?" *Airpower Journal* 11 (Spring 1997): 99–109; Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "Counterproliferation" Putting New Wine in Old Bottles," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (1995): 143–54; Barry R. Schneider, "Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1994): 209–34; Gregory F. Treverton, *Integrating Counterproliferation in Defense Planning* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1997); and R.F. Goheen, "Problems of Proliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World," *World Politics* 35 (January 1983): 194–215.
10. The debate on whether democratic states with massive nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities possesses moral hegemony over those non-democratic states with minimum nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities is an extremely important issue which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. At first glance, the United States, Britain and France are

“democratic states” and the Peoples’ Republic of China and the Russian Federation are not. In the realist universe, moral hegemony is based on the preponderance of hard and soft power capabilities and by that definition the democratic states exercise moral hegemony, a situation that is much resented by Russia and China. Second, the political question of whether major Third World democracies with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities (e.g., India) and those that are not democratic states (e.g., North Korea, Pakistan and perhaps Iran in the future) with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are constantly lectured and threatened by democratic states in the West that they cannot secure their national nuclear security interests has generated over time great resentment in the Third World. See Sean Malloy, “The Realist Logic of International Security,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 38 (June 2003): 91–95 and T.V. Paul. *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forego Nuclear Weapons* (Quebec, Canada: McGill-Queen University Press, 2000).

11. The American and Western nonproliferation literature does not exhaustively explore the universe of nuclear and WMD security requirements of major Third World states. This state of affairs is understandable because of the international consensus led by the United States and the Western alliance that nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are destabilizing in the hands or under the control of major Third World states. Peter Dombrowski and Rodger Payne, “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine,” *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (November 2003): 395–408. However, the one-sidedness of the Western debate suggests that there may not be a real possibility of a rational discussion on the legitimate national security requirements of major Third World states, whenever (positive or negative) security guarantees from the nuclear weapons states are not forthcoming or not viewed as reliable when offered and whenever the international security environment become too threatening to non-nuclear weapons states. Some major Third World analysts argue that the theoretical and conceptual “apartheid” embedded in the nuclear and WMD literature is driven by U.S. neoconservative and conservative academics and policy analysts, with the structural effect that their alleged intellectual analysis is (mis)-informing the actions of international and regional nonproliferation decision makers. See Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” *Foreign Affairs* 77 (1998): 41–52 and Jaswant Singh, “Obstacles in the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons,” *U.S.I. Journal* 128 (April–June 1998): 155–61. However, the literature focuses liberally on the global security needs of the nuclear weapons states in future conflict situations, instances where WMD-actual or WMD-capable Third World states may pose strategic threats to U.S. and Western national interests. See Donald G. Boudreau. “On Advancing Non-Proliferation,” *Strategic Analysis* 14 (February 1992): 327–42 and Jane Nolan, Peter Rodman, John Simpson, Gary Milhollin, and Harald Muller, “The Counter-Proliferation Debate: Are Military Measures or Other New Initiatives Needed to Supplement the Non-Proliferation Regime?” A panel discussion from the *Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Challenges of A New Era*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (12–18 November 1993), p. 32. In a post-cold war environment where nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities are growing more sophisticated among the nuclear weapons states—creating novel security uncertainties as the new century unfolds—analytical questions which do not fully examine the nuclear and WMD proliferation issue from all legitimate perspectives goes against the established scientific traditions of strategy and action.
12. The issue of nuclear disarmament and ending the role and weight of nuclear weapons in the international security system is a very “squishy” policy problem. The United States and the four nuclear weapons states posit that they will inevitably reduce their strategic nuclear weapons and other advanced nuclear capabilities down to zero in the future, while they acknowledge that they must continue to improve and recalibrate their nuclear arsenals to maintain their respective strategic deterrence postures. See John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” *Foreign Affairs* (January–February 2005): 49–60. From the Third World perspective, the five nuclear weapons states are not moving fast enough to disarm; and they feel increasingly threatened by the unstable international and regional threat environments. See Lawrence S. Wittner. *Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to Present* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); Jonathan Schell, “The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” *CDI Monthly* 3 (1998): 72–77; and J.D. Holum, “The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament: The U.S. View,” *Journal of International Affairs* 51 (Summer 1997): 263–81.
13. Derek D. Smith, “Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Security Studies* 12 (Summer 2003): 152–97 and William Hartung, “Prevention, Not Intervention: Curbing the Nuclear Threat,” *World Policy Journal* 19 (Winter 2002–2003): 1–11.
14. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, eds., *Deadly Arsenal-Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington,

- D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002); Douglas Pasternak and Tim Zimmermann, "Critical Mass: Counterproliferation Measures," *U.S. News and World Report*, 17 April 1995, pp. 39–45; and Tim Zimmermann, "Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough," *Orbis* 38 (Winter 1994): 67–82.
15. Jonathan Peterson, "Iraq's Defiance Keeps Chance of Strikes Alive," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 November 1998, pp. A1–A10.
 16. Ilan Bermand, "The Bush Strategy at War," *The National Interest* 74 (Winter 2003–2004): 51–57.
 17. Some major Third World states have not incurred the same intensity or longevity of political, economic, and military sanctions applied by the United States and other nuclear weapons states, as have other major Third World states that pursued nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities. This is one of the main problems with the international and regional nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regime(s) that major Third World states are most upset with, and which they frequently refer to as a blatant double standard. See Tyler Marshall, "South Asia Testing May Blast a Hole in 3-Decade-Old Double Standard," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 June 1998, p. A12 and Jim Mann, "U.S. Respect Only A Nuke or Two Away," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 June 1998, p. A5. It is interesting to note that Iraq and most recently Libya are no longer members of the anti-Western school of thought on nonproliferation and proliferation, the former because of invasion and occupation by the United States and its coalition allies and the latter because it sees its long-run interests best met through alliance or semi-formal relations with the United States and the West.
 18. Richard Falkenrath, "Weapons of Mass Reaction: Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Harvard International Review* 22 (May 2000): 52–55.
 19. See Patrick E. Tyler, "Pakistan Called Libyans Source of Atom Design," *New York Times*, 6 January 2004, pp. A1–A11; Raymond Bonner and Craig S. Smith, "Pakistani Said To Have Given Libya Uranium," *New York Times*, 21 February 2004, pp. A1–A6; John Burton, Stephen Fidler and Mark Husband, "Pakistani Ring 'Fed Libya Nuclear Parts,'" *Financial Times*, 21–22 February 2004, p. 1; Douglas Frantz, "Libya Arms Development Surprises U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 February 2004, p. A1; Mark Huband, "Libya Had Diverse Nuclear Weapons Programme, Says IAEA," *Financial Times*, 21–22 February 2004, p. 3; John Burton, "Malaysia's Respected New Premier Falls Foul of Climate of Corruption," *Financial Times*, 18 March 2004, p. P3; Michele Dunne, "Libya: Security is not Enough," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 32 (2004): 8–15; and George Joffe, "Libya: Who Blinkered, and Why" *Current History* 103 (2004): 221–25.
 20. It is interesting to note that U.S. foreign political and economic sanctions against India and Pakistan during the cold war period to prevent their development and deployment of nuclear weapons ultimately failed to work because of the countervailing supreme national security interests of the two South Asian states. See Guatam Adhikari, "India and America: Estranged No More," *Current History* 103 (April 2004): 158–64; Mohammed Ayoob, "South Asia's Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 45 (Winter 2001): 123–34; Jerome Conley, *Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001); Timothy D. Hoyt, "Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Danger of Strategic Myopia," *Asian Survey* 41 (November 2001): 956–77; Mohammed Ayoob, "Nuclear India and Indian-American Relations," *Orbis* 43 (Winter 1999): 59–74; Samir K. Sen, "He Who Rides a Tiger: The Rationale of India's Nuclear Tests," *Comparative Strategy* 18 (1999): 129–36; and Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking with the Past* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997).
 21. While Iran is currently pursuing nuclear energy self-sufficiency in a country rich in hydroelectric potential and oil and gas resources, it also operates a vast secret nuclear research infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons if it so decides. Recently, there has emerged new information suggesting that black market nuclear suppliers twenty years ago secretly offered Iran a veritable shopping list of nuclear weapons design and nuclear technologies required to build a sophisticated a nuclear weapons production center, but the nation's leadership turned down the offer. See Douglas Frantz, "Gaps Seen in Iran's Nuclear Disclosure," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2004, p. A3; William J. Broad, "Uranium Traveled to Iran Via Russia, Inspectors Find," *New York Times*, 28 February 2004, p. A4; Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak, "Debating Iran's Nuclear Aspirations," *Washington Quarterly* 26 (Autumn 2003): 99–114; Ray Takeyh, "Iran's Nuclear Calculations," *World Policy Journal* 20 (Summer 2003): 21–28; and Michael Eisenstadt, "Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges for the United States," *Arms Control Today* 31 (March 2001): 15–22.
 22. David Cortright, ed., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Sanctions* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Barbara Slavin, "Sanctions May Be Losing Favor As Top Policy Weapon," *USA Today*, 25 June 1998, p. 10A; and

- Shiraz Sidhva, "Afraid of Sanctions," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 161 (May 1998): 71–72.
23. For a review on the important issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and WMD terrorism, see Andrew O'Neil, "Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Serious is the Threat?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (2003): 99–122; John Parachini, "Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective," *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (2003): 37–50; Jonathan Spyer, "The Al-Qa'ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8 (September 2004): 29–42; David Albright and Holly Higgins, "A Bomb for the Uumah," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March–April 2003): 45–49; Tyler Marshall, "UN Powers Take Up Arms Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 June 1998, p. A12; and Gary Taubes, "Countering Nuclear Terrorism: Dwindling Capabilities?" *Science* no. 5201 (February 1995): 96–100.
 24. The U.S. policy decision to greatly strengthen the NPT in the next extension debate and prod the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen safeguard regimes will not be a cakewalk given the rising resistance by the Third World. For insight into the last extension debate in the 1990s, see John B. Rhinelander and Adam E. Scheinman, eds., *At the Nuclear Crossroads: Choices about Nuclear Weapons and Extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).
 25. See David Sloss, "Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 4 (Spring 2003): 39–57 and Henry Sokolski, *US Nonproliferation Policies Since 1945: Their Strategic Premises and Implications* (Washington, D.C.: The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 1995).
 26. Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhoan, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
 27. See Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," *International Affairs* 79 (July 2003): 719–38 and David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Reality: America Loses Bite," *New York Times*, 20 February 2005, pp. 1–4.
 28. One of the central theoretical questions not adequately addressed in the nuclear and WMD literatures is the (in)-security dilemmas faced by major Third World states. It is the "smoking gun" or the "tipping point" in the nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities debate from the Third World perspective. The problem of increasing security while not threatening the security of other states is the essence of the security dilemma. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman, 2002), pp. 400–415. For a series of informed analysis on the (in)-security dilemmas faced by major Third World states, see Alan Collins, "State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 39 (March 2004): 27–44; Donald L. Berlin, "The Indian Ocean and the Second Nuclear Age," *Orbis* 48 (Winter 2004): 55–70; Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Bomb," *Dissent* 48 (Fall 2001): 21–25; Samina Ahmed, "Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 21 (October 2000): 781–93; Brian Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); and Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43 (1991): 257–83.
 29. See Alan Collins, "State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 39 (March 2004): 27–44; Samina Ahmed, "Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 21 (October 2000): 781–84; and Gavin Cameron, *Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat for the 21st Century* (Monterey, Calif.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
 30. For an excellent discussion on the need to reconsider the meaning and operationality of strategic deterrence doctrine in the post cold war international environment, see Keith B. Payne, "The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction," *Comparative Strategy* 22 (December 2003): 411–28 and Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).
 31. Zachery Davis S. and Benjamin Frankel, *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results* (Stanford, Calif.: International Specialized Book Services, 1993).
 32. See Andrew Newman, "Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 27 (March 2004): 59–88 and Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (January–February 2004): 136–50.
 33. John Baylis and Robert O'Neil, eds., *Alternative Nuclear Futures-The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Eric Arnett, *Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

34. Mubashir Zaidi, "Pakistan Admits Possible Nuclear Ties with Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 December 2003, p. A.0 and Sooni Efron, "Secret Iran Nuclear Plan Discovered," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 February 2004, pp. A1–A10.
35. Sharon A. Squassoni, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Congressional Research Service* 34 (2004): 1–6 and Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?" *Third World Quarterly* 23 (2002): 31–53.
36. Douglas Frantz, "A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 February 2005, pp. A1–A12 and Jamie Calabrese, "Carrots and Sticks: Libya and US Efforts to Influence Rogue States," *Strategic Insights* 3 (2004): 1–9.
37. See Festus Ohaegbulam, "U.S. Measures against Libya since the Explosion of Pam Am Flight 203," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11 (2000): 111–35; Ronald Bruce St. John, "Apply 'Libya Model' to Iran and Syria," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 23 (2004): 45–49; and Joseph Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *The Nonproliferation Review* 64 (1997): 982–1000. South Africa is a first case of a major Third World state that acquired nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities; and its Afrikaner political elite decided to renounce them because of severe pressure from the United States and the international community and perhaps more importantly because of pressing domestic political reasons associated with the incoming African National Congress government led by Nelson Mandela in the 1980s.
38. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003); Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994): 66–107; Kenneth Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84 (September 1990): 731–45; and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981).
39. Edward M. Luttwak, "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Western Illusion," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 June 1998, p. M5. For an excellent discussion on the critical historical need for a renaissance in international security studies, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 1991): 211–39.
40. See William M. Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," *Washington Quarterly* 19 (1996): 3–18; Rod Barton, "Eliminating Strategic Weapons: The Case of Iraq," *Pacific Research* 6 (August 1992): 11–13; and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, and Nonproliferation Revisited," *Security Studies* 2 (Spring–Summer 1993): 3.
41. The global debate on the utility of negative (and positive) sanctions as a central means to prevent or discourage nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation activities was destroyed by the multiple Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in the late 1990s. See Mario E. Carranza, "At the Crossroads: US Non-Proliferation toward South Asia after the Indian and Pakistani Tests," *Contemporary Security Policy* 23 (April 2002): 93–128 and Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., *Indian Nuclear Security* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000). A long-term and counter-instrumental outcome of the U.S. negative sanctions regime in South Asia was that Pakistan and to a lesser extent, India have being offered and accepted positive incentives (i.e., debt relief, trade credits, and waivers on bank loans) from the United States to refrain from the export of their growing nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities to other major Third World states. See Elizabeth Mills, "India and the United States: Deal to be Done," *World Market Research Centre* 60 (April 2004): 25–26; Peter R. Lavoy, "Managing South Asian's Nuclear Rivalry: New Policy Challenges for the United States," *The Nonproliferation Review* 10 (Fall 2003): 89–94; Rajesh Rajagopalan, "The Evolution of Pakistan Policy, 1999–2001," *South Asian Survey* 10 (July 2003): 117–44; and D. Mistry, "Diplomacy, Sanctions, and the US Nonproliferation Dialogue with India and Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 5 (September 1999): 735–71. This double standard outcome has not been ignored by major Third World states that must now carefully reconsider the benefits and the costs of developing nuclear weapons and/or WMD capabilities. See Stanley A. Erickson, "Economic and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Proliferation," *Nonproliferation Review* 8 (Summer 2001): 40–54 and John Arquilla, *Modeling Decision making of Potential Proliferators As Part of Developing Counter-proliferation Strategies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1996). Given the recent disturbing information that important sectors of the military/industrial complex in Pakistan sold and/or bartered very sensitive nuclear weapons designs, technologies and fuel to major Third World states (Iran, Libya, and North Korea) for more than twenty years casts an invidious light on the consistency of U.S. reward and sanction policies. What is even more disturbing is that U.S. and Western intelligence services did not move to thoroughly destroy Dr. Khan's worldwide nuclear smuggling ring until the Libyan nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities admission hit the global headlines. Each time the United States wanted to

- move in to arrest Dr. Khan and dissolve his nuclear smuggling ring, major geopolitical events (i.e., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the September 11th terrorist event) intervened to prevent the “rollup and cleanup.” There is some evidence that Dr. Khan’s nuclear smuggling ring quiet for the last few years is beginning to reemerge from its “deep underground sleep” and is now reengaging with major Third World states interested in purchasing its nuclear weapons design(s) and nuclear technological secrets.
42. Tyler Marshall, “Clinton Seeks Flexibility in Imposing Sanctions,” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 September 1998, p. A4.
 43. See Abraham Sofaer, “On the Necessity of Pre-emption,” *European Journal of International Law* 14 (April 2003): 209–26 and Sherle R. Schwenninger, “The Rift over Rogues: Europeans Are Dismayed by Washington’s Growing Multilateralism,” *Nation* 263 (1996): 21–24.
 44. See Andrew Newman, “The Disarmament of Iraq: WMD Nonproliferation Template?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58 (June 2004): 221–40 and Khalil Dokhanchi, “U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Rogue States and Weapons Proliferation,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (May 1996): 241–44.
 45. See Michael Eisenstadt, “Can the United States Influence the WMD Policies of Iran and Iraq,” *Nonproliferation Review* 7 (September 2000): 1–11 and David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq’s Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn?” *Arms Control Today* 22 (July–August 1992): 3–11.
 46. Christopher Daase, “The Beginning of the End of the Nuclear Taboo: On the Crisis of Legitimacy for the World Nuclear Order,” *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 10 (June 2003): 7–41.
 47. See Ashton Carter, “Overhauling Counterproliferation,” *Technology in Society* 26 (April–August 2004): 257–69; David Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996–97): 87–119; Steven Flank, “Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation,” *Security Studies* 3 (Winter 1993–94): 259–94; and John Maxwell Hamilton, “Nonproliferation and the National Interests: America’s Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientist* 49 (1993): 50–51.
 48. See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Duty to Prevent,” *Foreign Affairs* 83 (January–February 2004): 136–50; Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M.S. Niou, “Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike or Assist?” *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (June 1996): 209–33; and Peter D. Feaver, “Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations,” *Security Studies* 2 (Spring–Summer 1993): 159–91.
 49. Chung-in Moon and Jong-yun Bae, “The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” *Asian Perspective* 27 (2003): 47–77 and Timothy L. Savage, “Letting the Genii Out of the Bottle: The Bush Nuclear Doctrine in Asia,” *Asian Perspective* 27 (2003): 9–45.
 50. Rajamani Ramamurthy, “On Both Sides, South Asia Nuclear Weapons Are in Mature Hands,” *Los Angeles Times*, 8 June 1998, p. B5. See also Michael Ryan Kraig, “The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” *India Review* 2 (January 2003): 1–48; Lo James, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Theory and Practice,” *International Journal* 58 (Summer 2003): 395–414; Peter R. Lavoy, “Managing South Asia’s Nuclear Rivalry: New Policy Challenges for the United States,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 10 (Fall 2003): 84–94; and Maleeha Lodhi, “Security Challenges in South Asia,” *Nonproliferation Review* 8 (Summer 2001): 118–24.
 51. See Nafeez Ahmed, *Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq* (East Sussex, England: Clairview Books, 2003); Rolf Ekeus, “The Iraqi Experience and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation,” *Washington Quarterly* 15 (1992): 67–74; Rolf Ekeus, “Unearthing Iraq’s Arsenal,” *Arms Control Today* 22 (April 1992): 6–9; Mark Magnier and Barbara Demick, “North Korea May be in ‘Anybody but Bush Camp,’” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2004, p. A9; William J. Broad, “Uranium Traveled to Iran Via Russia, Inspectors Find,” *New York Times*, 28 February 2004, p. A4; and Barbara Demick, “North Korea May Have Nuclear Backup Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, 24 February 2004, p. A7.
 52. See David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Earnings: \$100 Million,” *New York Times*, 16 March 2004, p. A8 and Josh Meyer, “U.S. Discusses Depth of Khan’s Nuclear Network,” *Los Angeles Times*, 16 March 2004, p. A3.
 53. Louis Rene Beres, “Israel’s Bomb in the Basement: A Revisiting of ‘Deliberate Ambiguity’ vs. ‘Disclosure’ in Efraim Harsh, ed., *Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 113–33.
 54. See Michael J. Siler, “Explaining Variation in Nuclear Outcomes Among Southern States: Bargaining Analysis of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policies Towards Brazil, Egypt, India and South Korea” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1992).
 55. K. Subramanyam, “An Equal Opportunity NPT,” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 49 (June 1993): 37–39. The majority of Third World criticism over the alleged unfairness of international and regional

- nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regime(s) has come from the South Asia region, particularly India. Historically, the Peoples' Republic of China, Brazil, Egypt, Syria, Argentina, Cuba, South Korea, Iraq, and Iran have also voiced their criticisms of these treaties and regimes.
56. Douglas Frantz, "Censure Spurs Iran to Ban U.N. Monitors," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 March 2004, p. A3; Craig S. Smith, "Alarm Raised Over Quality of Uranium Found in Iran," *New York Times*, 11 March 2004, p. A12; and Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, "North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests," *New York Times*, 20 July 2003, pp. 1–6.
 57. See Harold Feiveson, ed., *The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Andy Oppenheimer, "North Korea, Pakistan and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Destructive Deals," *The World Today* 60 (February 2004): 26–67; and Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996–97): 54–86.
 58. American support for some major Third World states with nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities, Israel and Pakistan (as well as India) confounds the search for a permanent nonproliferation agreement between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states because of the double standard in the U.S. nonproliferation position alluded to earlier (Erich Marquardt, "Why the U.S. Supports the State of Israel," *Power and Interest News Report*, 7 October 2004, pp. 1–2; Chuck Nuebauer, "Musharraf Has Rumsfeld's Support in Nuclear Case," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 March 2004, p. A3; and Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991).
 59. Selig Harrison, "A Nuclear Safety Plan for Pakistan," *Financial Times*, 19 March 2004, p. 13. See also Arian L. Pregoner. "Securing Nuclear Capabilities in India and Pakistan: Reducing the Terrorist and Proliferation Risks," *The Nonproliferation Review* 10 (Spring 2003): 124–31 and Robert E. Rehbeing, "Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals," *Nonproliferation Review* 9 (Spring 2002): 92–111.
 60. Sooni Efron, "Bush Outlines a Plan to Halt Nuclear Proliferation," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 February 2004, p. A8 and Joel Brinkley and William J. Broad, "U.S. Lags in Recovering Fuel Suitable for Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, 7 March 2004, p. 8.
 61. Andrew K. Semmel, "How Should the Regime Be Adjusted in a World Where Nine States Possess Nuclear Weapons?" 14 December 2004 <http://www.state.gov/tnp/rls/rm/40055.htm>.
 62. The black and gray markets for nuclear weapons design and nuclear technologies are flourishing internationally. The U.S. and Western efforts to close down the illegal suppliers of these dangerous and destabilizing technologies have not been successful. Moreover, the inability to reduce the significant uranium "leakage" from nuclear weapons sites in the Russian Federation to unknown sources complicates global nonproliferation efforts. See Douglas Frantz, "Dutch Confirm Possible Spread of Arms Secret," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 January 2004, p. A3; Douglas Frantz and Maura Reynolds, "Individuals Supplying Nuclear Trade, Officials Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 January 2004, p. A19; and Douglas Frantz and John Myer, "For Sale: Nuclear Expertise," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 February 2004, pp. A1–A8. Moreover, the inability to reduce the significant uranium "leakage" from nuclear sites in the Russian Federation to unknown sources complicates the global nonproliferation efforts.
 63. Mark Magnier and Barbara Demick, "North Korea May Be in 'Anybody but Bush' Camp," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2004, p. A9.
 64. Barbara Demick, "North Korea May Have Nuclear Backup Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 February 2004, p. A7.
 65. The nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation debates in major Third World states addresses major national security concerns and policy issues unique to their strategic cultures and motivating political constituencies. In a real sense, these debates are the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the non-Western perspectives of the international and regional nuclear nonproliferation treaties and safeguard regimes. See Runa Das, "Broadening the Security Paradigm: A Note on the Tension Between the Realist and Anti-Proliferation Lobbies in India," *Indian Journal of Political Science* 62 (June 2001): 253–63 and Haider K. Nizamani, "Describing the Nuclear Elephant: Nuclear Policy and Politics in India and Pakistan," *Millennium* 29 (Spring 2000): 141–51. See also Rajesh Rajagopalan, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Policy, 1999–2001," *South Asian Survey* 10 (July–December 2003): 231–46; and Michael Quinlan, "How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence," *Survival* 42 (Winter 2000): 141–54.
 66. One of the issues not yet addressed in the Khan nuclear smuggling ring problem is the role and impact of religion and culture in both targeting and accelerating the illegal transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons designs and uranium fuels from Pakistan to major Third World states. See David Rohde, "General Denies Letting Secrets of A-Bomb Out of Pakistan," *New York Times*, 27 January 2004, p.

- A6; Kathy Gannon, "Explosive Secrets from Pakistan," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 January 2004, p. B15; Douglas Frantz, Paul Watson, and Mubashir Zaidi, "Pakistan Caught in a Web of Evidence," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 February 2004, pp. A1–A6; William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network," *New York Times*, 12 February 2004, pp. A1–A18; Mubashir Zaidi, "Pakistan Accuses 7 of Helping Khan Share Nuclear Secrets," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 February 2004, p. A9; Craig S. Smith, "Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe," *New York Times*, 19 February 2004, p. A3; David Rohde, "Pakistani Linked to Illegal Exports Has Ties to Military," *New York Times*, 20 February 2004, p. A6; and David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test," *New York Times*, 27 February 2004, p. A8.
67. The history and motivations driving major Third World states' pursuit of nuclear weapons is fascinating and intriguing. See Bhumitro Chakma, "Road to Chagai: Pakistan's Nuclear Program, Its Sources and Motivations," *Modern Asian Studies* 36 (October 2002): 871–912; Farzana Shaikh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime," *International Affairs* 78 (January 2002): 29–48; Ashley J. Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 2001); Victor D. Cha, "North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields or Swords," *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (Summer 2002): 209–30; Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Non-Proliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and A.Y. Mansowrov, "The Origins, Evolution, and Future of the North Korean Nuclear Program," *Korea and World Affairs* 19 (Spring 1995): 40–66.
68. See Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iran and Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004) and David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "The Centrifuge Connection," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 60 (March–April 2004): 61–66.
69. For example, see Erich Marquardt, "Washington's Iran Strategy: Ostracizing Teheran from the International Community," *Power and Interest News Report*, 29 September 2004, pp. 1–2.
70. South Korea is an excellent example of a major Third World state that has historically resisted U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies. See Michael J. Siler, "US Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region during the Cold War," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 16 (Autumn–Winter 1998): 41–86.
71. John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1996–97): 4. Also see Geoffrey Kemp, "How to Stop the Iranian Bomb," *The National Interest* 72 (Summer 2003): 48–58; and Saira Khan, *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2002). The role and leverage of strategic culture in determining what nations see or don't see (or in explaining how they act or don't act) is an important determinant in the proliferation debate. Clearly, the literature on non-Western strategic cultural systems is not as strong as it should be in the post-cold war period. During the Cold War, theories on what strategic culture is and how it works were prominently discussed, especially Soviet strategic culture. See Ken Booth, "Strategic Culture in Theory and Practice," in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 3–128; Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Confirmed," *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 125–26; and Jack Synder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* RF-2154 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, September 1977).
72. See Mark Gaffney, "Will Iran Be Next?" *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 2 (Summer 2003): 196–216 and Godfrey Kemp, "How to Stop the Iranian Bomb," *The National Interest* 72 (Summer 2003): 48–58.
73. Lyle Goldstein, "Weapons Proliferation: Lessons of the Early Cold War for Understanding WMD Proliferation Today," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 15 (2002): 1–23.
74. Andy Oppenheimer, "North Korea, Pakistan, and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Destructive Deals," *The World Today* 60 (February 2004): 26–27.
75. Jeremy Bransten, "Bush Proposes New Initiatives to Stop Nuclear Proliferation," 13 February 2004 <http://www.payvand.com/news/04/feb/1106.html>.
76. The underestimation by the United States and the Western alliance of some major Third World states' calculated ability to both adapt, develop and reverse engineer advanced military and civilian technologies is noticeable. Why this remains the case—especially after Iraq demonstrated its expertise (pre-Gulf War 1) in biological, chemical, and bacteriological (and to a lesser extent, nuclear) research matters, as well as in short and intermediate range ballistic missile systems and advanced conventional munitions—is a mystery (Eliot A. Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World," *International Security* 10 [Spring 1986], p. 159). There is a strong scientific/technological paternal-

ism as well as a high level of ethnocentrism expressed by Western policymakers and intellectuals (except perhaps in the U.S. National Security Agency) towards the dual-use technology utilization practices of some major Third World states, inferring that they are “technological midgets” or worst who require specialized guidance from the United States and the West. See Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979). These classical forms of “outmoded thinking” policy and ideological exercises toward major Third World states in the nuclear and WMD domains are disarmingly counterproductive in both their policy design and policy implementation, and in the long run, very dangerous. See Henry Sokolski, “The Greatest Proliferation Threat: Our Outmoded Thinking,” presentation to the *Defense Policy Board* (1 May 1991). Also see Nazih N. Ayubi, *Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988–1991* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Garnet Publishing, 1995) and Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, eds., *Beyond the Storm: Gulf Crisis Reader* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991).

77. Jane Perlez, “Saudi’s Visit to (Nuclear) Arms Site in Pakistan Worries U.S.,” *New York Times*, 10 July 1999, p. A7. There is no evidence that Pakistan’s Dr. Khan or important members of his global nuclear smuggling ring approached the Saudis with his nuclear weapons sales pitch in the twenty years of highly international operations, although it would be logical since Saudi Arabia has very deep pockets. In a credible scenario, Saudi Arabia purchases at least two nuclear bombs for strategic national security reasons from Dr. Khan and stores them in a nearby Arab Muslim country for safe-keeping without informing the United States. In addition, did Dr. Khan approach the Egyptians with his military nuclear hardware and software technologies, or Indonesia or Malaysia, Asian Muslim states? Did Dr. Khan contact Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, and if he did, what transpired and was military nuclear technology transferred? Lastly, did Dr. Khan contact other major Third World states (besides Iran and North Korea) or Islamic terrorist organizations? These are questions that may never be answered since Dr. Khan, a national hero of Pakistan, is under house arrest and will not be allowed talk to U.S. or European security services to find out the answers.
78. Nathan Busch, “Risks of Nuclear Terror: Vulnerabilities to Theft and Sabotage at Nuclear Weapons Facilities,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 23 (December 2002): 19–60.
79. The ability of financially well-off major Third World states to access various levels of the international military arms market continues to increase in the post-cold war period. Iraq’s success in building both a powerful conventional and non-conventional military machine during the pre-Gulf War 1 period is well documented. There is no reason to believe that major Third World states’ access will degrade in the decades ahead, despite strong U.S. and Western countermeasures on the supply side. Frankly, the market profits are too great for all parties involved in these secret transactions for long-term Western countermeasures to work consistently and effectively. For a discussion of this important phenomena, see M. Moodie, “Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Diffusion,” *The Washington Quarterly* 18 (1995): 183–202; Richard Kokoski, *Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); R.A. Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” *International Security* 19 (1994): 170–98; Henry Sokolski, “Non-Apocalyptic Proliferation: A New Strategic Threat?” *Washington Quarterly* 17 (Spring 1994): 115–25; Amit Gupta, “Third World Militaries: New Suppliers, Deadlier Weapons,” *Orbis* 37 (Winter 1993): 57–68; Michael T. Klare, “Growing Firepower in the Third World,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1990): 9–13; Stephanie Nuemann, “The Arms Market: Who’s On Top,” *Orbis* 33 (Fall 1989): 510; Douglas Frantz, “Gaps Seen in Iran’s Nuclear Disclosure,” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2004, p. A3; and Stephen Fidler, “Bhutto ‘Rejected Plan by the Military and Scientists to Sell N-Technology,’” *Financial Times*, 24 February 2004, p. 8.
80. See James Blackwell, *Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Have Learned*. (New York: Westview Press, 1993).
81. See J. F. Pilat, “Iraq and the Future of Nonproliferation: The Role of Inspections and Treaties,” *Science* 255 (March 1992): 1224–1229; Jeffrey R. Smith, “Iraq’s Nuclear Powers Underestimated by United States,” *Washington Post*, 13 November 1991, p. A45; and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Iraq’s Secret A-Arms Efforts: Lessons for the World,” *Washington Post*, 11 August 1991, p. C1.
82. Elizabeth Young, “Counterproliferation: Common Sense, Neo-Imperialism or Wild Goose Chase?” *World Today* 53 (1997): 16–18.
83. Rajesh Mishra, “Nuclear Collaboration between North Korea and Pakistan,” *Journal of Peace Studies* 9 (September–October 2002): 67–73.
84. See Paul Daniel Conway, “Sanctions or Engagement” Designing U.S. Diplomatic Policy Tools to Confront Nuclear Proliferation in Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan,” *Dissertation Abstract International, the Humanities and Social Sciences* 64 (August 2003); Robert Litwak, “Nonprolifera-

- tion and the Dilemmas of Regime Change,” *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003–2004): 7–31; Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001); and Henry Sokolski, “Fighting Proliferation,” in *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads*, ed. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), pp. 197–213.
85. See Jason D. Ellis and Geoffrey D. Kiefer, eds., *Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy* (New York: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999); David Kay, “Denial and Deception: The Lessons of Iraq,” in *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroad*, pp. 109–127; and David A. Fulghum, “Advanced Arms Spread Defies Remote Detection,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (November 1992): 20–22.
 86. One strategic deception practice was Iraq’s remarkable ability to continue a long-term “yo-yo” strategy of crisis confrontation with the United States, inviting U.S. military forces into the Persian Gulf region and diplomatically withdrawing before an imminent military confrontation occurred. This deception strategy collapsed during the Gulf War II period with the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. James J. Zogby, “Think of Iraqis, Not Saddam,” *Los Angeles Times*, 13 November 1998, p. B9.
 87. Barton Gellman, “UN Inspectors in Iraq See Little Chance of Success,” *International Herald Tribune*, 23 November 1998, pp. 1–8 and Editor, “UN Arms Team Tries Again To See Iraqi Secret Documents,” *USA Today*, 19 November 1998, p. 13A.
 88. Bradley Graham, “In Cyberwar, A Quandary Over Rules and Strategy,” *International Herald Tribune*, 8 July 1998, pp. 1–6.
 89. Editor, “Face-off in Baghdad,” *Financial Times*, 15 November 1998, p. 6.
 90. Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” *Arms Control Today* 33 (December 2003): 1–4.
 91. Jan Lodal, “Pledging No First Strike: A Step Towards Real WMD Cooperation,” *Arms Control Today* 31 (2001): 3–9 and Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Future of Export Controls: Developing New Strategies for Nonproliferation,” *International Politics* 39 (2002): 131–51.
 92. Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari, “Being a Nuclear State is a Dynamic Process’: Why Doubts Persist over Pakistan’s Pledge to Curb Proliferation,” *Financial Times*, 17 February 2004, p. 13. See also Ghazi Saleh, “Pakistan Nuclear Identity and Security Challenges,” *Indian Journal of Politics* 34 (July–December 2000): 69–82.
 93. See Jasen Castillo, “Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters,” *Current History* 102 (December 2003): 426–31 and Matthew Weinzierl, “The Cost of Living: The Economics of Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” *The National Interest* 75 (Spring 2004): 118–22.
 94. Ron Smith, “The Nuclear Disarmament Chimera,” *New Zealand International Review* 27 (January–February 2002): 7–10.
 95. See Colin S. Gray, “The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On,” *Comparative Strategy* 22 (December 2003): 429–61 and George H. Quester and Victor A. Utgoff, “No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining Extended Deterrence,” *Washington Quarterly* 16 (1993): 129–40.
 96. See Terry C. Stevens, “Deterring North Korea: US Options,” *Comparative Strategy* 22 (December 2003): 489–514 and Randall E. Newnawn, “Nukes for Sale Cheap? Purchasing Peace with North Korea,” *International Studies Perspective* 5 (May 2004): 164–78.
 97. Robin Wright, “Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s Top Defense Official Probes Depth of Détente with the United States,” *Los Angeles Times*, 15 November 1998, p. M3; Brad Roberts, “Rising Powers: Weapons Proliferation and the New Great Powers,” *Current* 371 (March 1995): 20–31; Marc Dean Millot, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,” *The Washington Quarterly* 17 (Summer 1994): 41–71; Barry Posen, “US Security Policy in a Nuclear Armed World, Or: What If Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?” *Security Studies* 6 (1997): 1–31; Leonard Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); and Leonard Spector, *Deterring Regional Threats from Nuclear Proliferation*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 22 March 1992, p. 48.
 98. In the late twenty-first century, military confrontations between powerful states and weak states have shown that the latter have not been deterred from testing the political and military resolve of the former. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the growing conflict between the United States and its allies with Iraq may indicate a new type of near-WMD conflict in the future. In the pre-Gulf War I environment in Iraq, the level of policy frustration by the United States with Iraq’s intransigence in the nuclear and WMD domain also indicates a potential model for WMD-actual and WMD-capable states to probe “weaknesses” in powerful states’ resolve. However, the pre-Gulf War II environment in Iraq represents the wrong model for WMD-actual or WMD-capable Third World states who seek to use bluff, deception, mis-

information and related strategies to pretend that they have nuclear weapons and WMD capabilities when they really don't. For a compelling discussion on how successful weak states have been in confronting powerful states, politically and militarily, see A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Herrington, eds., *Great Powers and Little Wars* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993); Yohanan Cohen, *Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); and Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small

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Gandhi and King: A Comparison

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As Activists Committed to Nonviolence

Gandhi and King had a philosophical commitment to nonviolence. Nonviolence here is defined as the exercise of power based on “the principle which comes increasingly to motivate a human being as he or she transforms the desire to injure others into its positive counterpart.”¹ Activists who hold a philosophical commitment to nonviolence employ this principle in all aspects of their life and at all times. It is a creed that calls on adherents to not only avoid harming others but to work positively to uplift others, including opponents. The idea is not to avoid the exercise of power, but to use power, such as economic or moral power but not military power, to create change without injuring the opponent or at least by inflicting as little harm on the opponent as possible.²

Gandhi and King were both men of action who wished to agitate for change without harming others. For them nonviolence is not about passive resistance to evil, which is a form of inaction that neither countenanced. Rather, nonviolence is resistance that is active, creative and dynamic, but also not violent in its implementation. Gandhi and King did not seek conquests, they sought converts. They used power not to defeat opponents but to win their hearts and minds through a loving, albeit forceful, process of nonviolent conversion based on purity of means. Nonviolent activists, therefore, refuse to give in but neither do they strike back in vengeful anger. This principled stance begins to raise questions in the opponent’s mind that eventually (not always) leads the opponent to change his or her ways. Gandhi called this process *satyagraha* or truthforce and King called this soulforce and referred to it as the marvelous new militancy.³ It is this power, or force, that could peacefully transform a conflict, leading to a truly just resolution.

Gandhi and King made use of similar nonviolent strategies that initially relied on negotiations with the opponent that had to be conducted openly and in a spirit of goodwill and faith. If negotiations fail, gentle persuasion comes next, usually in the form of public declarations based on moral arguments. If that fails, the strategy calls for increasing the pressure on the opponent by first using nonviolent noncooperation, such as economic strikes and boycotts, and then using nonviolent civil disobedience, which involves openly breaking unjust laws and willingly accepting the punishment, often a prison sentence, in order to draw attention to the injustice.

But it is no small surprise that King’s philosophy and strategy of nonviolence was similar to Gandhi’s. During his academic pursuits, King was influenced by African Americans, such as Howard University’s President Mordechai Johnson, who had traveled to India to study Gandhi’s form of resistance. Moreover, King visited India in February 1959, shortly after the Montgomery Bus Boycott made him a household name. King’s trip to India “consummated his conversion to nonviolence.”⁴ He acknowledged Gandhi’s influence on him when he said that the trip for him was akin to encountering famous heroes of the American Revolution, such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.⁵ While he traveled to other countries as a tourist, King declared that he came to India as a pilgrim.

On a personal level, King’s trip to India prompted him to try to adopt some of Gandhi’s practices as his own, such as fasting, meditation and material dispossession, but he was not as successful at this as was Gandhi. King did not attempt to copy Gandhi’s vegetarianism, confessing a weakness for barbecue.

On a broader scale, King was impressed by the Indian government’s considerable efforts to improve the plight of India’s oppressed classes, such as its so-called Untouchables. Upon his return to the United States, King made special U.S. federal government aid to blacks one of his cardinal goals. He also wished that U.S. presidents, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson, had the moral courage to work on improving the condition of blacks in America the way he observed India’s national leaders working to uplift its Untouchables.⁶

As Political Leaders of Nonviolent Resistance Movements

Leading Adherents and Followers

Neither King nor Gandhi sought the mantle of leadership. If not for Gandhi’s rude exposure to white racism on a train in South Africa, he may not have ever tried to organize Indians there. Instead, he probably would have become South Africa’s richest “colored” attorney. Moreover, upon his return to India after a twenty-year absence, Gandhi was not initially a prime mover in Indian politics. Nor did he deliberately seek out injustices against which to launch nonviolent resistance campaigns.⁷ The same can be said of King who was a reluctant leader at first.⁸ Upon his return to the South after years away at northern schools, King planned

on having two careers, first as a pastor at some respectable middle class church in the South and second, as a university professor. Leading and organizing a mass nonviolent resistance campaign for 13 years was not among his plans.

Both Gandhi and King were newcomers to the movement whose leadership reigns they assumed. Gandhi had only been in South Africa a very short while before he began organizing the Indians. Likewise, King had only been in Montgomery a short while before he was nominated to head up the bus boycott effort. He was not a long-time member of Montgomery's established black elite. King was chosen as the boycott's leader because he was well educated and an articulate speaker, which appealed to Montgomery's black professionals, and also because he was a Baptist minister, which appealed to Montgomery's largely Baptist churchgoing blacks.⁹

King's leadership of his adherents and followers contrasts sharply with Gandhi's. King was not the administrator Gandhi was. While Gandhi kept scrupulous books and financial records, King did not possess this attention to detail. But King's closest aides, who shared his philosophical commitment to nonviolence as a way of life, did not expect King to be a great administrator: He was a dreamer, an orator and a holy man of faith. According to one aide,

what else does he need to be? He's a symbol that there needs to be a moral voice in America talking about the injustice and the inequity.... He doesn't need to know how to answer a telephone.¹⁰

King did not like to make personnel decisions, especially those involving somebody's dismissal. He was steadfastly loyal to close friends and advisers, like Stanley Levison and Jack O'Dell. Levison was King's close friend who, among other things, helped King write his books. O'Dell, who helped run King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) office in New York and had an affinity for numbers, had built a substantial donor list. When the U.S. Justice Department admonished King to jettison Levison and O'Dell because they were thought to be communists, King balked, demanding to see proof. But when the government failed to produce any shred of evidence, King demurred, his sense of loyalty to Levison and O'Dell trumping whatever political calculus the federal government was trying to get him to make. Eventually, however, direct pressure from President Kennedy and his brother Robert compelled King to fire O'Dell, which was one of the most agonizing decisions he ever had to make. Nevertheless, King maintained close contact with Levison despite the Kennedy brothers' entreaties. And when King finally succumbed to intense pressure to force the resignation of yet another controversial aide, Bayard Rustin, he nevertheless maintained close contact with Rustin, so much so that the "firing" was official in name only.¹¹ He even had to be convinced to fire a SCLC staffer after it was clear the staffer was stealing from the SCLC's treasury.

Unlike King, Gandhi was not reluctant to abandon even the oldest of relationships. When he discovered a childhood friend, who was living with him in South Africa and to whom he felt he owed a debt, in bed with a prostitute, Gandhi immediately expelled him from his house and never welcomed him back again. And Gandhi was less averse to wading into the middle of difficult and controversial matters that arose within his movement. Although his was an inclusive type of leadership, Gandhi also had authoritarian, even dictatorial, traits when it came to getting his way in the Congress Party.¹² Gandhi knew how popular he was and how essential his participation in Congress was in order for Congress to obtain mass support. However, if Congress began to veer in a direction that Gandhi opposed, he would threaten to resign. Gandhi was able to force Congress into choosing one leader over another and to force Congress into adopting his *satyagraha* methods as official party platforms, even though many, if not most, of the Congress leaders did not share anything near his philosophical commitment to nonviolence. Despite their intense love for him, some leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, thought Gandhi's ideas about nonviolence, village spinning programs and a simplistic life of labor without heavy industry were not just quaint and quirky, but downright dangerous to the security of an emerging modern India.

Neither was Gandhi reluctant to involve himself in the personal confrontations among his followers. A famous example of this is the feud between two of Congress's greatest leaders, Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel. Both men were headstrong, stubborn and possessed great force of personality and they disagreed on many policies and programs within the Congress Party. Their feud grew so bad at times that they could not even stand to talk to each other. After independence, both leaders would write to Gandhi offering to resign so that the other could assume unquestioned leadership over the Congress Party and the country's government (which were virtually one and the same thing just after independence). Yet Gandhi would have none of that, taking an active role in urging them to work together to iron out their differences. Nor was he reluctant to take sides in these feuds, agreeing with one person (usually Nehru) and opposing the other (usually Patel).

In King's case, when differences among staff emerged, he often remained silent, seemingly aloof. He appears to have had no stomach for settling disputes between people in the movement. He often procrastinated when he was called on to make a difficult decision. He didn't like to confront antagonistic personalities among the black leadership. When it came to debating, arguing or otherwise doing battle within the movement, "he was at a loss," said trusted confidante Rustin.¹³ Since Montgomery, King presented "an almost galactic remoteness" to those around him and, according to David J. Garrow, "combat with people outside the movement was one thing, but head-to-head unpleasantness was something King avoided consistently," adopting a passive stance instead.¹⁴

This is ironic when considered against the backdrop of King's active nonviolence, which calls for increasingly confrontational forms of intervention in government functions. Some saw King's passivity and gentleness amidst rowdy office gatherings as a fault while others saw it as a valued blessing. He would quietly sit through raucous sessions and then, in Hegelian fashion, he would reach a synthesis among all the different viewpoints, trying to appeal to everyone.¹⁵ Aides said he never got angry and demonstrated unusual patience.¹⁶ Perhaps that is exactly the type of leader the Civil Rights Movement needed, given its many discordant voices.

As moral spokespersons, both felt strongly about people taking the initiative for their own self-improvement. Both used their leadership roles to reform their own people from within as much as they sought to confront oppression from without. King argued that blacks "must assume the primary responsibility" for making changes that would improve their status.¹⁷ If blacks believe that others will be more concerned about their rights than they are themselves, then they will contribute to their own victimization and marginalization. In criticizing blacks for becoming cynical and disillusioned with American society, King said they,

have so conditioned themselves to the system of segregation that they have lost that creative something called *initiative*. So many [blacks] use their oppression as an excuse for mediocrity.¹⁸

Gandhi was a tireless reformer of Indian society. His three part social welfare program—weaving homespun cloth (*khadi*), attaining Hindu-Muslim unity and ending Untouchability—reveal his passionate desire to reform India. In constantly preaching that people should make and wear *khadi*, Gandhi sought *economic* reform to revive each village to help make it self-sufficient. In preaching Hindu-Muslim unity, Gandhi sought *political* reform to ensure the survival of a united Mother India. And, in launching his controversial attack on Untouchability, he sought *spiritual* reform in an effort to save Hinduism from self-decay. These issues were far more important to him than was political independence from Britain, for what was the point of changing political leadership in Delhi if village life remained so hopelessly destitute, if India was brutally divided and if Hinduism remained an oppressive system?

Neither Gandhi nor King hesitated to criticize those with whom they had philosophical disagreements. Of Malcolm X's aggressive rhetoric about using any means necessary in defense of black rights, King argued that such an approach was neither morally nor strategically sound. Of the white clergy who gave sympathetic lip service to black civil rights, King chastised them for too often being a taillight rather than a headlight. He said they were "more cautious than courageous" and content to remain silent "behind the anesthetizing security of stained glass."¹⁹ Of the black activists in the Civil Rights Movement, King complained that it was populated with too many middle class people and not enough

activists from the grassroots in the rural south or the northern ghettos.²⁰ Of the Federal Government, on which he relied so much in his confrontation with local and state governments in the South, King was critical of its snail-like pace in introducing civil rights legislation. King was also a vocal opponent of the Federal Government's foreign policy in Vietnam.

For his part, Gandhi issued a contemptuous indictment of Western Civilization in his short book *Hind Swaraj (Indian Home Rule)*. In it, he condemned Western Civilization as immoral and godless and predicted it would self-destruct.²¹ He also published articles criticizing the Congress leadership. He accused it of being corrupt and venal. He charged Congress with being more concerned with protecting its privilege of power than with helping India's destitute masses. He wrote forceful articles railing against ancient Hindu traditions, like child marriages and Untouchability, calling for an end to both.

One of the most important issues to discuss in this regard is the challenge both Gandhi and King faced in their efforts to mold their constituents into a unified front. Neither man was successful in this. The black community, as with the Indian, suffered from internal divisions, not least of which were those arising out of religious differences. Not all blacks in America are Christians, just as not all Indians are Hindus. Even though virtually all blacks and Indians experienced the humiliation of white oppression and racism, this shared experience proved to be an insufficient base on which Gandhi and King could build a lasting united front. Interestingly, both were subjected to withering critiques from the Muslim leaders in their respective communities. To be sure, it must be a coincidence of history that both men confronted an increasingly hostile population that did not practice their faith, but instead practiced Islam and from which were issued challenges to their legitimacy.²²

The so-called black Muslims in America, especially Malcolm X, leveled scathing criticisms against King and the nonviolent resisters. Most of Malcolm X's vitriol was reserved for whites, but Malcolm X was almost as unsparing in his attack on King's nonviolence. He condemned nonviolence as a "cowardice-producing narcotic" and proclaimed that King, with his nonviolent love-thy-oppressor-philosophy, was speaking a language that the violent white man could not understand.²³ Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the powerful and charismatic leader of the Muslim League in India, had strong disagreements with Gandhi and blamed Gandhi for some of the Hindu-Muslim problems. Jinnah became such a powerful force in Indian politics that he was able to thwart all of Gandhi's efforts to keep India united.

Both Gandhi and King were beloved by the masses. But this is no small wonder since both so heavily identified themselves with the poor and disenfranchised. Despite coming from privilege, Gandhi and King had an intimate understanding of, and could implicitly relate to, the needs of the common folk.²⁴ On marches, both drew throngs of people who just wanted to get a glimpse of them or to somehow

participate in a historic moment. Like Gandhi, King was swarmed by onlookers trying to get closer to him, to touch him. A white reporter covering a march in Mississippi marveled at the impact King had on the rural, uneducated blacks, even bringing five-year-old girls to tears.²⁵

Both identified with the poor masses and worked tirelessly on their behalf. They lived like the poor, Gandhi in primitive rural huts, King in tenements in the Chicago ghetto. They traveled like the poor, Gandhi by third class rail or by bare feet, King by bus or mule. They dressed like the poor, Gandhi in his simple white loincloth, King in his signature farmers' overalls. They worked like the poor, Gandhi toiling in the hot fields or at his spinning wheel, King bending down during the harvest with migrant farm laborers. And both furnished their people with the potent weapon of love attached to nonviolence, a weapon that empowered them and gave them hope against their despair.²⁶

Finally, both were master communicators, King seemingly born to the bully pulpit while Gandhi had to learn to overcome his shyness in front of large groups. Both became effective public speakers, able to use rhetoric, metaphor and, in King's case, anaphora to great effect. While King was the more accomplished speech-giver, both had a knack for dramatizing, in stark and vivid imagery, the injustices that their people suffered. Both had a flair for the theatrical drama necessary to lead a mass nonviolent movement. Gandhi's Salt March, for instance, struck a chord deep in the psyche of diverse sectors of the Indian population. King's harnessing of both Christian and constitutional principles resonated not only with black Americans, but with white Americans as well.

Confronting the Opponent

Interestingly, both Gandhi and King had their activism forged in the burning humiliations they suffered on public transportation. Gandhi was forcibly thrown off a train in South Africa because he refused to give up his first class seat. As a high school student, King had to give up his bus seat on the way home from a debating competition. Seething with anger as he remained standing during 90 mile bus ride home, King at that time vowed to hate all white people. And on a train ride back home to Georgia from graduate school in Boston, King had to dine behind a curtain, so that whites wouldn't see him, as his train crossed the Mason-Dixon Line.

Moreover, both confronted a white power structure that was extremely resistant to change.²⁷ Like many others, they saw the essential hypocrisy of the whites. On the one hand, whites proclaimed adherence to a noble philosophy based on liberty and equality. On the other hand, whites denied these same rights to people of color.

Of course, both used nonviolence to resist their opponents, but for different ends. Gandhi sought to overthrow his opponent's governing system, arguing that to cooperate with the British system of government in India was to cooperate with evil. By contrast, King did not seek to over-

throw the system of government in the United States. Rather, by exposing its shameful conduct, he sought to compel it to live up to its declared creed that all men are created equal and enjoy the same unalienable rights. King believed in American society and the American system of government. He believed the United States was truly an exceptional country and wanted blacks to be able to freely and equally participate in its many opportunities.

In confronting their opponents, Gandhi and King also used nonviolent resistance to popularize jail-going. They knew that provoking their white opponents into imprisoning them would raise a groundswell of popular support. Jail-ing nonviolent resisters, with the cameras rolling, would demonstrate to the world how desperate and morally bankrupt the governing authorities were. Indeed, at times the British government refused to accept Gandhi's invitation to arrest him, knowing full well this would turn the people against it. King had similar experiences, as when he was mysteriously bailed out of jail in Albany, Georgia: he suspected it was the very same sheriff (or his cronies) who had arrested him in the first place.

Gandhi and King changed the nature and image of imprisonment. King gave beautiful speeches about transforming prisons from "dungeons of shame" into "havens of freedom and human dignity."²⁸ Gandhi made jail-going "the hallmark of integrity and national commitment rather than an experience of degradation and public shame."²⁹ While in jail, both would engage in extensive prayer and study. Each would also take to writing, King's "Letter from Birmingham City Jail" being the most famous. Moreover, imprisonment served yet another purpose, especially for Gandhi. He had become so popular and beloved that he welcomed jail as the only way to get respite from the throngs of admirers who flocked around him wherever he went.

As Religious Devotees

Both Gandhi and King were driven the most by their strong faiths. Their faiths informed their philosophical commitment to nonviolence and also compelled them to social activism. These were not politicians trying to be holy men; these were holy men trying to be politicians. In both cases, a spiritual man is entering politics because he feels his religious beliefs compel him to do so. Despite their moments of doubt, despite their bouts with depression and despite the hatred, chaos and violence that enveloped them, neither lost faith. As their careers progressed, through failures and successes, it appears that they grew even stronger in their respective faiths. According to C. Eric Lincoln,

the peculiar genius of Martin Luther King is that he was able to translate religious fervor into social action, thereby creating political leadership under the rubric of his religious ministry.³⁰

But these same words could just as easily be written about Mohandas Gandhi.

During their nonviolent resistance campaigns, God and religion were constantly invoked. For instance, in South Africa, Gandhi told the *satyagrahis* that God was with them.³¹ King made similar proclamations such as, in 1955 during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, when he proclaimed in his best preacher's baritone voice, that "if we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong!"³² Moreover, King cited a broad range of authoritative theologians to bolster his arguments. He did this to masterful effect in his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail" when he cited both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas to argue that unjust laws must be disobeyed.

Both leaders put themselves and their movements on the side of a just and merciful God. Both invoked love as a pillar of their faith-based struggle. King's use of *agape* brought "Gandhi's spirit of inclusiveness into an American context more than any other aspect of King's philosophy."³³ King liked to say that Christ furnished the spirit of love, justice, redemption and bearing the cross of suffering while Gandhi furnished the method of nonviolent resistance.

Some of Gandhi's critics point out that his near fanatical devotion to God, expressed primarily through Hinduism, actually helped fan the flames of religious intolerance between Muslims and Hindus. Despite his own Herculean efforts to attain Hindu-Muslim unity, Gandhi's constant emphasis on religion and religious piety may have contributed to an increase in religious intolerance, which wasn't so hard to do in the first place since Hindus and Muslims had a shaky relationship for decades. At first, Jinnah, the Muslim League's leader and future "father" of Pakistan, was a powerful and influential member of Congress with staunch unionist sentiments. However, Jinnah turned away from Congress as he began to believe that the party was becoming increasingly a *Hindu* nationalist party, as opposed to an *Indian* nationalist party. Jinnah blamed this evolution in part on Gandhi who was constantly emphasizing religion in his speeches and actions. Jinnah and many other Muslims feared that Gandhi's emphasis on religion in politics would end up replacing the British *Raj* with a Hindu *Raj*.

Gandhi and King's religious devotion elicited very strong responses, both from people who adored them and from those who reviled them. To his followers, Gandhi was *Bapu* (father) or *Mahatma* (great soul). But to his detractors, especially the Hindu extremists who feared he was giving away too much to the Muslims, Gandhi was not a Mahatma, nor even did they refer to him by his given name, Mohandas. Instead, they referred to him as Mohammed Gandhi, an alliterative play on the term Mahatma and meant as an insult to Gandhi, since Mohammed is a very popular Muslim name. To his intractable British adversary, Winston Churchill, Gandhi was nothing more than a

sedition middle temple lawyer, now posing as a *fakir* . . . striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceregal palace . . . to parlay on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor.³⁴

King's followers referred to him as LLJ for Little Lord Jesus, or just Little Jesus. Upon his arrival somewhere, his admirers shouted, "King is King!" or "Hail to the King!" His black opponents, however, referred to him derisively as "Da Lawd," and white racists referred to him as Martin Luther Coon, or Martin Loser King.³⁵

In comparing Gandhi and King against the backdrop of religion, it is also useful to point out a paradoxical combination of values they both possessed. In the first instance, each was a staunch nationalist, which gave their work an essentially exclusivist flavor. Gandhi was fiercely proud of India and its impressive civilization. He thought India, with its rich ancient history, had much to offer the world. After all, as the birthplace of two of the world's most widely practiced religions, India can be considered The Holy Land to hundreds of millions of Hindus and Buddhists. Gandhi was proud of the faith into which he was born and which was born of his beloved Mother India. He wanted India to be run by Indians, not by an alien power.

Like Gandhi, King was a patriot, a quintessential American who believed that America was ordained by God to be special, even unique among all other countries. This is called the Doctrine of American Exceptionalism and is shared by many Americans. King saw the United States as a beacon on a hill, providing a guiding light for the rest of the world to follow. Even his opposition to the Johnson administration's Vietnam War policies was couched in patriotism: King said he opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam because of his love for America. Furthermore, he believed that black Americans in particular could set a fine example for the rest of the world to follow. Because of their unique role in history, black Americans could teach the rest of the country and the world about the transforming power of nonviolence. By bearing the cross of others' shame, by acting out their resistance using nonviolence and self-suffering, black Americans could redeem the soul of the entire nation, which would then serve as a shining example for the rest of the world to follow.³⁶

So, as lovers of their own countries, both Gandhi and King possessed a nationalist vision that was essentially exclusivist in its patriotic fervor. Gandhi's Indian nationalism led him to demand independence from Britain and the exclusion of whites from Indian rule because, unlike white Americans, white Britons in India were foreigners. King's American nationalism led him to demand the inclusion of blacks in the American Dream.

Yet, and in the second, paradoxical, instance, their exclusivist nationalistic sentiments were offset by their universalistic visions for humanity. Fueled by their deep religious convictions, each envisioned a kind of global inclusiveness that called for human oneness, regardless of nationality. For Gandhi, everyone is a child of God and must be treated thusly. Each person is spiritually connected to everyone else: to hurt one person is to hurt oneself. For King, his philosophy of Personalism meant that every human be-

ing had worth under God, and therefore must be loved and treated as part of a single, unified garment of human destiny. King's Personalist vision did not apply only to Americans. Since he believed that "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere," the whole world must be redeemed, not just the United States.³⁷ He developed an all encompassing global vision. The Poor Peoples' Campaign that he was organizing when he was murdered is a good example of his inclusive vision for bringing justice to all who suffered, not just blacks.

As religious devotees, both men insisted on living the totality of their lives informed by a single, unifying creed, nonviolence. Gandhi's nonviolence was acquired through his deeply held Hindu beliefs, reinforced through the influences of Jainism and his Jain friend, Raychandbhai, and then leavened by European and American influences, such as Leo Tolstoy and Henry David Thoreau. King's was acquired through his deeply held Christian beliefs, then reinforced by the influences of Gandhi, Bayard Rustin and others. All aspects of their lives were filtered through the demanding prism of nonviolence. In Gandhi's case, all his experiments with diet, celibacy, non-possession and even his maddeningly frequent about-faces on issues, were all conducted under the unifying rubric of *satyagraha*, which had as its most exigent endeavor the desire to see God through the pursuit of Truth.

For King, his faith dictated not only his nonviolence in the Civil Rights Movement, but also his views on other issues, especially poverty and the Vietnam War. His opposition to the war alienated the Johnson administration, cost him considerable financial support among white liberals and angered many black leaders who turned their backs on him. But King, irrevocably bound by his faith, refused to yield on these issues.

While both were men of intensely held religious convictions, their faith was not confined to the cloister. They were also men of action, believing that their faith demanded their presence at the ramparts of an epic historical struggle. Both were keen at taking the best moral and spiritual tenets of their faiths and turning them into political action that was high minded. Such action was thus so profoundly symbolic that it struck the peoples' deepest psychological chords and transformed many of them into sympathetic adherents if not active resisters. This is what Robert King calls "engaged spirituality." Gandhi, for instance, used the fast to demonstrate to Hindus the extent he was willing to suffer for his principles. King used not only the symbol of the cross, but also Negro spirituals to fuse political action with a holy message:

The spirituals did for the Civil Rights Movement what Gandhi's fasts did for his own reform movement: they brought people together and gave them the courage to resist oppression, while also affecting the consciences of the people outside the movement.³⁸

As Men

Both Gandhi and King had relatively privileged youths, at least by comparison to other Indians and blacks of their time. Although both were scarred by white racism, both were fortunate to come from stable families that were relatively economically secure and insulated from the worst that racists had to offer. Both of their fathers were "strong and ample providers who exercised considerable influence within their respective communities."³⁹ Gandhi's grandfather, then father, then brother, all had good positions in the local government. King's father was a self-made business entrepreneur and preacher. His family was solid middle class.

As young boys, however, Gandhi and King had strikingly different personalities. Young King was athletic and liked to play rough games. Although he did not like to fight, he was willing to settle playground disputes with his fists by suggesting to his opponent that they duke it out on the grass. Few childhood rivals accepted King's offer. King was short and stocky and very physical: he could give a hit as well as absorb one. By his own recollection Gandhi, who was much more slender, even by Indian standards, did not have much interest in athletics at all. There are few, if any, accounts of Gandhi brawling as a youngster.

Moreover, both appear to have had mild suicidal tendencies in their youth. In his frustration at having to do what his elders told him, Gandhi and a childhood friend made a suicide pact but they failed to muster the courage to go through with it.⁴⁰ King made a couple of half-hearted attempts at suicide. The occasion both times involved the grief-stricken boy and his beloved grandmother. On the first, when his grandmother was accidentally knocked unconscious, King thought she was dead and leapt from a second-story window. He did it again sometime later upon hearing the (correct) news of his grandmother's death.⁴¹

Although both had expensive high-powered educations, Gandhi was not much of a student compared to King. His schooling, from early childhood through law school in London, was not marked by any significant or outstanding academic achievements. Later in life, however, Gandhi proved to be an adept intellectual, a voracious reader and prolific writer. King, by contrast, was an exceptional pupil and a well respected and promising young scholar (although not the best of writers). Perhaps King's academic rise was due to the post-World War II need to fill the schools and colleges. However, it is unlikely that this alone, especially in the segregated Deep South of the 1940s and 1950s, would have been enough to propel an African American all the way through to his Ph.D. King was, indeed, an intellectual. What is paradoxical about King's obvious intellect is the plagiarism he committed in writing his dissertation at Boston University. If King was an intellectual lightweight, this would have been easily discovered in the classroom or at the many salons he and his housemates hosted in Boston. Few doubt King's intellect or academic acumen, which was evident from early childhood, so why did he plagiarize parts of his doctoral thesis? Did he cut corners in his haste to

finish? Was he becoming academically lazy? Was he insecure about his writing skills? Or was it simply an outgrowth of the common and widely accepted practice among black preachers to borrow material from one another without giving attribution?

Unlike King, Gandhi was painfully shy. As a young barrister, Gandhi had difficulty mustering the courage to speak up in a court case, even though it was his turn and everyone was waiting for him to speak. By contrast, King won a debating contest while he was in high school and was already accomplished at the pulpit before he graduated from college. Neither was King shy in his pursuit of women. He was quite the ladies' man, while Gandhi hardly even understood the impact of his childhood marriage to Kasturba. King was a galavanter while Gandhi sought to achieve celibacy at an early age. Even as she agreed to marry him, Coretta Scott's friends warned her about young King's reputation as a womanizer.

What they both did share, however, was a strong moral center. As a little boy, King seemed to know instinctively that something was immoral about how his best friend's parents no longer allowed Martin to play with their son because of Martin's skin color. And King was outraged by having to give up his seat to a white person on an overnight train ride. For his part, young Gandhi refused to obey his teacher's instructions to copy off of another pupil's exam so that a visiting school official could see that the teacher's students had all achieved a 100 percent mark. Even in his rebelliousness, Gandhi's moral center eventually overrode his youthful impulses. After stealing and lying, the young *Mahatma-to-be* could not overcome the sense of guilt and shame he felt and thus confessed his sin to his father. And once Gandhi made a promise, as a young law student in London or as an accomplished barrister in South Africa, there was absolutely no going back on it.

That said, neither Gandhi nor King can be considered excellent role models as family men, at least in the traditional sense. Unlike the conventional father and husband, Gandhi's attachment to and love of family did not supercede his love of others. Gandhi made no distinctions in how he treated people, whether they were blood relations or not. He virtually disowned his eldest son, Harilal, after he learned of Harilal's drinking, cavorting and public conversion to Islam. Gandhi instructed other family members not to share anything with Harilal. Is this the proper approach a votary of love and nonviolence takes toward another person, a son no less? Furthermore, in correspondence with family members, Gandhi was harsh, refusing to send them money, proclaiming that all his resources were devoted to his social uplift programs and that relatives did not deserve his largesse just because they were kin.

Gandhi was strict with Kasturba too, rarely giving in to her wishes. He forbade her from keeping gifts. He also dictated to doctors what medicines she could have in times of illness. Even though he eventually eased up on trying to control every aspect of his wife's life, "he refused to give

any credence or respect to her opinions or intellect,"⁴² remaining patrician toward her until she died. That is not to say that Gandhi did not love "Ba" because he did. It's just that his love for her did not conform to conventional notions of spousal fealty.

And King loved Coretta, but he was strict with her also. Right at the end of their first date, King shocked Coretta by expressing his desire to marry her. But this proposal was conditioned on Coretta's willingness to accept the traditional role of the housewife who would keep the home and raise the children. Despite her considerable prospects as a professional singer, Coretta acceded to King's insistence that she remain home. Once they were married, he even forbade her from partaking in nonviolent resistance campaigns. Coretta once said, "I've never been on the scene when we've marched. . . . I'm usually at home because my husband says, 'you have to take care of the children.'" ⁴³ Moreover, King was, by today's standards, an absentee father, not seeing his children for weeks at a time. King was also unfaithful to his wife.

When it came to gender relations and the treatment of women overall, Gandhi was arguably far ahead of his time while King was behind his. Although he started out as a young male chauvinist in the first years of his marriage, Gandhi ended up calling for an end to child marriages because of the heavy burden it placed on young girls. Gandhi wanted to liberate women from their social shackles. He called for an end to *purdah* (screen or veil) and the seclusion of women because women must exercise their right and duty to serve outside the home as well as inside it. He called for equal treatment of women and insisted that men share in the housework at his *ashrams*. He even called on women to join the men as equals in the nonviolent *satyagraha* campaigns.⁴⁵ He felt women had a special strength of character and a great capacity for self-sacrifice and nonviolence. He also believed that women were perfectly situated to help him carry out his major reform programs, including spinning, ending untouchability, improving home hygiene and even building friendships across communal boundaries.⁴⁶

By contrast, King looked down on professional women and did not think that women could be effective leaders.⁴⁷ According to James Lawson, a high-ranking member of the movement, "Martin had real problems with having women in a high position."⁴⁸ But even if King insisted that Coretta's place was in the home, other women played key roles in the movement. From Rosa Parks's famous "no" on that Montgomery bus, to Ella Baker's leadership in saving the SCLC from financial ruin,⁴⁹ to Diane Nash's remarkable ability to keep the Freedom Rides, which were on the verge of collapsing, intact and nonviolent, women played a prominent role and were very much the "backbone" of the Civil Rights Movement.⁵⁰

Even as a national figure, King's views about freedom and equality did not extend to women. In the late 1950s, he wrote a column for *Ebony Magazine* called Advice for Liv-

ing. In it, he wrote that the “primary obligation of the woman is motherhood.”⁵¹ In one column, a woman wrote in asking for advice about her cheating husband. Rather than hold the husband responsible for his despicable behavior, King suggested that it was the wife’s fault. He asked her to consider what the other woman had to offer her husband that she did not: “Do you nag?” he asked.⁵² While King’s traditionalist views of women may have been similar to some other men of his time, they certainly clashed with the major theme of his movement. Moreover, the women’s liberation movement was in full swing during King’s last years, so he must have been fully cognizant of women’s issues.

Gandhi and King share similarities and differences in how they tried to cope with human passions, including their materialist, culinary and carnal desires. Despite the objections of their spouses, Gandhi and King both sought to overcome what many consider a natural human desire, to acquire material possessions. In Gandhi’s case, he gave up virtually all worldly possessions, save a pair of spectacles, a walking stick, a few articles of clothing, some writing implements and some crude dining ware. At a very early age and much to the consternation of his wife, Gandhi began divesting himself of his and his family’s possessions, putting them in trust for the poor. After his visit to India, King also tried to shed his desire for material things, although he was less successful at this than Gandhi. For the longest time, he resisted Coretta’s pleas and delayed buying a new car and a new home, despite the fact that the family had clearly outgrown the old ones. He felt that he did not deserve to keep the monetary award that came with his Nobel Peace Prize while Coretta argued that he should. He won that argument. Although King’s taste for fine suits stayed with him, by his last days, he was increasingly turning to the idea of complete denial of material possessions.

When it comes to the palate, Gandhi and King diverge considerably. Judging that he must overcome all desires in order to see God face to face, Gandhi engaged in a lifelong experiment to conquer his palate. He was a strict vegetarian by his law-school days. In later life, he conducted diet experiments in order to determine how little and how simply he could eat. Gandhi’s repeated fasts were also tied to his desire to conquer his palate. For his part, King does not appear to have had any interest in conquering his palate. A little bit overweight, King was a meat eater who definitely enjoyed a good meal. He was known to make sudden outbursts at SCLC meetings proclaiming he could not continue without first having something to eat.

Regarding their sexuality, Gandhi and King show differences as well as similarities. On the one hand, both were nearly consumed by their preoccupation with sex. Gandhi and King both felt immense guilt about their sexuality. King was haunted by his infidelities, while Gandhi never fully recovered from the shame of running off to his wife’s bed just as his father was about to die. On the other hand, they came to terms with this preoccupation through sharply contradictory practices, with Gandhi essentially denying his sexuality through the austere practice of *brahmacharya* (celi-

bacy), while King repeatedly succumbed to his sexual appetite. Despite his guilt and self-loathing, King’s urges, perhaps coupled with his loneliness for being away from home so much, led him to break his marital vows on numerous occasions. According to Ralph Abernathy’s book *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down* (1989), written long after King died, King engaged in a sexual liaison even on the night before he was assassinated. By contrast, Gandhi achieved celibacy at the young age of 37. Yet, despite finally keeping his vow of celibacy for more than four decades, Gandhi remained preoccupied with his sexuality until his death. He clearly enjoyed the company of young women, writing to one, “The sexual sense is hardest to overcome in my case.”⁵³ Once Gandhi had an involuntary discharge while sleeping and awoke traumatized by the incident. So, to be absolutely sure of his celibacy, Gandhi conducted a controversial experiment by sleeping naked alongside nubile young women.

As Heroes

If a hero is someone who, knowing the danger, demonstrates bravery and courage in the fearless service of others, then surely Gandhi and King are heroes. King defined courage as the power of the mind to overcome fear.⁵⁴ To be sure, both King and Gandhi demonstrated fearlessness in the face of repeated death threats and several assassination attempts. King was spat upon, jailed, beaten, hit with bricks, bombed and stabbed, yet he retained the courage to continue struggling for his beliefs.⁵⁵ In seminary school, a white racist pulled a gun on King and threatened to kill him. King calmed him with his words. Later, the student admitted he was wrong and publicly apologized to King.⁵⁶ At a signing ceremony for his first book, *Stride Toward Freedom*, a crazed woman stabbed King in the chest. Once while King was giving a speech, a white supremacist rushed the stage and punched him in the face and then began to pummel him. When King lowered his arms and looked calmly at his attacker, one witness said that she never again doubted King’s complete philosophical commitment to nonviolence.⁵⁷ King’s house was firebombed and he and his family were constantly receiving death threats. Yet he remained eerily calm amidst this maelstrom. After the firebombing, King confronted an angry black mob outside his home that wanted revenge. King calmed them, saying “we must love our white brothers, no matter what they do to us. . . . We must meet hate with love.”⁵⁸ When hooded Ku Klux Klansmen rode through his neighborhood to try to terrorize him, he went out on his front door step and remained there until the horsemen left. In the closing words of his last speech, King expressed this fearlessness eloquently:

Well, I don’t know what will happen now. We’ve got some difficult days ahead. But it doesn’t matter with me now. . . . Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I’m not concerned about that now. . . . [because] I’ve seen the promised land. I may not get there with

you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the promised land. And I'm happy, tonight! I'm not worried about anything! I'm not fearing any man! Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord!⁵⁹

For his part, Gandhi received many death threats and in fact experienced several close calls. In South Africa, Gandhi was almost beaten to death by an angry mob of whites. After a burly Indian threatened to kill him, Gandhi showed no fear in defying his compatriot. True to his threat, the husky man clubbed Gandhi on the head, seriously wounding him. During the communal riots in Calcutta, Gandhi deliberately waded into the thicket of violence, residing in the abandoned house of Muslims. An angry mob of Hindus broke into the compound, demanding that he leave at once. They trashed the place, swinging clubs and sticks. Gandhi was nearly hit in the head with a brick. Gandhi's life was in danger yet he remained calm and eventually talked the crowd into putting down its weapons and going home. On another occasion, a bomb exploded near the dais where he was conducting his prayer meeting. This was a failed attempt on Gandhi's life, conducted by members of the same group who would in fact succeed the next day, this time with three bullets to the chest. When the bomb exploded Gandhi remained calm, soothing the crowd by resuming his prayer session. And, true to his wish, when Gandhi was shot by the Hindu extremists the next day, he said *Hey Ram* (Oh, God) three times and then fell to the ground.

Gandhi and King are also heroes because of how they lived their lives in the service of others. Although both could have been rich and successful as private citizens, both chose instead to sacrifice great career potential, and the comfort it would bring them and their family, for a life of service to others. Both men gave up promising and lucrative careers for a life of voluntary poverty. Indeed, both were far more concerned with caring for and serving others than they were for themselves.

So what of their legacies? Do Gandhi and King's non-violent visions dominate Indian or American society today? Does today's India reflect Gandhi's vision? Has the United States fulfilled King's dream? In short, the answer is mostly no. Overall, since India did not follow Gandhi's lead on the issues that mattered most to him, such as nonviolence, *satyagraha*, Hindu-Muslim unity, *khadi*, reviving village life and ending Untouchability, there is little to suggest that Gandhi is the father of contemporary India.⁶⁰ Contrary to what Gandhi wished, India evolved into a modern country with a strong central government, a sophisticated military and heavy industrial and agricultural sectors. And King's eloquent dream of creating a beloved community in the United States remains a dream. In the twenty-first century, people still are too often judged by the color of their skin and not the content of their character. America remains very much segregated. Racial profiling of blacks on the streets, on the highways, in the malls and in the restaurants still

exists and the problem of America is still the problem of racism.⁶¹

Nevertheless, there is evidence all around of Gandhi and King's influence and enduring legacy in the twenty-first century. Both men are the subject of numerous continuing studies and books. Both men have many Internet websites dedicated to their memory and teaching. Both men are the subject of numerous international conferences and symposia. Both men have been the subject of multiple film documentaries and cinematic movie productions. Both men have monuments and museums dedicated to their life and work. Both men have national holidays honoring their memory. Both men have left behind a wealth of admirers and followers who today carry on their work all over the world. Both men have their words reproduced and replayed countless times in countless venues. Most important, their style of nonviolent resistance is still practiced throughout the world.⁶² Indeed, both men are more than historical figures—theirs is a legacy of timeless applicability and boundless potential, one for all the ages.

Endnotes

1. Michael Nagler, "Nonviolence," in *World Encyclopedia of Peace*, vol. 2, ed. Ervin Laszlo and Jung Youl Yoo (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986), p. 72.
2. Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9.
3. *Satyagraha* also translates as the strength that comes from adhering to the truth.
4. James M. Washington, ed., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1986), p. 31.
5. William Robert Miller, "The Broadening Horizons," in *Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile*, rev. ed., ed. C. Eric Lincoln (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), p. 63.
6. Stephen B. Oates, *Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 142–44.
7. Judith Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 108.
8. Donald T. Phillips, *Martin Luther King, Jr. on Leadership: Inspiration and Wisdom for Challenging Times* (New York: Warner Books, 1999), p. 41.
9. David J. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference* (New York: W. Morrow, 1986), p. 20.
10. Oates, *Let the Trumpet Sound*, p. 286.
11. Rustin was a remarkably gifted organizer and instrumental in influencing King's turn to philosophical nonviolence. He was also openly gay

- and a former member of the Communist Party, both factors that made him a serious liability to King.
12. Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 96.
 13. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 343.
 14. Marshall Frady, *Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 46 and Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 343, respectively.
 15. German philosopher G.F.W. Hegel's (1770–1831) notion of synthesis, which was the product of the clash between a thesis and its antithesis, appealed to King's intellectual sensibilities.
 16. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, pp. 464–65.
 17. Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Rising Tide of Racial Consciousness," in *A Testament of Hope*, p. 148.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
 19. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," in *A Testament of Hope*, p. 299.
 20. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 540.
 21. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Indian Home Rule*, second improved edition (Madras, India: S. Ganesan, 1922), pp. 22, 53. More than 30 years after he first wrote the book in 1910, Gandhi said he stood by the remarks in it.
 22. This is especially poignant in Gandhi's case since he went to great lengths to maintain good relations and a productive dialogue with India's Muslims. See David Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of his Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 158–74.
 23. James H. Cone, *Martin and Malcolm in America: A Dream or a Nightmare?* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993), p. 176.
 24. Oates, *Let the Trumpet Sound*, p. 290.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 399.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
 27. Interestingly, while Gandhi confronted whites as a member of the majority group, King confronted them as a member of a minority group.
 28. "The Sermons of Martin Luther King, Jr.," Retrieved 13 July 2005 from [MLK Papers Project Sermons: "The American Dream" website: http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/sermons/650704_The_American_Dream.html](http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/sermons/650704_The_American_Dream.html), no date.
 29. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, p. 17.
 30. C. Eric Lincoln, ed., *Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), p. xiii.
 31. D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Kormachand Gandhi*, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1951), p. 88.
 32. "MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church," Retrieved 10 July 2005 from [MLK Online website: http://www.mlkonline.net/mia.html](http://www.mlkonline.net/mia.html), no date.
 33. Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, p. 183.
 34. Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours*, p. 238.
 35. Frady, *Martin Luther King, Jr.*, p. 96.
 36. Gandhi made prophetic reference to this in the 1930s when he said, "it may be through the [American] Negroes that the unadulterated message of nonviolence will be delivered to the world" (Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, p. 182).
 37. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," in *A Testament of Hope*, p. 290.
 38. Robert H. King, *Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Continuum, 2001), p. 158.
 39. Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, p. 177.
 40. Gandhi, Mohandas K., *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. by Mahadev Desai (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 26.
 41. Lerone Bennett, *What Manner of Man: A Biography of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Co, 1968), pp. 18–19.
 42. Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours*, p. 97.
 43. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 308.
 44. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, p. 210.
 45. Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours*, p. 111.
 46. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, p. 59.
 47. Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 232.
 48. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 141.
 49. This, despite King's vocal opposition to giving her the position, and then acquiescing only if it was agreed Baker's position in the SCLC would be temporary.
 50. Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, p. 178.
 51. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, p. 99.
 52. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
 53. Stanley Wolpert, *Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 186.
 54. Phillips, *Martin Luther King, Jr.*, p. 306.
 55. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
 56. Oates, *Let the Trumpet Sound*, p. 30.
 57. Branch, *Parting the Waters*, p. 654.
 58. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 137–38.

59. "Memphis: We remember: I've been to the Mountaintop," Retrieved 18 September 2002 from American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees website: <http://www.afscme.org/about/kingspch.htm>, no date.
60. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, p. 389.
61. To this can now be added racial profiling of Muslim and Arab Americans.
62. See Hardiman, *Gandhi in His Time and Ours*, pp. 198–293, for an excellent discussion of Gandhi's legacy not only in India but throughout the world.

Miracle or Model? South Africa's Transition to Democracy

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Fifteen years have passed since Nelson Mandela was released from a South African prison in February 1990 and about a decade has passed since that country's first multiracial election in April 1994. The transition bracketed by those two events, i.e., the transition from an apartheid dictatorship to a multi-racial democracy, is routinely described as a "miracle," something the *American Heritage Dictionary* defines as an "event that appears unexplainable by the laws of nature and so is held to be supernatural in origin or an act of God." Patti Waldmeir's depiction of South Africa's transition, for example, is entitled *The Anatomy of a Miracle*; Adrian Guelke has written about "the Misunderstood Miracle," and Allister Sparks has titled his recent overview of the first decade of multiracial democracy *Beyond the Miracle*.¹ While those books concentrate largely on changes in the country's politics, others describe the changes in its economic policies as a miracle. Pamela Cox, former head of the World Bank's South Africa Division, has argued that the post-1994 African National Congress [ANC] government "inherited an economy that was in severe distress, and what they have done to put the economy on the right footing is...almost miraculous."²

Yet others are troubled by this conception of South Africa's transition. Princeton Lyman, the American ambassador to Pretoria for much of that time, has written that the "problem with painting South Africa so often as a 'miracle' is that it leads to seeing it as an aberration, a special case with limited relevance to other conflicts."³ This study considers this issue; can South Africa's transition be explained by the "laws" of conflict resolution and democracy promotion and, as a result, be relevant for other cases, or should it be considered unique and as something coming from God?

South Africa as Miracle

There are several ways that the outcome in South Africa might be considered a miracle: that it occurred at all and ended the way it did, that leading figures in the transition process behaved in unexpected ways, and that it included a number of fortuitous events, any one of which might be described as "miraculous."

An Unexpected Transition

Many inside and outside the country were surprised at the outcome. Margaret Thatcher uttered the most memorable false prediction, arguing in 1987 that "anyone who thinks the ANC is going to run the government in South Africa is living in cloud-cuckoo land."⁴ Scholars, too, had reason to be skeptical. Historically, relatively few internal

conflicts—generally estimated at between one-quarter and one-third—ended with negotiated settlements, much less democracy. Roy Licklider has concluded, in addition, that 50% of negotiated settlements ending civil wars were followed by a return to violence. Thus in Africa, there have been failed conflict resolution efforts in Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, the Congo, and elsewhere. There are many reasons why internal wars are more difficult to resolve politically: the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, the difficulty of compromise with foes against whom one has been fighting and with whom one must live when the war is finished, the self interest of some in prolonging the conflict, and the high stakes of such conflicts—typically control of the government and the consequent control of the resources that that provides.⁵ In the South African case, specifically, there was a "legacy of political polarization—rooted in deep socioeconomic inequalities, reinforced by a state founded on racial discrimination, and inflamed by a history of political violence," conditions that "could hardly have provided a less promising foundation for a stable democracy."⁶ The outbreak of genocidal violence in Rwanda in the same month as South Africa's election provided evidence of the need to resolve domestic conflicts peacefully but also of the difficulty of doing so.

Not unexpectedly, many informed observers in South Africa, itself, did not expect a successful transition. Georg Meiring, head of the country's National Defense Force, concluded in November 1993 that "it is probably unrealistic to expect internal stability to be achieved within the next decade." Eugene Nyati, a black risk analyst, identified some of the reasons for pessimism: "Public disillusionment and the lack of improvement in the quality of life will galvanize resistance.... Civil and labor unrest will resume and render the country ungovernable once again." Ordinary people shared this pessimism. Only 15% of whites polled in a late 1991 survey believed they would be better off in the "new" South Africa. Africans, too, were skeptical. For example, one ANC "comrade" told Waldmeir that "I don't think we're ready for a new South Africa. There's a war coming."⁷ Given the pessimism about future stability, it is not surprising that many doubted that democracy would emerge. That pessimism was reinforced by the state of democracy elsewhere on the continent: the 1994 Freedom House survey identified only eight "free" countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 20 that were "partly free," and 17 that were "not free."⁸

More than unexpected, there are also ways that South Africa's transition was unprecedented. William Zartman has argued that, "neither history nor analysis could have predicted a negotiated outcome to the internal conflict in South

Africa,” because “there is no precedent anywhere for successful negotiations allowing a poor majority to take over from or even share power with a rich majority when majority and minority identify and are identified ascriptively. That only happens by revolution or by post-colonial replacement.” Similarly, Seymour Martin Lipset believes that in societies like South Africa, where the state is a primary source of power, status, and income, “for a person or governing body to be willing to give up control because of an election outcome,” is “astonishing behavior, not normal...” Or, as Pik Botha, then South Africa’s foreign minister, argued in 1978: “A political system of one-man one- vote within one political entity means our destruction.... I am not aware of any nation in the history of the world having knowingly committed that sort of suicide.”⁹ Yet that is precisely what white South Africans did.

Unexpected Behaviors

That leading participants behaved in ways that previous experience would not have predicted is a second way to consider the country’s transition miraculous. Three participants were crucial: P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk, and Nelson Mandela. De Klerk and Mandela are better known and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, but Botha, too, played an important role. Defense Minister from 1966–80 and prime minister/president (the title of the country’s chief executive changed in the 1983 constitution) from 1978–89, Botha had helped to develop the “total onslaught” idea, i.e., that virtually all components of South African society were under attack, and that Pretoria needed a “total strategy” to defend itself. While this did lead to some socioeconomic reforms, e.g., the right of Africans to unionize, increased school enrollments, and abolition of the Immorality Act, it refused to contemplate meaningful political reform, e.g., establishing a common citizenship or eliminating the pass laws. Moreover, Botha combined these modest reforms with repression of apartheid’s opponents. These hardly seem like the policies of someone committed to major reforms. Nonetheless, it was Botha who authorized the first secret talks between the government and Mandela, talks that continued for the remainder of his presidency. Botha, himself, met with Mandela in July 1989. Reflecting on that meeting, Mandela illustrated both Botha’s reputation and his changed approach: “I thought I was going to meet this finger-wagging man I had seen on television, and I didn’t know how I might react. But when I entered the room he came in from the opposite side and walked toward me with his hand outstretched. That was the way the whole thing went. He was charming and the whole conversation was very warm.”¹⁰

De Klerk, Botha’s successor as President, played a more visible but equally unforeseen role in the transition. A “model nationalist whose family history was interwoven with that of the Afrikaner nationalist movement,” de Klerk’s family included persons who had been imprisoned by the British during the Boer War, participated in the founding of the conservative Reformed (“Dopper”) Church in the 19th cen-

tury, and played a role in the founding of both the National Party and Purified National Party in the 20th. The future president’s father had served as a cabinet minister under three different prime ministers and his uncle, Hans Strijdom, had been a prime minister.¹¹ De Klerk’s views, moreover, seemed to make him an unlikely reformer. He had long considered apartheid to be morally and politically sound, arguing that in addition to trying to protect white interests, it also protected and nurtured African cultures and prevented the sort of struggle for supremacy that might lead to a race war. As National Party leader in the Transvaal, de Klerk had opposed Botha’s modest reforms. Given this history, few predicted de Klerk would be a reformer, his own brother arguing that “he is too strongly convinced that racial grouping is the only truth, way of life. He is too dismissive of a more radical style.”¹²

What is surprising about Nelson Mandela, the third important participant in the transition, is not that his political views changed but that they did not, despite the privations he experienced. Mandela and the African National Congress had long advocated non-violent resistance and compromise between whites and blacks. He argued at his 1964 trial that the ANC had engaged in violence only after all other means of political activity were barred. He maintained those views throughout his prison years, telling an interviewer in January 1986 that the ANC would end its armed struggle if the government “would legalize us, treat us like a political party and negotiate with us.” In a March 1989 letter to Botha, Mandela emphasized the need for compromise, arguing that “reconciliation will be achieved only if both parties are willing to compromise.”¹³ These were not words uttered merely to please his jailers. After his release, Mandela persisted in such arguments, telling a July 1991 ANC meeting that negotiations were “a continuation of the struggle leading to our central objective: the transfer of power to the people,” and working to reorient the organization from armed struggle to peaceful negotiations.¹⁴ Perhaps more important was Mandela’s lack of bitterness, despite having served more than a quarter century in prison. He remarked soon after his release that “bitterness would be in conflict with the whole policy to which I have dedicated my life.”¹⁵ The role played by Mandela after his release is well-known and applauded. What is not so well known is that he was lucky to have had the opportunity to play that role. One of his lawyers at the 1964 trial believed that Mandela, having admitted the facts of the state’s case, had a 50-50 chance of being sentenced to death.¹⁶

Fortuitous Happenings

A final way to view South Africa’s transition as miraculous is to identify the fortuitous elements that occurred throughout. Consider the timing. Its beginning could be dated in 1985, with the first secret contacts between Mandela and the government. Those talks did not lead to much movement on either side. That would not come until later in the 1980s, after the demise of the Soviet Union and commu-

nism, something de Klerk described as a “God-sent opportunity” to change South Africa.¹⁷ Those events altered the calculations of both the government and the ANC, and talks began to move forward. Had contacts between Mandela and the government begun before 1985, they may have died out in mutual frustration by the late 1980s; had they begun later, de Klerk, seeing what happened to Mikhail Gorbachev and his reform effort in the Soviet Union, may have concluded that he could not control the reform process and decided to abandon it.

Mandela's first talks with a government official were with Kobie Coetsee, the Justice Minister. Coetsee's interest in Mandela was, at least in part, a consequence of his friendship with Piet de Waal, with whom he had gone to college. De Waal later became a lawyer in Brandfort, the small town to which Winnie Mandela had been banned in 1977. Forced by circumstances to serve as her lawyer, de Waal and his wife became friends with the ANC radical. De Waal soon began to urge his old friend Coetsee, now Justice Minister, to ease Winnie's banning order and to consider releasing Nelson Mandela. Coetsee later admitted that these appeals from an old friend, had an impact on his thinking. He met Mandela in November 1985, but only after a chance encounter with Winnie. Traveling to Cape Town to be with Nelson during surgery, Winnie happened to be on the same plane as Coetsee. Their conversation convinced Coetsee that he should meet with the prisoner.¹⁸

There were also fortuitous meetings and events during the negotiations. A significant one occurred less than two weeks before the April 1994 election. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party and a crucial hold-out, had demanded international mediation of his differences with the primary negotiators. Wanting to make the elections as inclusive as possible, Mandela and de Klerk agreed, but the mediation failed, an outcome that heralded a troubled election. Then, at nearly the last minute, Washington Okumu, a Kenyan participant in the mediation, persuaded Buthelezi to participate in the election. Okumu had known Buthelezi for twenty years and shared his Christian faith, something he appealed to by forcing the IFP leader to consider the costs of civil war. Yet the Okumu-Buthelezi meeting almost did not occur. When the Kenyan did not arrive for their scheduled airport meeting, Buthelezi decided to leave. Only after his plane had engine trouble and had to return to the airport did he meet Okumu. “It was,” Buthelezi later remarked, “as if God had prevented me from leaving and I was there like Jonah brought back.”¹⁹

Another obstacle to an inclusive election was the white right. This was a diverse group, consisting of a variety of Afrikaner political and cultural groups with a variety of views. Some, such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), were fascists opposed to any sort of change in the prevailing order. Another important group, the Afrikaner *Volksfront*, was a political organization that had been formed by Constand Viljoen and other former generals in May 1993 and sought merely the establishment of an Afrikaner homeland. The AWB and *Volksfront* maintained a tenuous alli-

ance with Buthelezi's IFP and leaders of several apartheid-era African homelands. That alliance was only broken up following the “Battle of Bop” in early March 1994. This “battle” was between Lucas Mangope, black leader of the Bophuthatswana homeland and opponent of the elections, the people of Bophuthatswana who wanted to take part in the election, and the homeland's civil servants who feared for their pensions. When the people rose up against Mangope, Viljoen decided to come to his aid. The AWB rushed in, too, and its participation turned the intervention into a fiasco. Racist and ill-disciplined, AWB men traveled throughout the homeland's capital city shouting abuse and killing and wounding some of its residents before deciding to depart. The last vehicle of its convoy was fired on, the driver shot, and the passengers begged for medical help. Instead, in front of television cameras, they were shot by angry Bophuthatswana military men. South Africans were horrified and any threatened military option disappeared. Thus, the AWB's intervention, unwanted by either Mangope and Viljoen, might be considered fortuitous. Equally miraculous was the timing. The Battle of Bop culminated on March 11, 1994, the last day to register candidates for the election. Recognizing that the military option was gone, Viljoen immediately decided to register his party's candidates, doing so only ten minutes before the deadline. As Anthony Sampson has written, “Ironically, it was the thugs of the AWB who saved the day, by discrediting the whole expedition and Mangope's regime, along with the system that created it.”²⁰

South Africa as Model

Although there were elements of the miraculous in South Africa's transition, much of it might also be explained by contemporary theories on conflict resolution and democracy promotion. The success in South Africa might, consequently, serve to reinforce theory and practice in other cases. Anticipating such an outcome, Archbishop Desmond Tutu remarked in late 1993, “once we have got it right, South Africa will be the paradigm for the rest of the world.”²¹ The relevance of theory can be demonstrated in three facets of the transition: its setting and outcome, the transition process, and the design of the new government.

The Setting and Outcome of the Transition

With respect to the setting for South Africa's transition, there is increasing evidence—contrary to earlier skepticism about political settlements for civil war—that these can be ended through negotiations, in part because the nature of civil wars is changing. They are becoming more identity based (as in South Africa) than ideologically based, meaning that neither side will be able to convert the other to its way of thinking. In such circumstances, the most likely alternatives are repression, perhaps even genocide, or a political settlement. In South Africa, whites and blacks even-

tually “realized that they had been cast together by forces of history that could not be undone and that in the final analysis that they were dependent on one another to a degree where they could either live together or perish together, and who then followed the painful and difficult logic of that recognition.”²² Other factors inducing political settlements in contemporary conflicts include the growing disinterest of the world’s leading powers and the growing emphasis on economic success as a source of political legitimacy.²³

At the onset of its transition, South Africa may well have been in what William Zartman describes as a “ripe moment,” one characterized by a “mutually hurting stalemate” between the parties, i.e., a “gradual long-term realization by both sides that the current course was a dead end.”²⁴ While not inevitable, the existence of a mutual hurting stalemate increases the chances the parties will pursue a negotiated settlement. In South Africa, both the South African government and the African National Congress had realized by the mid-1980s that they could not defeat the other.

From this perspective, it is the self-interest of the parties that brings them together to resolve their differences. That is, the motivations and incentives of leaders involved in the transition process are crucial to its outcome. Here, too, there is theory that helps explain the emergence of democracy in South Africa. Consider Noah Feldman’s discussion of America’s nation-building efforts in Iraq.²⁵ He argues that democracy is possible, though perhaps not probable, there because all leading parties recognize that they cannot rule alone. Thus, even if democracy is not their first preference, it might emerge as the least worst option. South Africa is very different than Iraq, of course, but there, too, the various parties came to recognize that they needed each other, that it was in their interests to resolve the conflict, and that compromise and democratic guarantees were the best ways to deal with lingering mistrust.

The government saw many problems. A fundamental one was that there were more and more Africans in the country relative to whites: the African majority had been 6,242,000 when the National Party came to power in 1948, but by 1991 it was 23,238,000 and growing because of higher African birth rates.²⁶ The government had tried a variety of military and political strategies to deal with this and preserve white power but none of these were completely successful, in part because opposition was far larger and better organized in the mid-1980s than it had been at the time of the earlier Sharpeville and Soweto crises. There were also economic problems. Apartheid’s restrictions on labor mobility limited economic efficiency, and the government’s high spending on the military (17.7% of the budget by 1989) fueled inflation. Internationally, Pretoria was increasingly isolated, with black-led governments on its borders and growing calls for international sanctions. Even the United States and Britain had begun to consider sanctions after a state of emergency was declared in 1986.²⁷ A senior member of the government’s National Intelligence Service later described the government’s predicament: “Nowhere was the situation out of hand, but it was clear that politically and

morally we were losing our grip.... The political system had become obsolete, and a long bloody struggle lay ahead. It had become clear that the sooner we negotiated a new system the better.” Leading voices in white society had reached a similar conclusion. White business leaders began meeting with the ANC as early as 1985. Even the leader of the *Broederbond*, the bastion of official Afrikanerdom, had concluded by the mid-1980s that the “exclusion of effective black participation in the political process is a threat to white survival...”²⁸

Yet all was not well for the regime’s opponents, either, and they may also have been motivated by self-interest to pursue a compromise solution. The ANC’s military efforts had had little direct effect on the South African state, but they had had the adverse effect of alienating the white population it hoped to negotiate with. It remained an exiled organization, although one with some degree of domestic support. With the coming to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, world revolution grew increasingly discredited and the Soviet-bloc’s provision of arms slowed. There were divisions within the organization, between those in the country and those outside, between those committed to a revolutionary overthrow of the government and those contemplating negotiations. These differences, largely academic in the 1960s and 1970s, became more important as the prospect of negotiations increased.²⁹

Having made the decision to act, the South African parties were fortunate that many of the barriers to successful conflict resolution were not present. Consider the list of factors complicating the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements identified by Stephen John Stedman: three or more major contending parties, absence of a peace agreement signed by all, the likelihood of spoilers, a collapsed state, large numbers of soldiers on both sides, access of one or both parties to disposable natural resources, a regional environment hostile to a settlement, and a conflict based on ethnic secession. One could make a case that none of these were present in the South African case. Similarly, many of the institutional attributes of war-torn societies identified by Nicole Ball, including weak political institutions, limited legitimacy of political leaders, and a lack of agreement on the country’s future direction, seem not to be present in this case. Ball does identify several socioeconomic and security characteristics that can describe South Africa, e.g., damage to the country’s infrastructure, contraction of the legal economy and expansion of the illegal economy, and a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces. While one should not minimize these conditions, they were likely not as common in South Africa as in other conflict-ridden societies.³⁰

In addition to rendering the resolution of South Africa’s conflict comprehensible, contemporary theory also helps to explain the emergence of democracy there. Democracy has emerged in a variety of countries and there appears to be no magic factor that fuels democratic transitions, but South Africa did possess a number of attributes often cited as contributing to democracy.³¹ Economically, the country was rela-

tively wealthy and had grown dramatically after 1948. While growth had slowed in the early 1980s, it resumed by the middle of the decade. By 1994, the country's economy was in the world's top thirty. While still severely disadvantaged, Africans had seen improvement in their economic and educational status. Black disposable income increased almost twice as fast as white disposable income between 1960–80. While only 122,000 Africans had been enrolled in secondary schools in 1970, nearly ten times that number were enrolled in 1985. The economy had also become more modern, with the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors relative to traditional strengths in mining and agriculture.³²

The country's social structure was becoming increasingly variegated and pluralistic, another facilitator of democracy. There had long been individual whites who opposed apartheid, but their number began to increase after the 1960s. The once monolithic Afrikaner community had begun to fragment by the 1970s and 1980s. Business groups began to reach out to the ANC in the 1980s. The non-white political opposition, too, became more diverse, more assertive, and more skilled over time, especially after the emergence of the United Democratic Front in 1983.³³ That organization, in addition to mobilizing apartheid's opponents, "helped to build an unprecedented organizational structure from the local to the national levels" and "nurtured a political culture that emphasized democratic rights and claims indivisible by race."³⁴

The hybrid nature of the apartheid state, one that practiced elements of democracy for whites while suppressing Africans, was also relevant for the emergence of democracy. While one should not exaggerate the democratic credentials of white South Africa, there were periodic elections, a modest political opposition, a press that had some degree of freedom, and elements of the rule of law. As a result, many in the country had experience with democratic procedures and the country's political institutions needed merely to be transformed rather than created from the ground up. This eased the transition to democracy. The ANC, too, had some experience with compromise and tolerance, if not democracy, since it had long been a multi-racial group. It included a number of different viewpoints, periodically consulted the people—the writing of the Freedom Charter being the best example—and engaged in widespread internal discussions before making decisions, e.g., regarding the decision to resort to violence in the early 1960s.³⁵

The Transition Process

Contemporary theory also provides an understanding of the nature of South Africa's transition process, so much so that Timothy Sisk has described it as a "model of step-by-step measures to promote a just peace in a society deeply divided during the course of a profoundly unjust history." Zartman, similarly, summarizes his review of the negotiations by noting that "what happened in South Africa was

the epitome of a negotiating process...that brought into being a new political system characterized by compromise and pluralistic participation."³⁶

One, perhaps surprising, element of that slow, step-by-step process was the delay before holding national elections. While there is much evidence that democracy might be the only viable long-term political solution in divided societies, democratic procedures can exacerbate tensions in the short run. This not unlikely outcome occurs because democratic processes exacerbate social conflicts through, for example, election campaigns, a free press, and debates within legislatures. Societies emerging from internal conflicts have not only intense social conflicts but also non-existent or illegitimate political institutions through which such conflict could be channeled. Opportunistic elites, moreover, may deliberately exploit ethnic tensions to promote their own narrow interests.³⁷ Experience in Angola, where a contested election was followed by a return to war, and Bosnia, where election campaigns have served to harden the ethnic divide, illustrates the danger of holding elections too soon. In South Africa more than four years passed between Mandela's release from prison and the April 1994 elections; six months passed between the end of the negotiations and the elections. In this time the two leading parties had learned to trust each other, leading political forces had cooperated with each other, exiles and exiled groups had been able to return to the country and re-establish themselves, and the political education of the electorate had begun.

Contemporary theory also suggests that the conflict resolution processes must be as inclusive as possible. While moderates in the two camps may be able to conclude a deal among themselves, excluding more radical elements is a mistake. Failures of less-than-inclusive efforts demonstrate that the "only realistic solutions for settling the horrific problems of the war-torn, divided societies of Africa are inclusive arrangements," because "the alternative is nearly always a catastrophic breakdown of the state and society."³⁸ Inclusive solutions are preferable, because they establish procedures to increase confidence between former foes before and after the settlement is achieved, and they increase incentives to distribute resources throughout the country rather than to one privileged group or region, solidifying the outcome. This principle of inclusiveness applies to both the negotiations leading to the settlement and to the settlement, itself.

The South African case demonstrates that, while crucial, inclusive settlements are difficult to achieve. There, two important political players—the governing National Party and the African National Congress—were involved in negotiations from the outset, but a number of groups remained on the outside. The most significant were organized into the Freedom Front, an opportunistic alliance of such diverse groups as Buthelezi's IFP, the Afrikaner *Volksfront*, the Conservative Party, and leaders of some of the country's African homelands. That this alliance was an opportunistic one might suggest that it would do anything to derail the

negotiations and, consequently, that as many of its members as possible should be brought into the process. Particularly worrisome were the IFP and the white right.

Inkatha was important because Zulus constituted nearly twenty percent of the country's population. Buthelezi did not speak for all Zulus, but he did have widespread support among the rural population, governed the KwaZulu homeland, and had influence over the Zulu monarchy and royal structures. Buthelezi insisted that the people of KwaZulu had a right to self-determination and proposed a constitution for the province that would allow local laws to take precedence over national laws, allow the province to maintain its own army, and forbid the South African government from sending armed forces or levying taxes there without the provincial government's approval. Most other parties found these demands unacceptable, but they needed to work to bring Inkatha into the process, because Buthelezi's participation was "key... Without his participation..., the specter of civil war hovered over the country." Mandela recognized this, telling a public gathering that "I will go down on my knees to beg those who want to drag our country into bloodshed."³⁹ To minimize that prospect, de Klerk and Mandela made a series of concessions and, when those were unsuccessful, met with Buthelezi less than three weeks before the election, and agreed to international mediation of their differences. That effort, too, failed, and it now appeared that there were no options but to hold the election without the IFP's participation and to run the risk of civil war.⁴⁰ Only the intervention of Washington Okumu, detailed above, prevented that.

Once Buthelezi had agreed to participate in the elections, little more than a week remained before election day and both legal and practical barriers had to be overcome. Again, the other participants did all they could to insure Inkatha's participation. Millions of ballots had to be altered, with stickers identifying Buthelezi's IFP applied. In addition, the white parliament had to meet one last time, on April 25, the day before the first day of the election, to approve the IFP's late registration.⁴¹

Fewer dramatic last-minute concessions were made to the white right but, as with the IFP, the government and ANC made repeated efforts to reach out to it and insure its participation in the elections. Negotiators had good reason to fear the white right, because radical Afrikaner nationalists had a history of resorting to arms to oppose government policy, e.g., Boer War and during World War II, and they had the potential support of a large part of the Afrikaner electorate. The March 1992 whites-only referendum, in which nearly 69% endorsed the negotiating process, undermined much of the right's argument that the government was operating without popular approval. Still, the ANC sought to bring Viljoen, leader of the Afrikaner *Volksfront*, and others into the transition process. The general's eventual decision to participate in the elections was "a decisive turning point," because "[n]ot only did Viljoen's decision take the sting out of the right-wing threat to disrupt the proceedings and launch an Afrikaner war of secession," but he

"instilled into his disbelieving right-wing supporters the acceptance that the era of Afrikaner and white rule had passed forever."⁴²

Mandela dealt directly with Viljoen, beginning secret talks in August 1993. While the ANC had no interest in the establishment of an Afrikaner *volkstaat*, it continued to hold out the possibility. By December an agreement was reached pledging the two sides to non-racial democracy and to exploring the idea of Afrikaner self-determination. However, Viljoen continued to refuse to agree to participate in the elections due to continuing objections by his Freedom Alliance partners. This led some on the white right to consider achieving their goal by force of arms, a delusion that was destroyed in the Battle of Bop identified above. That failure led Viljoen to defy a majority of the Front and to agree to participate in the elections.⁴³ Further concessions were then made to guarantee the participation of Viljoen's group. His Freedom Front negotiated an accord in April 1994 with both the governing National Party and the ANC mandating the creation of a *volkstaat* after election. This body would investigate the possibility of a *volkstaat* in the new South Africa and report back to the governing authorities.⁴⁴

The country's military also had to be brought into the transition process. Fearing that it might be a barrier to the transition, leaders of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), began secret talks in mid-1992 with the leaders of the South African Defense Force about the future structure of the country's armed forces. By November 1993 the two sides had reached agreement, with proposals to integrate their forces as well as preserve the position of senior SADF officials. Other concessions involved guarantees to the soldiers' pensions and an agreement to establish an amnesty program.⁴⁵

The Structure of the Settlement

To permanently lay down their arms, participants in any conflict resolution process must be certain that their interests will be protected in the new political system. One reason the latecomers may have been willing to join the process is that the interim constitution agreed to in November 1993 guaranteed that the first post-apartheid government would be an inclusive one. Members of the 400-seat National Assembly were chosen by a system of proportional representation, a mechanism designed to create a more representative legislature and one in which multiple parties are rewarded; there was, in addition, a very low threshold, 0.25% of the vote, required to win seats in the Assembly. The cabinet was to be chosen proportionally from among parties with more than twenty seats in the Assembly. The president would be chosen by that body, and the two vice presidents would be chosen from parties with more than eighty seats. A federal system, another way to divide power and to allow for multiple election winners was established. The upper house of the national legislature was to be chosen by the provincial legislatures on a proportional basis, providing yet another guarantee that there would be diverse voices in the

new government. Finally, the interim constitution entrenched important civil liberties and established a powerful constitutional court to safeguard them.⁴⁶

The virtue of these arrangements was reflected in the outcome of the April 1994 election. Seven parties won seats in the Assembly (twelve did not). The ANC won more than 62% of the vote and 252 seats in the National Assembly, enough to form a majority government but not the two-thirds necessary to enact a new constitution alone. The National Party, winners of 20% of the vote, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, with more than 10%, would also participate in the new executive. That cabinet included 18 ANC members, six members of de Klerk's NP, and three members of Buthelezi's IFP. Regionally, the ANC won seven of the countries nine provinces, the National Party one and the IFP one.⁴⁷ This was, in the words of the Johannesburg *Star*, a "dream outcome." The "perfect" results led some to question whether the outcome was manipulated behind closed doors. As Guelke has written: "the suspicion of a deal among the parties lingered for good reason: the scale of reported irregularities and the extent of sheer incompetence in the running of the election were such that voting and the counting of the votes would hardly have borne scrutiny if the process had been denounced by any of the major political parties."⁴⁸ Whether or not they passed democratic muster, the election results were perfect from the point of view of conflict resolution as each of the major parties won something, none won a dominant position, and continued cooperation between them would be necessary in the post-conflict period.

Conclusion

This study began by asking whether South Africa's transition to democracy should be considered as a miracle or used as a model. Perhaps the answer is that it is both. That is, the participants did much that contemporary theory directed to insure a favorable outcome but that outcome only occurred because of a number of unexpected and fortuitous events. For instance, the leading players in the transition had worked to incorporate both the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Afrikaner *Volksfront* in the elections, but neither had done so or, probably, would have done so but for the intervention of Washington Okumu with respect to the former and the "Battle of Bop" with respect to the latter. The onset of the process, similarly, might be understood using the theoretical concept of a "mutually hurting stalemate," but South Africa was fortunate that prominent political leaders recognized this reality and did so at approximately the same time. It was, moreover, a most unlikely trio of leaders—a former defense minister as President who had recently cracked down violently on opponents, followed by a President whose family had participated in the establishment of most Afrikaner institutions and who had long supported apartheid, joined in partnership by a former prisoner who emerged from a quarter century of imprisonment without bitterness and firmly committed to negotiating and sharing power with his former jailers—who came to this conclusion. Ironically,

perhaps, this combination of skill and luck makes South Africa's transition like many others and less miraculous, as virtually all political successes involve some combination of luck and skill. Where they differ is the particular combination of those elements.

What lessons does the South African case provide for theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution and democracy promotion? Just as the transition was a mix of luck and skill, scholars might find reason for hope and disappointment. Disappointment because it indicates that, however knowledgeable and skilled they are, circumstances might conspire against them. On the other hand, the likely occurrence of fortuitous events might encourage practitioners to continue their work in trying times. The knowledge that both skill and luck are likely to be needed compels practitioners to design negotiations and propose outcomes that participants can take advantage of when unexpected events do occur, i.e., they should anticipate being lucky and also try to make their own luck. Discussions between Mandela and Viljoen well before the Battle of Bop, for example, following the advice of theorists to make the transition process as inclusive as possible, may have reassured the former general that he could be confident entering the election process after the fortuitous events in Bophuthatswana. Also, the design of the interim government—with the power sharing mechanisms and guarantees of civil liberties advocated by scholars—likely eased the last minute entry of the *Volksfront* and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Scholarly efforts to document and, perhaps, to promote a mutually hurting stalemate, similarly, may eventually result in a recognition by decision makers that negotiations are their only option. Perhaps this "model"—applying best practices while also anticipating fortuitous events—will allow "miracles" to occur in other deeply divided societies.

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 32. Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, pp. 599, 666; Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 244.
 33. Dan O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 367–82; Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, pp. 547–50, 563–65, and 606–11; and Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, ed., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
 34. Jeremy Seekings, *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 3.

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37. Roland Paris, “Wilson’s Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Postconflict Peacebuilding,” in *Turbulent Peace*, eds. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, pp. 768–69 and Andrew Reynolds and Timothy D. Sisk, “Elections and Electoral Systems: Implications for Conflict Management,” in *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*, eds. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 11–13.
38. Reynolds and Sisk, “Elections and Electoral Systems,” pp. 28–34; quoted at pp. 29, 30. See also Licklider, “Obstacles to Peace Settlements,” pp. 700–701.
39. Lyman, *Partner to History*, p. 129; Mandela quoted in Sampson, *Mandela*, p. 478.
40. Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, pp. 219–25; Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, pp. 153–63; and Lyman, *Partner to History*, pp. 127–46; 194–212.
41. Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, p. 225.
42. Johann van Rooyen, “The White Right” in *Election ‘94 South Africa: The Campaigns, the Results, and Future Prospects*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 89.
43. Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, pp. 183–84, 222–25; Guelke, *South Africa in Transition*, pp. 67–88; Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, pp. 197–205; and Lyman, *Partner to History*, pp. 167–80.
44. Van Rooyen, “The White Right,” p. 97.
45. Lyman, *Partner to History*, pp. 162–67.
46. Zartman, “Negotiating the South African Conflict,” pp. 164–65; Reynolds and Sisk, “Elections and Electoral Systems,” pp. 23–26; and Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, pp. 194–95.
47. Andrew Reynolds, “The Results,” in *Election ‘94 South Africa*, ed. Reynolds, pp. 182–220.
48. Both quotations are from Adrian Guelke, *South Africa in Transition*, pp. 118–19.

Review Essay: Reconsidering the Scope and Trajectory of Cuban Studies

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Max Azicri and Elsie Deal. *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival and Renewal*. Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2004. 363 pp. \$65.00 (cloth).

Jorge I. Dominguez, Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia. *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. 430 pp. \$24.99 (paper).

For well over 40 years now, American scholars, pundits and policy makers have vigorously debated the scope and trajectory of the Cuban revolution. The critical questions have centered on debates that deal with the strategic importance of “retaining, eliminating and modifying” the ever-present U.S. embargo, and the extent to which the Castro regime represents an “anti-democratic blight on the deep undercurrents of changes that now characterize the hemisphere as a whole.”¹ This also includes a continuous flashing of warning signs, “*la crisis se profundiza*” (the crisis deepens) and the updating and revamping of the modalities that must be employed is Cuba is to be “effectively integrated” in the globalized world community. What has been missing from this variant of Cubanology has been a correspondence to an objective and apolitical analysis of all political and economic phenomena in Cuba as they are. Overwhelmingly, this body of work has been generated with a counter-revolutionary notion of repudiating and renouncing any scintilla of rationality and logic rendered by way of analysis related to Cuba, because to do so would imply some sort of allegiance with support for a regime that is content to survive with “islands of capitalism in a sea of socialism.”² What is missing from these criticisms and objections have been elements of reflection and insight as to how present developments on the island might impact the *present* and *future* status of governance in Cuba and how that might influence relations with its neighbor to the north, the United States, as opposed to analysis that issues prescriptions for fixing what the authors perceive as being shortcomings in the trajectory of developments on the island in the wake of the ending of the Cold War. This requires scholars to address “the major issues by applying to the task, timely and well-balanced scholarly studies,” so that the analysis, “provides a comprehensive picture of a multifaceted” Cuba.³

For this reason alone the two books in this essay are long overdue and welcome additions to the literature of Cuba studies for two reasons. First, one of the most egregious sins of omission by American scholars has been the absence of Cuban counterparts. Collaboration of this kind may have been all but impossible in the recent past and there can be little argument that the Cubans were free or willing to openly engage American scholars in a constructive dialogue about the future of the Cuban revolution. This dilemma was compounded on numerous occasions by Cuban government intervention aimed at scuttling and subverting nascent research projects, especially if the results contradicted official and unofficial priorities as they pertained to most if not all elements of the Cuban regime. Cuban scholars were also denounced and sometimes removed from important positions if the scope and objectives of their collaborations with foreigners strayed to far from the regime norm or somehow bucked some unwritten and unspoken protocol. Yet, the brief *apertura* (opening) made possible by the end of the Cold War and the easing of academic travel restrictions for U.S. scholars during the 1990s, perhaps, created the environment where trust and confidence between these scholarly communities reached a level sufficient to engender collaboration that produces the type of analysis that significantly adds to the depth and understanding of contemporary Cuban politics and economics. By almost any accounting, an entire generation of American scholars interested in Cuban issues has now had the opportunity to visit and interact with Cuban scholars, government officials and institutions in ways unimaginable during the Cold War.

Second, as a consequence of this closer interaction, this new generation of Cuba scholars (Cuban and American) has also had the benefit of vetting their research within their respective disciplines and professional associations. This has been instrumental in enhancing and boosting the validity of research in this area. Moreover, as this research has found its way into publication it has raised the bar for the entire scholarly community. This has meant that the overtly ideologically and politically motivated work that passed for research in the past, both for and against the regime, is now being held to a higher standard, and rightly so. This is not to disparage the meaningful research of the past but this development represents an entrée into a realm of research where hyperbole, reportage and prescription will no longer meet muster.

This is vitally important for a couple of reasons. First, social scientists should have learned an important lesson from the end of the Cold War. That is that no one accurately predicted, let alone could they account for the surprisingly rapid demise of the Soviet Union and the cataclysmic events that ended the 40 year East-West confrontation. This failure stems from the propensity of Cold War scholars and especially Kremlinologists, who as products of Cold War strategic thinking were unable to conceive of research agendas that could not reach beyond the bounds of analysis that relied upon interpreting policy statements and the seating arrangement of the Soviet *nomenklatura* atop Lenin's tomb during the May Day parade to assess the pecking order and priorities of the Russian elite. This was tantamount to the reading of tea leaves and left social scientists wholly unaware of the significant lack of capacity and legitimacy of the Soviet hegemon at the end of the 1980s. Similarly, without a significant shift or re-formulation of the research agenda vis-à-vis Cuba it suffices to say that social scientists and old guard Cubanologists may find themselves in a similar situation, unable to adequately assess or contend with dramatic changes on the island that perhaps have been years in the making or that have already taken place.

Second, given the fact that Cuba has survived the Soviet *denouement*, and that it is truly independent for the first time in its modern history, the scope and objectives of Cuba studies must be centered on these basic facts. Implicit in this realization is a need to accurately and unambiguously create a research agenda that deals with the Cuban reality as it is and not some fantastical departure or return to an accommodation that may have never existed. This speaks to the revisionist nature of pre-Revolution apologists and the anti-Castro rhetoricians that for overtly political and strategic reasons continue to posture and parade about moribund and mostly symbolic icons of a Cuba that no longer exists, or perhaps also never existed. In addition, this requires that these developments be analyzed within a rigorous theoretical and methodological framework further expanding the ambit of a base of objective and meaningful Cuba-related research.

In that vein, led by Jorge I. Domínguez and the David Rockefeller Center on Latin American Studies at Harvard University, *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century* comes at a crucial moment for all of the aforementioned reasons. The book begins with a simple statement, "Cuba's economic future has already begun."⁴ That statement alone set out an ominous task of situating that future within the international and transnational context that Cuba finds itself in at the opening of the 21st century. Specifically, the book seeks to explore four broad themes: (1) to focus on the salient macroeconomic questions relevant to Cuba's future; (2) to analyze the international economic context and Cuba's economic development strategy over time and comparatively across the region; (3) an examination of social policy and welfare issues as they pertain to poverty and income inequality debates, and the extent to

which the revolutionary model for social development is still relevant given the dramatic changes over the past decade and a half; and (4) a study of the development of important transnational networks and the responses by both the United States and Cuban governments as they effect the formal and informal constraints on people (remittances, family visits, academic travel, etc.) on both sides of the Straits of Florida. As if to set it self apart from the fray that engrosses any interaction between the United States and Cuba, the book is clear in its overall objective as it seeks to focus its attention on the Cuba that actually exists.

This is not a book about what may happen to bring about a change of Cuba's political regime, nor a fantasy about what may occur if such a political change were to take place. There are scholarly grounds for focusing on the world as we know it...to make suggestions about possible policy changes within the context of Cuba's existing political arrangements.⁵

This is particularly notable is the chapter on the economic challenges facing Cuba contributed by Cuban economist Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, and in a commentary on economic inequality and the future prospects for social policy in Cuba contributed by American scholars, Lorena Barbería, Xavier de Souza Briggs, and Miriam Uriarte. Both contributions are clear departures from anything that could be perceived as "coddling a dictator" as they set out rather vexing issues and deliberately and unambiguously lay out the *problematica* that must be addressed if Cuba hopes to begin working toward their respective solutions. Pérez Villanueva's chapter assesses the factors that have contributed to the transformation of Cuba into a service economy.⁶ The assessment includes policy recommendations including the necessity of increasing investment to correspond to "an industrial strategy that is needed to adapt to the increasing share of services as a part of the economy." As he states, "Otherwise, the trade deficit will continue to increase with the continued burgeoning of imports."⁷ This is a tacit realization that in the wake of the economic collapse of the 1990s, Cuba's demand is outstripped its supply and will be required to boost the capacity of industries specializing in consumer related products to meet that demand. Furthermore, he argues economic progress is presently constrained by numerous significant factors including structural deformities, internal inefficiencies and the depreciation or over-valuation of capital assets.⁸ He also includes the presence of the U.S. embargo (*bloqueo*) as a contributing factor but unlike the other factors mentioned, this highly contentious and politically motivated issue realistically lies outside the realm of those matters over which Cuban economic policy makers hold any sway under the present set of circumstances. Rightly, he points out that Cuba remains energy dependent and still relies to a large extent reliant on the import of intermediate good. While there has been some

excitement over the discovery of oil reserves off the north-west coast of Cuba, it is highly unlikely that the potential gains from this development can be realized in the near term as Cuba possesses few of the resources required to be a player in offshore oil drilling and exploration.⁹ That fact coupled with the unsteady nature of world oil markets heightens Perez Villanueva's concern regarding Cuba's external exposure that potentially could undermine some of the "irreversible" gains witnessed in Cuba since the mid-nineties. He adds to this analysis the parallel and negative impact on social equity vis-à-vis the resuscitation of the Cuban economy. He details the social distortions that many have used as a criticism of the regime and calls for a careful balancing of political, social and economic factors that undergird Cuban society and the on-going objective of social and human capital development that has long distinguished the Cuban model.¹⁰ That he waits until the conclusion to mention this vexing dilemma for the Castro regime is reason for our attention, but he adds that this discussion while warranted must be debated logically and within the understanding of the "revolutionary model of social justice"¹¹ that has animated Cuban planning for the past forty years. As a solo contribution, that may be sufficient, but within the milieu of Cuba studies, much more discussion of this critical point is needed and the commentary from Barberia, et al specifically seeks to deepen the discourse and to bring further attention to the relevance of the social development model in the face of numerous challenges.

The authors critically assess the extent to which (1) the Cuban welfare state is sustainable in the face of what they term "lackluster economic growth, (2) the viability of a standardized and universal social welfare delivery model in the face of growing diversification in Cuba, where the needs of people are beginning to vary widely, and (3) the implications of "spatial inequality" all due to the dramatic changes in the Cuban economy since the end of the Cold War.¹² They conclude that the Cuban objective of egalitarian social development faces the twin challenges of developing sustainability in lieu of economic growth and a variable social welfare delivery system. On both counts, this will necessarily force Cuba to acknowledge and address, the heretofore poorly understood consequences of economic restructuring and social access during this past decade. Moreover, the extent to which these internal effects from both domestic and external forces are understood will be vital to the legitimacy of the Cuban state as it moves onto the subsequent stages of a process of economic restructuring and revitalization.

What is unique about these two examples is that they base their perspective in carefully conceived spaces that seek to place these particular questions into a universe of similar and related processes not unique to Cuba. "Cuba is exceptional only in the particulars of its experience and in the ways in which earlier socialist commitments... tend to frame the current dilemmas."¹³ Moreover, that this is done within a context of interaction between scholars from "both sides" boosts that validity of the analysis.

Max Azicri and Elsie Deal's edited contribution, *Cuban Socialism in a New Century*, is similar in its outlook seeking to expand the ambit of Cuban studies as to simultaneously update the standard analysis of Cuba that has traditionally and broadly focused on inchoate studies of society, religion, economy, politics, military, migration and international relations, but by also focusing on recent developments on the island, such as the rebirth of religious institutions, newly approaches on international relations and trade, and correcting, as it were, mistaken assumptions regarding the present and future Cuba. The book's contributors include both the "official insiders" and academic scholars that offer a welcome depth and diversity of analysis to the subject matter.

In that light, Jose A. Moreno's contribution "From Capitalist to Socialist Culture, and Back to Capitalist Values?" echoes Susan Eva Eckstein's *Back From the Future*¹⁴ analysis of a structural and ideological changes from the 1960s to the 1990s and the challenge posed by strategies for development and survival in the post-Cold War context to the "matrix of values conducive to the emergence of a new man and the creation of a new society."¹⁵ Specifically, he openly ponders the implications of the creation of modalities that have produced differences and exclusions between various groups on the island as a consequence similar to those that existed prior to 1959. He concludes by issuing a warning of sorts to those who might misinterpret these developments:

Probably the most serious mistake one could make would be to assume that once the present government is replaced, the Cuban exile-elite presently ruling South Florida could return to business as usual in a pre-1959 Cuba. It would be a mistake comparable to the one that led to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.¹⁶

But more interesting is the analysis by William LeoGrande as to what challenges await the post-transition leadership in Cuba. He clearly states that, "the new leadership faces tough policy choices, debate will surely intensify, spurred by those who favor a thoroughgoing economic reforms and greater political liberalization."¹⁷ Ultimately, the "right to govern" is contingent on "the legitimacy of the institutions" under the direction of this new leadership. The key piece of information in this assessment is that by the 1990s, the average age of the members of the Central Committee, Cuba's penultimate ruling body was fifty-three, and the average age of members of the National Assembly was forty-three. This was highlighted by a rather interesting quote by Cuba's forty-ish Foreign Minister, Felipe Pérez Roque, "There has already be a tangible transfer of power [to the next generation] and that has been done by Fidel."¹⁸

In this instance the authors' have rejected the idea of Cuban exceptionalism and have placed their analysis within the discourse of broader research agendas, which is to argue that while relatively unique within the history of post-revolution Cuba, these processes of change and renewal are

representative of larger projects and processes that have been in play across the globe for well over the past quarter century. That they are presently occurring in Cuba is of great interest in many circles and represents, as demonstrated by these authors, an opportunity to exercise elements of what can be termed a new Cuba studies regime. Moreover, developments of the past decade or so on the island reflect a new and distinct reality, and as such, the effort to research, distill, and analyze this new reality must similarly re-tool methods and approaches in the contributions to this field of study are to be meaningful and lasting.

Conclusion

Interestingly enough, these two books reflect a commitment to “take the academic high road” and to avoid the pitfalls of political expediency that for some have been rewarding, but at the end of the day, have only served to obscure our understanding of an important field of academic inquiry, and in some circles provided the grist of rationalities that only served to obscure or diminish the Cuban reality. This is echoed by Max Azicri when he states, “the island-nation is challenging us to learn why and how it refuses to succumb to adversity but chooses instead to chart its own destiny.”¹⁹ Appropriately, Dominguez concurs in stating, Cubans have begun to rebuild the bonds that rendered the Cuban nation apart as growing numbers of *diaspora* Cubans rally to assist their relatives in Cuba not just to survive but to build more productive lives. Government policies will have to change further, however for the full potential benefits of these new transnational ties to be realized.²⁰

In both cases, the blend of American and Cuban scholars reflects an ideal of sorts, in that it is through the intellectual interaction and collaboration between these groups that engenders both higher standards and deeper understanding of these complex realities. We may begin to develop meaningful modes of inquiry that acknowledge that the “bar has been raised” and that these works represent legitimate responses to “get over it,” in more ways than one.

Endnotes

1. Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds. *Cuban Communism*, 9th ed. (New Brunswick [U.S.A.] and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. xvi.
2. Jorge Perez-Lopez, “Islands of Capitalism in a Sea of Socialism: Joint Ventures in Cuba’s Development Strategy,” in *Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress*,

- ed. Jorge Perez-Lopez (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1994).
3. Max Azicri, “Cuban Socialism in the Twenty-First Century,” in *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival and Renewal*, ed. Max Azicri and Elsie Deal (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2004), p. 35.
4. Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: An Introductory Analysis,” in *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva, and Lorena Barberia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
6. Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva, “The Cuban Economy and Its Future Challenges,” in *The Cuban Economy*, p. 51.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
9. Keith Epstien, “Cuba May Be On Verge of Oil Bonanza.” *Washington Dateline*, 19 January 2005, <http://washdateline.mgnetwork.com>.
10. Perez Villanueva, “The Cuban Economy and Its Future Challenges,” in *The Cuban Economy*, p. 85.
11. This term is commonly attributed to Jose Marti, the 19th century Cuban revolutionary and intellectual architect of Cuban nationalism.
12. Lorena Barberia, Xavier de Souza Briggs and Miren Uriarte, “The End of Egalitarianism? Economic Inequality and the Future of Social Policy in Cuba,” in *The Cuban Economy*, p. 287.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
14. See Susan Eva Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Castro Under Cuba* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
15. Jose A. Moreno, “From Capitalism to Socialist Culture, and Back to Capitalist Values?” in *Cuban Socialism in a New Century* (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2004), p. 61.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
17. William LeoGrande, “The ‘Single Party of the Cuban Nation’ Faces the Future” in *Cuban Socialism in a New Century*, p. 198.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Azicri, “Cuban Socialism in the Twenty-First Century,” in *Cuban Socialism in a New Century*, p. 35.
20. Dominguez, “The Cuban Economy at the Start,” in *The Cuban Economy at the Start*, p. 14.

Review Essay: Unresolved Memories of Chile

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Steve J. Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004. 247pp. \$29.95 (cloth).

Peter Winn, ed. *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004. 423pp. \$24.29 (paper).

The 1973 military overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende Gossens, on that “other” September 11, is one of those events with scholarly staying power. Maybe because it occurred in Chile where conspiring men in uniform were antithetical to the nation’s civilian, constitutionalist tradition, or maybe because of the sheer pathos aroused by the scene of air force planes bombing the presidential palace to roust an armed Allende vowing defend his government to the end, or maybe because of the ensuing military repression, the mass arrests, the imprisonments in remote locations, the torture as policy, the thousands of “disappeared,” the forced exiles—whatever the reason, shelves-full of histories, memoirs, novels, and documentaries have appeared to describe and analyze, defend and condemn the unimaginable occurrences of 1973 and their intense aftermath. From the start, most of those works immediately accepted the episode as a watershed in Chilean history. More than thirty years later, despite that the sixteen-year regime of Army General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte had been long replaced by renewed constitutionally-elected civilian government, most studies with modern Chile as subject still find the historical roots of their myriad topics in the *golpe* against Allende and the resulting military rule of Pinochet. Two recent examples of the continuing scholarly interest are Steve J. Stern’s *Remembering Pinochet’s Chile* and *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, edited by Peter Winn. Both published in 2004, the two adopt 1973 as the starting point and trace their topics forward, well past the return to civilian government in 1988–89. Neither, however, ascribes to that historic transition a significance equal to the earlier events. For both, the legacy of Allende’s demise and Pinochet’s dictatorship continues in almost seamless fashion to the present.

For Stern, the topic is the post-Pinochet struggle within Chile over the creation of an “emblematic memory,” that is, how will the origins, violence and legacy of the military government be remembered in the collective mind of the nation? Contending for broad acceptance are four heretofore “loose” memories, each of which Stern introduced

through a representational story of an individual Chilean interviewee. A matron of the elite remembered the overthrow as “the happiest day of my life,” thus Pinochet as a hero who saved the nation from the upheaval and impending civil war of the Allende years. A 66-year old mother experienced lasting remembrance of the same events as “rupture...an open wound, an awful hurt that fails to heal” (p. 42) after two of her sons were arrested, tortured and disappeared in 1974. In the memory of one dissident, these were years of quietly persevering under similar persecution until awakening to, and participating in, new movements for the revival of civic culture. Finally, there was the Army colonel, who passionately declared himself indifferent to the entire issue of human rights and violence, as were, he was convinced, most Chileans, soldiers and civilians alike. By 1998, Stern concludes, as Pinochet was about to be arrested in London and held pending a ruling by British courts on an extradition order from Spain, the Chilean struggle had reached a “memory impasse,” the struggle unresolved amid a swirl of contending emotions in the present and agendas for the future.

Remembering Pinochet, the introductory volume to Stern’s trilogy on the topic, is meticulously researched, creatively organized, and engagingly written. Although the subject, public memory, is a highly abstract one, the human is never far removed from his discussion, not only in the case studies that he employs, but also in the Afterwords that follow each chapter, in which another human story—like the conscripted soldier whose nightmarish experience remained shrouded in official silence—lends nuance to a central point. Then there is the author’s appreciated determination to put a Chilean face on this adventure into the burgeoning historiographical field of the history of memory through invented terms, like “policide” (the murder of a way of doing politics and government) and “memory knots” (individuals and groups who relentlessly work against society’s fears and inertia to form collective memory out of loose, individual ones). Most refreshing of all is Stern’s candid admission of his own anti-Pinochet bias, an attitude proceeding from his personal leftward leanings, the familial influence of his *chilena* spouse, Florencia E. Mallon, a Latin Americanist scholar in her own right, and his heritage as a second generation Holocaust survivor.

Peter Winn’s collection of essays, *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, likewise views the same historical period, 1973–98 (with 1999–2002 seen as “epilogue”) as an integral era, also despite the celebrated change of political direction with the election of Patricio Aylwin, candidate of

the Center-Left coalition *Concertación* in 1989. Here the subject is organized labor in Chile as it flourished under Allende, suffered under Pinochet and was relatively neglected under the new democrats. After an introductory essay on “The Pinochet Era” by the editor, various contributors describe organized labor in general during the period (Volker Frank), followed by the status of workers in specific industries: textiles (Winn), copper manufacturing (Joel Stillerman), copper mining (Thomas Miller Klubock), agriculture (Heidi Tinsman), fisheries (Rachel Schurman), and the forestry sector (Klubock). In each enterprise, the fate of the worker is the same. Under military rule, there was outright repression of leading militants, massive cuts in wages and benefits, and the wholesale loss of the right to organize, collectively bargain and strike, losses codified and institutionalized in the *Plan Laboral* of 1979. Just as damaging to workers’ interests, the authors collectively argue, has been the failure of reinstalled civilian administrations to champion a living wage and restored rights for Chile’s working class. Neither Aylwin (1990–94), nor Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), not even the Socialist Ricardo Lagos, elected in 2000, have sought to alter much the neoliberal economic policies adopted under Pinochet, policies and programs for which Chilean workers have paid—and continue to pay—an enormous financial and social cost. Whatever the real truth of the “Chilean Miracle,” the book concludes, the nation’s working men and women have only been victims of it.

As with any published collection of essays, some contributions stand out more than others. In this case, Stillerman’s clearly written discussion of copper miners fascinates for its depiction of the decline of Chile’s historically most privileged and politically powerful labor group. Heidi Tinsman’s contribution is noteworthy for her contention that

women workers in the new for-export agricultural industries made significant social gains, despite exploitation by employers. And Thomas Klubock impressively details the ecological damage to national forests that accompanied the “boom” in Chilean lumber and wood products. In the end, however, the collection suffers from its repetitiveness and its predictability. Although more cohesive than normally are others of this format, *Victims of the Chilean Miracle* contains little that is new, other than detail, beyond its introductory chapters. It is the same story told six times. Nor is the message in any way subtle or nuanced. If the tome intended to explore the question: “Are they [Chilean workers] victims of Chile’s neoliberal ‘miracle’?” (p. 2), the answer was provided in the affirmative by the title. Indeed, the volume seems so intent on promoting its message that its credibility begins to suffer from lack of context. As with so many earlier works on this controversial episode, the more determined the desire to condemn Pinochet, the more favorable becomes the judgment of Allende, whose administration is here hailed as the “apex of democracy in Chile” (p. 19), the deteriorating economy, social fabric, and political traditions virtually dismissed.

Two new additions to the already voluminous library of works on the fall of Allende and the rule of Pinochet, both recognize the watershed that was 1973 and its aftermath for Chilean history. One, however, contributes but yet another voice to an aging debate about the merits of the Socialist and the sins of the General. The other breaks new ground in its insights about a Chilean present that is looking back in order to map its future. Both books come from recognized authorities in the field, are clear in their exposition and comprehensive in their documentation. But if there is time and energy to read only one, choose Stern.

Book Review: Murder at Morija

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Tim Couzens. *Murder at Morija*. Johannesburg: Random House, 2003. 468pp. \$25.00 (paper).

Tim Couzens' *Murder at Morija* is both a fascinating story and also a contribution to a larger discussion among historians and anthropologists of Christianity in southern Africa, particularly those interested in the colonial period. The works of Elizabeth Elbourne, Jean and John Comaroff, Norman Etherington, and others have brought the stories of various Protestant mission societies, especially the London Missionary Society, into academic debates about missionaries and colonial societies—the cultural meanings of time and corporeality, the social and ideological dynamics of colonial systems, and the role of missionaries and their local co-workers as agents in the development and transformation of those dynamics. Employing distinct methodological stances and different theoretical constructs, those scholars nonetheless share a concern for not only the missionaries' stories but also the Africans with whom they worked and their role within the socio-economic and political dimensions of the colonial context.

While not directly commenting on the work of historians and anthropologists, Couzens certainly employs the fruits of those discussions in his telling of the story of Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) missionaries in Lesotho. Taking advantage of a rich set of archival resources, he describes in thick detail French-speaking Protestant missionaries reaching through an English-speaking colonial environment to a Sesotho-speaking people who were asserting an emerging cultural identity and political aspirations against an expanding Dutch-speaking state until the British took charge of Basotholand (Lesotho) as a British territory in 1868, setting the political context within the mission worked and the central event took place.

Tim Couzens' approach fits well within this larger conversation; however his presentation is not academic history, interpretive or otherwise, or theoretical debates about economy and society, discourse and agency. He writes as a novelistic historian weaving a complex story of murder and intrigue around the death by poisoning of a prominent French-speaking Swiss missionary (Édouard Jacottet) in his own home at the Morija mission station in Basotholand (Lesotho) in late 1920. The murder with which he begins provides a point of entry into and the justification for exploring a longer and more complex story of a particular mission society. In a sense, Couzens simply reports an early twentieth century murder mystery and then traces the characters and their religious confrères back to the early nine-

teenth century. Without claiming to present a comprehensive perspective, he includes an historical depth and great sensitivity to the individuals and the groups inhabiting the mountainous landscape of that developing nation, exposing greater complexity than characteristic of "mission history." Thus, by digging beneath the surface of the unsolved crime, Couzens presents a compelling story of the PEMS in Lesotho from the 1830s until the 1920s.

Couzens' careful biographical rendering of the more prominent missionaries emphasizes their individual characteristics and opinions, as well as their national, cultural, and theological origins, as French-speaking Protestants of Swiss origin, heirs of the Huegenots. Church-state relations in the canton of Neuchâtel, the Réveil of the 1820s, and the imposing influence of the great Protestant teacher Godet are some of the key elements that give shape to the thought and practice of the missionaries from Arbousset and Casalis in the first generation to Mabille, Duby, Jacottet, and others in succeeding generations. The biographical sketches go well beyond the public relations biographies many societies provided; Couzens explores the interior struggles of many of the missionaries, as well as the tensions between them. The letters he uncovers and the motives he traces explore a view of the missionaries no official history would care to reveal; however, in Couzens' hands, the petty scandals and blemished characters give life to a missionary community that would otherwise be lost in the pious platitudes about the purpose of the mission and in the record of administrative adjustments of personnel and strategy.

This work is also a contribution to the history of a mountain kingdom that confronted and resisted both Boer and British colonial intrusion. They succeeded in holding back Boer control by falling under the sovereignty of the British crown. Tracing relationships between missionaries and the successive generations of chiefs and kings from Moshoeshe, the founder of the Sotho nation, to his great-grandson Griffith, Couzens highlights the critical role that the missionaries played in the development of Sotho national identity and the political semi-autonomy they achieved. Part of Édouard Jacottet's own story concerns his unparalleled contributions to the study of Sesotho, a Bantu language closely related to Setswana, and more distantly related to the Nguni languages of southern Africa. Another important thread in the story is the role of the Sotho converts in the development of the mission organization and work.

In addition to the sweeping narrative history (448 pp.), this work includes the following: at the beginning of the

book, maps/drawings of Lesotho, the Morija station, and the Jacottet house; in the middle of the volume, photographs (#147) of the principal European and African characters and locations; finally, endnotes and an index provide helpful guides into the sources upon which Couzens relied and into the text, respectively. These reader friendly aids manage to avoid the danger of overweighting the text with the frequent footnotes normally employed by professional historians and anthropologists.

In conclusion, in addition to those interested in the PEMS and/or Lesotho, this study of missionary history should draw the attention of historians of religion and students of colonial societies from a variety of disciplines. I highly recommend this book both for general readers and professional scholars. Simply put, Couzens tells a fascinating story set against the long backdrop of the nineteenth century and any reader interested in a good murder mystery might relish the tragic implications of Jacottet's death and the rich detail of Couzens' interpretation.

Book Review: Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire

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Witney W. Schneidman. *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire*. New York: University Press of America, 2004. 312 pp. \$33.00 (paper).

Decolonization in Africa was a difficult issue for the United States, creating, as a Department of State study once noted, an "embarrassing choice between security requirements and basic political principle" (quoted at p. 5). On the one hand, there was America's own anti-colonial tradition and belief in self-determination. On the other hand, there was its alliance with and deference to leading European colonial powers, plus the need for their cooperation in the Cold War. Further complicating these issues was the American fear that "premature independence" for African colonies, to use a phrase popular in the Eisenhower administration, would result in weak and unstable regimes susceptible to communist manipulation, but that failure to work toward independence also created opportunities for radicals.

This book illustrates these dilemmas by examining America's relations with Portugal and its colonies in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s and 1970s. Primary attention is devoted to the first two of those colonies; Guinea-Bissau is probably mentioned only because a prominent Portuguese general there, Antonio de Spínola, played an important role in the 1974 events that were to lead to Portugal finally granting independence. No mention is made of Portugal's other colonial holdings in Africa, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. American policy toward Portugal and its African colonies has not received a lot of attention, despite the fact that this case constitutes not only "one of the most important episodes in Africa's decolonization experience," but also, from the perspective of American foreign policy, one of the "most tragic" (pp. xv, 225). One likely reason for the oversight is diminished Portuguese influence in Europe and Africa by the 1960s. Moreover, when world attention began to focus on white-ruled territories in southern Africa, most was directed at South Africa rather than the Portuguese colonies there. This book corrects that oversight, providing an interesting and thorough account of American policy toward a changing reality in both Portugal and its African colonies during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years. The author served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Clinton administration and has also worked in and on Africa for the World Bank and several consulting firms.

Schneidman begins his study in 1960 with the arrival at the United Nations of fifteen new African states and arrival in the White House of John F. Kennedy soon after. At the outset of his term, Kennedy modified traditional American attitudes of deference to European colonial powers and skepticism about African liberation movements in favor of ones aimed at promoting colonial self-determination. Specifically with respect to Portugal's colonies, the U.S. began to apply more pressure on Portugal and more support for those contesting its rule. It supported several Security Council resolutions in the Spring of 1961 that called upon Portugal to move toward self-determination. At the same time, the United States supported dissident Portuguese military officers plotting a coup in 1961 against the dictatorship of Antonio Oliveira Salazar. Assistance was also extended to the liberation movements in Portugal's colonies, with Holden Roberto in Angola and Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique receiving covert aid. In sum, the United States had begun to resolve the "embarrassing choice" identified previously largely in favor of political principle.

The change did not last. By 1963 American policy had begun to revert to the traditional approach, e.g., it no longer supported UN resolutions calling for self-determination and had distanced itself from Roberto and Mondlane. While Schneidman provides a chronological narrative, his book is also valuable for depicting reasons why the United States often failed to act in support of the principle of self-determination. Most important were security considerations, i.e., the other side of that "embarrassing choice." Over time, the Kennedy (and, later, Johnson and Nixon administrations) "concluded that the price of inducing Lisbon to grant self-determination in Africa was not worth the costs of a breakdown in the bilateral relationship" (p. 74). The most obvious security issue in this case was Portugal's control of the Azores Islands, and its agreement to allow the United States access to an air base there, a base once described by Dean Acheson as "perhaps the single most important...we have anywhere" (quoted at p. 5). The scheduled expiration of that lease on 31 December 1962 required that the Kennedy administration become less assertive about Portugal's African colonies. When the Portuguese refused to renew the agreement, instead allowing it to continue on a "day-to-day" basis (for the next nine years), their leverage was heightened. At other times, the U.S. had to worry that Portugal might withdraw from NATO as France's Charles de Gaulle had. More broadly, Johnson became preoccupied with Vietnam and Nixon with superpower relations.

Compared to these issues, Africa and Portugal's colonial territories there were usually deemed as relatively unimportant. Dean Rusk, Kennedy's Secretary of State, noted in his memoirs that "Africa was not high on my list of priorities" (quoted at p. 57). Tapley Bennet, American ambassador to Portugal in the mid-1960s, met regularly with Johnson while on home leave but never remembered any discussion of the situation in Portugal's colonies. Nixon's administration concentrated on superpower detente to such an extent that the "problems of Portugal and Portuguese Africa attracted virtually no attention" (p. 107). Bureaucratic factors reflected these priorities and also strengthened them. Africanists within the Kennedy administration gradually lost their influence to the Pentagon and Europeanists in the State Department as American policy shifted between 1961–63. Most had left government by 1967. Over time, according to one State Department Africa expert, "individuals possessing Africa expertise...had less influence than those interested in selling planes, buying chrome or in renewing contracts" (quoted at p. 118). Kissinger was famous for his disdain of the Africa Bureau, regarding it as one of the "backwaters" of the policy process, where officials "tended to promulgate a rather inflexible version of Wilsonianism" rather than viewing issues through his realist lense (p. 193).

Yet another factor was that the Portuguese were stubborn, difficult to deal with, and actively resisted American initiatives. Salazar was so stubborn that one American observer argued he would not accept a reform program for the colonies "without the benefit of a frontal lobotomy" (quoted at p. 47). Even after the renewal of the base agreement in 1971, to cite another example, Portugal proved difficult, hesitating to allow the U.S. to use it to resupply Israel during 1973 Arab-Israeli war. American officials did not know how to overcome such intransigence. Kennedy had first tried to exert pressure but later eased off. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations relied more on carrots than sticks, Nixon going so far as to tell the Portuguese foreign minister that "I'll never do to you what Kennedy did" (quoted at p. 112).

Furthering undermining any impulse to assume a more active role was the widespread American belief that the political and military situation in Portugal's colonies was at a stalemate, meaning that any American involvement would not alter the situation there while also angering the Portuguese. Such thinking was reflected most clearly in the conclusions of a 1969 National Security document that the "Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence..." (quoted at p. 118).

But the whites were not to stay, in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, or, ultimately, South Africa. Portugal's 1974 "revolution of red carnations" brought to power a government committed to dismantling its colonial empire. The United States remained largely indifferent to this process at the outset, even as the Angolan parties negotiated and then

quickly violated an accord aimed at establishing independence. It manifested more concern with the political maneuverings in Lisbon and the prospect that the Portuguese Communist Party might come to power. Only the March 1975 Soviet decision to provide military assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the insertion of superpower politics into southern Africa prompted a more active American policy. Thus, its "one-time" payment of \$300,000 to Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in early 1975 was followed by two payments, of \$8 million and \$6 million, in July and another \$10 million was agreed to in August. Also in August, funds were provided to Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for the first time. By then, many outsiders were jumping into Angola, including South Africa and, most importantly, Cuba. The dispatch of Cuban combat troops and nearly \$500 million in Soviet military assistance enabled the MPLA to gain control of Luanda, the Angolan capital and to be the government nominally in power at the time of Angola's independence in November 1975. The American decision to provide covert funds to several Angolan parties was a comprehensive failure: it had not dissuaded the Soviets from providing even greater assistance to their Angolan client, it had not prevented the MPLA from winning sufficient power to gain recognition from many African states after November 1975, and it had further encouraged the Congress to cut back on executive power. Schneidman argues, as did many at the time, that a better approach would have been to avoid becoming involved in Angola, because of congressional hostility, Roberto's weaknesses, and the absence of any other allies in Angola.

Schneidman relates these details well and his book adds to our understanding of American policy toward European colonial powers and their colonies as well as the dilemma between political principle and American security interests. His chapters on American policy toward Portuguese Africa are informative. Less relevant is the extensive discussion of the Portuguese revolution. While clearly important for Portugal and Portuguese Africa, politics in Lisbon are given too much attention. All major actors there were committed to granting independence, they disagreed only about the timing, so there is little need to detail the complicated political changes going on in the Portuguese capital. The author might also have devoted more time to defending his decision to focus on Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The selection of the first two is obvious, as these were the two largest and most important of Portugal's African colonies. But why Guinea-Bissau? If Guinea-Bissau is included in the analysis, why not Cape Verde? One final criticism should be directed at the editor. There are several spelling errors, e.g., the Angolan capital is spelled "Launda" on page 50, and the table of contents listing for chapter three includes an "endnotes" section, even though three chapters remain in the text and the endnotes only appear at the end.

Book Review: Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies

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Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr. *Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies*, vol. 1. Williamsburg, Va.: The Borneo Research Council Monograph Series, 1991). 528 pp. \$30.00 (cloth).

First, a disclosure: the authors of the articles in this volume are primarily anthropologists, many of whom have devoted their lives and careers to producing these ethnographic accounts of gender relations and practices in Borneo, while the author of this review is a sociologist who has studied gender roles in Indonesia, particularly in Java. Thus, I approached these studies with interest and respect, but from a different knowledge and disciplinary base. Second a qualification: these are not recent studies, nor is this a new volume; rather it was published in 1991 and brings together research reports based on work that in many cases was far from new at the time. Nevertheless, the window into gender roles and sexuality provided by these diverse studies stands up to both the test of time and the continual development of the field of gender studies. The result is a hefty volume that provides fascinating portraits of gender roles in one of the more remote corners of Southeast Asia and a valuable compilation of accumulated knowledge about indigenous peoples as their culture and lifestyles were in the process of confronting profound change in traditional ways of life.

Borneo is an island divided between different nation states and populated by hundreds of different societies and ethnic groups. The sixteen chapters that report primary research cover eight separate indigenous societies spread across Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah, and Kalimantan. The Iban (famous as former headhunters) and the Rungus (less belligerent) are most heavily represented in these accounts, but there are also studies of a handful of other groups. The chapters vary from wide-ranging descriptions of gender roles and sexual behavior to studies on the various stages of the life course, ranging from birthing to mortuary practices and everything in between. There are detailed accounts of highly gendered and formerly widespread occupations such as headhunting (male) and weaving (female) and absorbing discussions of controversies such as the practice of *latah* (unruly verbal behavior exhibited by semi-marginalized women in many of these communities) and the use of penis pins as displays of manhood and status. There is even a historical chapter detailing attitudes about miscegenation and

other forms of cross-cultural gender relations in the early days of nineteenth century British colonial rule. Taken together these articles represent both a highly diverse and reasonably comprehensive depiction of the varieties of gender roles and experience found among the indigenous peoples of Borneo. The individual chapters also make fascinating reading.

Given the diversity in topic and approach, one of the clear strengths of this volume is the introduction coauthored by Vinson Sutlive (the editor) and George Appell. In addition to summaries of individual chapters and topics, the authors draw generalizations from this work, enumerate ongoing questions and controversies, attempt to answer outstanding questions based on the cumulated evidence, and indicate the gaps in the knowledge base. For example, they indicate that in all of these societies women and their work are highly valued even if not universally given as high status as men; gender roles tend to be complementary and equivalent rather than identical; women typically are excluded from occupying political roles although informally they often have a strong voice in collective decision-making; sex role socialization and particular aspects of women's sexuality are inadequately investigated; biological sex differences are recognized and built into the fabric of the gender division of labor; and there is wide variation in attitudes and prudishness about sex. Intriguingly, rape and other forms of sexual violence do not appear to have existed traditionally in any of these societies. This is particularly noteworthy given the high degree of real and ritual aggression exhibited by Iban men and others in this area.

These and other insights from this overview provide important context and balance for the almost bewildering array of detail discussed in the individual studies. While virtually every chapter is compelling in some way, some stand out either for their wealth of information or for the inherent interest of their seemingly exotic subject matter. For example, in addition to the studies of *latah* (chapters by Doolittle and Winzeler), penis pins (Brown), and mortuary practices (Schiller) mentioned previously, there are detailed accounts of the meaning of headhunting (Davison and Sutlive), the practice of *bejalai* – traveling or journeys undertaken by men as quests for status and expressions of male prerogative (Kedit), and the importance of weaving to women's lives and social influence (Mashman and Drake). Several chapters represent family collaborations one way or another. For example, different aspects of Rungus gen-

der roles and sexuality are studied by three members of the Appell family (L. Appell, G. Appell, and A. Appell Doolittle), providing one of the more comprehensive and compelling accounts of these topics found in this volume. Alternatively, Crain draws upon the experiences of his family who accompanied him in his field work. He contrasts his family's childrearing practices based on western assumptions and methods with those of the Lun Dayeh, a group located in Kalimantan near the Sarawak and Sabah borders. The direct comparison between Western and Lun Dayeh approaches are starkly illustrated in the mutual surprise expressed over his young son's upbringing, and Crain implies that the early childhood experiences have had lasting effects on his son's character and preferences. This account is one of the more intriguing as well as frustrating as it would be informative to have much more detail on both accounts. It also bears out the conclusion alluded to previously about the relative lack of good specific information on sex role socialization.

One of the best aspects of this volume is that it truly contributes to *gender* studies, examining both male and female, separately and together, so that it is possible to get an emerging picture of how gender roles are constructed and practiced in collaboration and in opposition. There are numerous detailed accounts of the gender division of labor and how material culture and practices associated with gender are linked to ritual and spiritual life. Less convincing are the occasional efforts to give theoretical underpinning to these accounts, especially in light of more recent developments in gender relations and feminist theory. As raw material for theory construction, however, these provide ample and sometimes provocative data. For example, an article on the existence of a highly oppositional binary system of social relations based on male-female opposition among the Selako (Schneider and Schneider) details how virtually all activities, artifacts, and beliefs appear to be assigned separate gendered meaning, ranging from allocation of space in traditional houses to cooking practices (men roast, women boil). These findings are highly suggestive in light of strenuous efforts to resist conceptualizing gender in binary terms in contemporary feminist theory.

Many of the studies are accompanied by extensive and high quality photographs and diagrams. There are detailed depictions of long-house organization, weaving patterns,

children and adults at work and play, and even portraits of historical figures and settlements, providing important visual detail that would not be available through narrative description alone. Unfortunately, few of these are dated or clearly specify when they were taken, and it would be valuable to have more consistent indication of the provenance of these photographs.

In fact, the absence of clear information about date and time is part of a more general problem for a number of the accounts of the research discussed in this volume. While it is evident that some of this research reaches relatively far into the past, when and what duration for the fieldwork is not always clearly specified or the information is buried in footnotes. Similarly, there is great unevenness in amount of information supplied about methods used. Perhaps this reflects one of those disciplinary differences alluded to earlier, but to have cross-disciplinary impact, as I believe these accounts potentially have, it is important to have systematic information on how study sites were selected, complete sources of information, who were the key informants, language and translation issues, etc. Some of these studies satisfactorily supply this information, others leave the reader with too many questions.

The greatest strength of this volume is the amount and depth of information on gender roles and practices within a variety of small communities, many of whose traditional ways of living are undoubtedly on the way to extinction. The accumulated research reported here provides important baseline information whose existence makes a strong case for the necessity of continued follow up to investigate changes produced by the increasing volume of contact with the outside world. The book ends with one such account of changes to traditional culture from rural-urban migration contributed by the volume's editor. One of the more intriguing findings is the ways that women appear to be increasingly disadvantaged relative to men, even though in their traditional societies they had strong claims to near equal status. It would be extremely interesting to have similar research on all of these societies as well as systematic case comparisons across these and other social groups. It is from such work that more detailed and nuanced understanding will emerge of how gender is conceptualized and constructed across the varieties of human experience.

Book Review: Culture and the Question of Rights: Forests, Coasts, and Seas in Southeast Asia

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Charles Zerner. *Culture and the Question of Rights: Forests, Coasts, and Seas in Southeast Asia*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003. 289 pp. \$19.95 (paper).

When William of Normandy landed on the shores of England in 1066, he foraged the land. Goods were confiscated, farms were burned, and the inhabitants killed to prevent them from supporting King Harold. By 1071 one-fifth of the English population had been decimated. William gave their land to the knights and vassals who had sworn allegiance to him. Only two Anglo-Saxons owned land 20 years after the Normandy invasion; the English had been disenfranchised. This method of disenfranchisement has been the fate of non-Western people. Europeans discovering new lands, claim those lands for their monarchs. The indigenous people have no title, and therefore no rights. In the name of civilization, indigenous people are then transplanted to reservations so that the land can be developed by "civilized" folks.

Discovery of new land has always resulted in the disenfranchisement of the local people. European powers ignored the customary practices that regulated the land, water, and produce, and imposed their own property laws. These first world powers had national sovereignty over the land that was recognized by the European community. In the United States, the landmark case of *Johnson v. M'Intosh* (1823) validated the "discovery doctrine". Johnson had purchased land from the Pinankeshaw Indians in 1775 when the United States was still an English colony. The land was controlled by Virginia when the colonies declared its independence from Britain in 1776. In 1784 the Virginia colony transferred the land to the United States government. In 1818 Congress sold the land to M'Intosh. Johnson's heirs brought suit in federal court to regain ownership of the land. The Marshall court held that the land originally belonged to England based on the "discovery doctrine" but was ceded to the United States Government after the American Revolution. The court's position was that Native Americans had the right to occupy the land but did not own it, and could not sell it. Johnson's heirs lost their claim to the land. The same reasoning has disenfranchised indigenous people worldwide.

However, today indigenous people are challenging this doctrine. Indigenous people are the local people, the first ones to settle the land. They are the people who were con-

quered by Europeans, or other foreigners, who occupied their land. They have been subjected to genocide and ethnocide - annihilation of the culture of an ethnic group by the dominant group. It is these indigenous people that Charles Zerner discusses in his book *Culture and the Question of Rights*. They have survived the initial contact with the colonizer and are now struggling to retain or regain their rights to land, water, and produce via "translation" — sharing, promoting, and interpreting their culture to outsiders. It is through this cultural information of song, dance, and linguistic text that these indigenous people assert their rights to the land. Through translation government and others know that there is a culture that governs the everyday activity of these people.

Culture and the Question of Rights is a discourse on property rights in Southeast Asia. It is a discussion of indigenous people fighting to have their culture, rights, and laws respected and accepted by the state. In a series of articles, Charles Zerner documents how the local people challenge the "discovery doctrine" that disrespected their customary laws. We learn about local land, water, and agricultural practices. Through song, dance, poetry, and dreams, ownership and usage is recognized by indigenous people; westerners use a deed to convey the same rights. These ethnographic articles expose us to the injustices perpetrated against indigenous people in the name of development, progress, and civilization while at the same time providing information on customary property law.

The first article by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, "Cultivating the Wild: Honey-hunting and Forest Management in Southeast Kalimantan," discusses the importance of culture in defining what is considered to be a commodity. Among the Meratus Dayak of Indonesia, no one has legal claim to honey trees or the honey that they produce. The community recognizes claims of ownership based on finding and nursing the trees. Even when a man claims ownership, the honey belongs to everyone and must be shared. Ownership of the tree is not absolute; the hunter must convince the tree, the bees, and the community that the tree is his through song, poetry, and his ability to get the honey. Tsing reminds us that not everyone sees the world through Western lens.

The second article by the editor, Charles Zerner, "Sounding the Makassar Strait: The Poetics and Politics of an Indonesian Marine Environment," is a discussion of the precarious nature of fishing and the inequities of the state. Mandar fishermen must propitiate the spirits every time they

enter the waters. They offer food and speech in return for fish, safety and prosperity. "Failure to tell the one in control that one has arrived, to tell it the daily news, that one is fishing or traveling, and to make requests...is to steal from the guardian spirit" (p.74).

The sea forces fishermen to renegotiate every time they enter the water with the pantheon of gods. However, the power of the gods are superseded by the power of the state. Customary law allows local fishermen to carve out their territory on a first come basis. Once a roppong is anchored to the floor of the sea, the fisherman has customary claim for two to five kilometers surrounding the area. Newcomers must cede their rights to fish to owners of the first roppong site, and first roppong fishermen can use violence to reclaim their territory. If there is conflict, first roppong must prevail based on customary law. However, the state perceives customary law as an impediment to development. According to the state, the sea belongs to all citizens, and first roppong sites can not prevent new roppong sites from fishing in state waters. Mandar fishermen have been forced to share the local waters with interlopers while they continue to appease the guardian spirits. If they fail to acknowledge the guardian spirits, they risk misfortune; if they fail to acknowledge state law, they risk jail. In a society that depends on fishing for its livelihood, Mandar traditional practices have been labeled maladaptive for state development, an impediment to progress. But progress promotes inequality, enriching some while impoverishing others. Development policies support the privilege; opening local waters up to everyone allows non-Mandar tuna vessels with modern technology to usurp the tuna industry. Their technology allows them to catch more fish and sell it cheaper. Local fishermen fearing the lost of their livelihood opposed the state's new law and reinstated the customary one that barred non-local fishermen from fishing in local waters. Zerner's article is an indictment that cultural practices usually function to level the playing field or redistribute the wealth. Governments do not always recognize the negative impact that progress may have on indigenous people. Progress in this case created unequal access to scarce resources, which the locals refused to accept.

The next article by Marina Roseman, "Singers of the Landscape: Song, History, and Property Rights in Malaysian Rainforest," tells how the Temiar of Malaysia claim title to their land through song and dreams. These people do not recognize individual ownership but communal rights. Members of the village have the rights to live, gather, plant, harvest, hunt, fish, and be buried on communal land. They decide how the cultivable land will be divided among members. Household ownership rights are acknowledged for production and distribution of produce only. Fruit trees, which are associated with past residences, are associated with the person who plant and tend them. This person does

not own the fruit they produce but does have a say in when it is gathered and how to distribute it. The rights to the fruit tree are inherited by the children of the parent who planted it.

Stephanie Gorson Fried's "Writing for their Lives" is the most poignant article in the collection. The author discusses the Bentian Dayak leaders attempt to salvage their land rights by asking the government of Indonesia to issue them a certificate of ownership. One is almost moved to tears as the leaders initially condemn their slash and burn farming in order to convince the government that they are pro-development. They switch from condemning their traditional agricultural practices to defending it as less destructive to the environment than tree logging. The local leaders contend that their people have not been adequately compensated for the destruction of their farms and land, and that the land the national government wants to give to developers is land that the Bentian Dayak bought from the original indigenous people many, many years ago.

One is distraught to discover their efforts futile; the land is given to developers, and the farms destroyed. One wonders how the Indonesia government could be so insensitive to the needs, customs, and laws of these indigenous people. The reader, if not the government, is convinced by the end of the article that the "adat," Dayak customary law, should be the law of the land.

Nancy Lee Peluso further elaborates on the concept of property and resources for the indigenous people of Indonesia. When the Dayaks were no longer able to practice slash and burn agriculture, they planted rubber in their gardens. Rubber trees increased the value of their land and allowed them to feed their families. Durian trees were also planted along side the rubber. These trees, and their fruit, belonged not only to the planter but to their wives and children and the children of their children. Two or three generations down the line, the trees are owned by cousins. The fruit must be shared, but it is usually agreed that the person who tends the tree has primary ownership. Peluso's article shows how one group of Indonesia people have benefited from the political and economic changes that have been imposed upon them.

Ethnocentrism, racism, mercantilism, and capitalism have deprived the indigenous people of Southeast Asia of their land and water rights. Today these people are trying to educate the government and all who will listen about their culture and laws. They seek recognition and utilization of their law in deciding property rights. Unfortunately, their struggle has just begun. Only time will tell if they will be victorious. In the meantime, Zerner has exposed us to the problems of indigenous people everywhere, not just those in Southeast Asia. This book is recommended reading for anyone interested in Southeast Asia and international studies.

Book Review: The State of the World's Cities 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture

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UN-HABITAT (United Nations Human Settlement Programme). *The State of the World's Cities 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture*. London: Earthscan, 2004. 198 pp. \$39.00 (paper).

The United Nations (UN) report *State of the World's Cities 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture* had its world premiere September 2004 in Barcelona at the World Urban Forum. The Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) released the report as a 198-page, well-organized book. The book can be ordered directly through the agency's website www.unhabitat.org. Online book vendors have used copies available as well. Unfortunately, this is one of the main drawbacks of the otherwise valuable report—availability. The very nature of book publishing limits accessibility and forces marketing limitations upon a report that offers a unique, one-stop shopping opportunity for a world community. The purpose of the book—to be used in assessing and addressing “current challenges and create dynamic, multicultural and inclusive urban settings”—may fall short of the same type of inclusion when it comes to audience. The book was not available at the university or metropolitan libraries in my state of residence. Potential readers would have to know about the report. No doubt those in attendance at Barcelona and those connected to or interested in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been exposed to this report. But the world is larger than the reach of the UN and globalization pays no attention to organizational boundaries. The tireless efforts of so many individuals whose contributions culminate in the pages of *World Cities* deserve the attention of a truly global community. As UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan writes in the forward to the book, creating *cities of difference* requires the engagement of all stakeholders.

World's Cities 2004/2005 builds on previous publications targeting various aspects of the MDGs as related to urban areas. The current report addresses the uneven impacts of globalization in the world's cities and points to multiculturalism and inclusion as the hope of peace and the answer to enduring urban woes. At first glance, the information provided in *World's Cities* may appear uninviting in terms of the desolate picture it paints of our world, but those drab statistics are put into a context of hope. The book, which keeps culture front and center, also serves as a dissemination tool of Best Practices, the best feature of the book. These anecdotes appear as pull-out narrative boxes, 63 in all spread

out over seven chapters. From the mesmerizing rhythm of Hip Hop to the calm collaborating of participatory budgeting, Best Practice stories direct the reader toward an imagination of progress rather than simply noting abstract concepts and theories.

It is important to draw lessons from these experiences and learn how approaches that work well in one place may be adapted in other places that share similar problems. Such knowledge exchange may take different forms and holds potential for positive development. It encourages hope for progress. (p. 1)

The book's Overview sets the rationale for the urban focus—cities set the economic stage for a nation—and distinguishes four new dimensions of globalization: speed, scale, scope, and complexity. Technologies have brought the *speed* of global connections to a simultaneous level. No community is insulated from the *scale* of globalization. The multi-dimensional *scope* of globalization includes the cultural and social, as well as the economic and political. Dynamic interactions on a global level increase the *complexity* of embedding research and diverse ways of knowing into policy and practice.

Chapter 1 discusses the dimensions of globalization impacts on our world's cities and establishes the framework for the entire report. While acknowledging the conflicting rhetoric on the meaning of the effects, *World's Cities* posits that the interaction between the phenomenon and cities is not unidirectional: “it is not just that cities are affected by global forces, but that local economies, cultures, and politics also affect global patterns. Global factors become embedded in local culture, practice, and institutions” (p. 10). As such, culture is presented as a city's attitude, rather than a singular dimension, and thus the entry point for analyzing other dimensions of importance, which include economic, social, institutional, political and demographics. The chapter later incorporates the multi-dimensional impacts in the section “Challenges for Policy and Management” before leaving the reader with questions about defending public interest in the new era.

Chapter 2 enlarges culture as attitude and examines it from the material perspective of urban development and defines it as “the ideas and practices, sites and symbols, of the symbolic economy” (p. 32). Cultural capital becomes

redevelopment of urban spaces and a factor in employment growth. Two other sections discuss trends in urban culture industries and the spread of consumption spaces, such as the enclosed urban shopping mall. The chapter concludes by returning to the attitude of inclusive culture:

Often this combination of nerve, racial diversity and an impatient desire for new things explodes into an astoundingly uncivil society, characterized by oppositional cultures in which men and women speak frankly of their differences and struggle openly to protect their rights. This, however, is the price that today's global cities have to pay for creativity and cultural inclusiveness. (p. 47)

A multidimensional analysis of metropolitanization in Chapter 3 sets the context for six perspectives that offer a new descriptive and analytical approach for metropolitan phenomena. The new approach is then used as a lens to examine metropolitan development trends in developing countries, transition economy countries, and advanced economy countries. Chapter 4 ushers in a data-heavy, multifaceted analysis of international migration in a globalization framework. The occurring xenophobia of migration has produced claims—often unsubstantiated—of economic, cultural, political, and social distress from the recipient communities, now mostly located in the advanced economy countries. Therefore, migration must be considered in the contexts of both the migrants' and recipient community's sides. "In general terms, there is no doubt that the management of migra-

tion flows should not be unilateral. It should include international, national, and local bodies" (p. 83).

Chapter 5 presents new global data and the accompanying regional analysis of urban poverty. The chapter's strength is in the multi-platform presentation of the data and analysis. For example, narrative boxes set aside highlights that include trends in urban poverty in a regional presentation; five key dimensions of slums; and best practices. Chapter 6 overviews global crime trends before turning to a regional discussion of the safety and transparency aspects of urban governance. Solutions are articulated as the "globalization of norms of good urban governance," which are characterized for the first time in *World's Cities*. The report ends, rather than concludes, with the Changing Culture of Planning and an overview of the principles of a new urban planning culture with a focus on the dominant global cities. Chapter 7 defines the planning culture as the "both formal and informal [ways] ... in which planning in a given country and/or city is conceived, institutionalized and enacted" (p. 160).

World's Cities should be a reference book sitting on the desks of everyone from researchers and policy makers to journalists and practitioners in development. Its pages should be well-worn with turned-down page corners, highlighted text, and notes written in the margins. And for those of you in the United Nations sphere, think outside the box when it comes to the audience for this report. The copy used in this review is now on the desk of a Native American who specializes in tribal government media and rural community development.

Book Review: Training in Developing Nations: A Handbook for Expatriates

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John L. Daly, ed. *Training in Developing Nations: A Handbook for Expatriates*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 2005. 218 pp. \$29.95 (paper).

Apparently many expatriates returning home from their training experiences in Third World countries have felt deficient in their abilities as trainers. Contributing to this lack is the fact that there is a dearth in pertinent information and methodologies to assist trainers in their preparation for service in developing countries. *Training in Developing Nations: A Handbook for Expatriate (TIDN)* attempts to meet this need. It is “designed to provide useful insights and helpful tips for international trainers and technical consultants” (p. vii) preparing to carry out professional training in developing nations.

The idea for this type of book was formed shortly after the editor was selected as a Fulbright Senior Scholar to the African country of Swaziland where he spent ten months as a technical advisor and trainer. In preparing for the stint in Swaziland, he was unable to find “relevant preparatory materials” (p. viii) to help him prepare for his mission.

In the “Introduction,” Daly provides the reader with an overview of the text after stating that people with no Third World training experience will find in this text “helpful tips” while preparing for “training and travel” (p. xi). He also mentions that this text could serve as a valuable resource for assessing one’s previous training in developing countries “with training provided by others” (p. xi). He affirms that the material in the text reflects the insights of experienced trainers who are highly educated academics, who have had considerable training and field experience. This text, he believes, will serve both those beginning training and those who are experienced.

The text consists of three main sections. Part I is titled “Practical Strategies for Training in Developing Settings.” Chapter 1 by William Marjenhoff deals with issues of safety, security and being comfortable in developing nations. The author lists some essentials necessary to one’s preparation prior to one’s departure. And on arrival at one’s destination, one should be alert to criminal activity at airports, alert to being taken advantage of by taxi drivers, the police and even the government officials. Some of these fundamentals may seem unnecessary to the nonchalant person who is trusting of everybody; but to ensure one’s protection and well-being, these are indeed necessary, and commonsense is key.

Stories on the infringement of the personal safety of travelers abound.

In Chapter 2 Daly offers seven tips to enhance expatriate trainers’ effectiveness when operating in underdeveloped managerial contexts. For example, one should not assume that communication will be smooth just because English is the official language of a government. In Swaziland, while English is the official language, it is not the dominant vernacular; siSwati is. Also, the variety of English one speaks may be somewhat challenging to the trainees of the host country. Moreover, when one is communicating with a Swazi, the word “yes” does not always mean an affirmative nod. Since this response is prevalent in many African contexts, non-Africans can misinterpret this response. One should be careful and learn to read between the lines to ensure that adequate communication is taking place. Knowing something about basic communication patterns of the host country is important. Daly does a good job of apprising prospective technical consultants or trainers of the possibility of facing culture shock relevant to a breakdown in communication when they relocate to a Third World country. Therefore focussing on the suggestions he offers may serve you well.

Being a female trainer in many international settings presents many challenges because the place of women does not equal that of men. In Chapter 3, Barbara Liggett discusses such challenges based on her wide experiences working with international students. Her advice is invaluable, not only to expatriates women trainers but also to men as well. She concludes the chapter by emphasizing that the “struggle—the challenge of gender—is present for educators and for students. The struggle, itself, however, can be a catalyst for creating a circle of learners, worldwide” (p. 47). Perhaps if women like Barbara Liggett made a point of connecting with some women from developing countries who are in key positions, to get their perspectives on gender issues, they would gain added insights into how to handle gender issues.

Marketing strategies for training initiatives in developing nations is the topic of Chapter 4. Since there is very little information at our disposal relevant to marketing strategies in the training area, Daly’s discussion is of utmost importance. He has made an excellent point in putting the onus of “getting the word out” to the host nation sponsors on the trainers themselves. This is an effective way of en-

hancing participation and improving attendance on the part of host participants.

Part II deals with training in specific fields. In Chapter 5, Ambe Njoh, draws attention to three historical perspectives designed to improve administrative effectiveness in developing countries: classical administrative reforms (1950-mid-1960s), institution building (mid-1960-early-1970s) institution development (mid-1970-present), and elaborates on their strengths and weaknesses. Information about these initiatives should be of interest to trainers because an awareness of the how administrative reforms in developing countries work can help prepare trainers for what to expect in the host country. According to Njoh, the institution development model has potential for effecting changes consistent with administrative objectives. A person interested in this area would need to explore this field. Someone going to a specific country would need to have some background on the country's administrative structure in order to prepare to offer adequate training.

According to Willy Holleweg dit Wegman, "economic development is key to human development (HD) and poverty alleviation" (p. 85). Chapter 6 is a reflection of Holleweg dit Wegman's long experience as a trainer and represents much of the thinking about economic development theory from a European perspective. He insists that training based on the local setting's needs and solutions and aid funds should be allocated accordingly. "Developing countries, and African countries in particular, will never reach an acceptable overall development if the people are not trained in an appropriate manner" (p. 110). And an adequate number of local trainers should be trained. Holleweg dit Wegman gives examples of case studies on the successes and failures of job creation through small and mid-level enterprises. This is an important chapter to read for those interested in economic development.

In Chapter 7, Joyce Barrett gives a frank presentation of the need for effective and efficient media training in developing countries. Her essay is easy, quick reading, humorous and full of insights on the media training, based on her approaches to teaching as well as her experiences with students in Third World countries. She does emphasize ethics as an important element in journalism. This chapter should be required reading for persons planning to be media trainers overseas. There are apparently moral issues needing to be addressed in this field.

Chapter 8 is concerned with the preparation of expatriate trainers who will give instruction in group-counseling skills and knowledge to mental health workers in developing countries. The authors stress the pre-training of expatriate trainers prior to their posting in overseas training contexts. Also, the host country and community need to be committed to the undertaking, so they need to make available information on local traditions and customs, etc., that will assist the trainer who is going to have to develop a rapport with trainees. The reader is informed of the current state of group leader training overseas and then presented with a best practices model for group leader training and how this

model can be applied to developing countries. The authors recommend an extended period of service and encourage some flexibility on the part of the trainer. The mental health area needs attention, more so with the devastation of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter provides helpful information to those planning to work in mental health.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played a significant role in the provision of assistance to the citizens of Third World countries. In Chapter 9, Willy Holleweg dit Wegman offers an elaborate model showing the operation of NGOs. He stresses the training of experts based on needs assessment. The information in this chapter is invaluable to trainers interested in NGOs. The information sheds light on how crucial proper training is on account of the short duration of funding from donors. Training has to be quick but thorough. The example of a fictitious developing nation, the author uses, can provide insights to trainers.

Cherie Onkst and Eknath Naik's contribution to this text (Chapter 10) is of great importance in view of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which has ravaged much of the developing world. In this chapter, Onkst and Naik suggest strategies relevant to the training of local health care professionals. First, characteristics of health care professionals are mentioned. Since they are considered the cream of society, the role of health professionals is vital; so in working with them, the expatriate should give them due respect and treat them as equals in the sharing of knowledge and ideas. Next, communication styles of the host country are explored since they are crucial to a positive working relationship with the local professionals. American communication is generally two-way, whereas the communication style of many developing world contexts is one-way, or top-down. Also, since learning styles vary from culture to culture, the trainers need to take these factors into consideration when training local experts. Other issues such as the implementation, content, length, and the evaluation of the training programs are presented. Emphasis is placed on the people being served and trained, so training methodologies should be tailored to the needs of the target audience and should be flexible so as to be adapted to different situations and different cultural settings. It should be noted that expatriates themselves vary their styles or approaches according to their personalities. Part III is a chapter on observations and conclusions. In this concluding chapter, Daly not only reviews the findings from previous chapters in the book, but he also explores future trends and challenges germane to training in Third World countries. Key factors in improving training include, sufficient institutional support, cultural awareness, adaptability of the trainer, patience on the part of the trainer, and future training trends and challenges.

To conclude, it is necessary to suggest that this book will not provide all the answers that an expatriate trainer needs in preparing to work abroad. A trainer needs to try to find as much information as possible on the country of his/her future sojourn. Embassies may provide some information on their respective countries, but much of this is sketchy

and prepared for tourists. Texts on culture and intercultural communication can be valuable resources. Many of these texts are used in colleges and universities, but, unfortunately, books specific to the cultures of many developing countries still need to be written. Publishers nonetheless may be reluctant to publish books for which there is no large market. We need to remember that books alone do not give a person deep insights into a culture. Culture is like an iceberg: what you see is not all a culture is. Therefore, when you are living in another culture, you have to constantly try to learn as much as possible about the culture and strive to be an effec-

tive intercultural communicator, especially when dealing with people face to face.

Training in Developing Nations is indeed an engaging text, and I have to agree with the editor that it “will help the reader gain firmer grasps on training in developing nations” (p. 198) although I refer the term “should” to “will.” The reader should always bear in mind that in whatever field training is conducted, the training should be tailored to the needs of the culture receiving the training and not to the needs of the industrialized world.

Book Review: Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda

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Nigel Eltringham. *Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda*. Sterling, England: Pluto Press, 2004. 232 pp. \$26.95 (paper).

When reporting on the Rwandan massacres, the Western press has often used stereotypic language with references to tribal savagery and hackneyed allusions to “the heart of darkness.” Tainted with racism and generally limited in scope the information regarding Rwanda has usually been shallow at best. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, Nigel Eltringham addresses the dangers of oversimplifying the catastrophic mayhem of Rwanda and details deep critical explanations to “account for the horror.” Eltringham delves into Rwandan history and politics. In addition, he examines certain aspects of language use regarding Rwanda and presents findings from his sociolinguistic study, which includes narratives from Rwandans relating their perceptions of colonialism, national history, and the mass killings.

With a look into Rwanda’s past, Eltringham writes that “social distinction in colonial Rwanda was racially constructed and did not conform to the current multidimensional understanding of ‘ethnicity’” (p. 19). Instead, the distinctions made among people of the region were propagated. With the 1933–34 census, “racialisation” labeled the population into three groups: Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, and “following patrilineal custom children...inherit[ed] the identity inscribed on their father’s ID card” (p. 18). As a result, artificial biological separations were established on paper and subsequently specific physical and cultural variations were socially generated in the minds and in the behaviors of the people toward each other. Further, the author discusses how political players propagated ethnic and racial divisions in order to gain power. By examining the killings of the 1959 “revolution” and the 1963/64 massacres, Eltringham addresses how such distinctions led to other killings and to the 1994 genocide. Before the 1994 killings, “genocide propaganda” included references to the 1959 and 1963/64 massacres as empowerment of “the Hutu’ liberating themselves from the Tutsi’” (p. 47). However, Eltringham explains that the division between the groups was not a long established distinction marked by certain cultural norms or language, or by absolute socioeconomic or political imbalances, or by real biological differences. Instead, the differences were developed and strengthened to promote prejudice and hatred for the political gain of a few.

Eltringham writes that the postulated distinctions between “the Tutsi and the Hutu” were further exacerbated by reports and writings about Rwanda. Eltringham notes that instead of being “the result of ‘primordial bloodlust’,” the Rwandan genocide was “*modern*, premeditated, [and] well organized” (p. 64). The author discusses how the treatment of the Rwandan genocide, mired in racist attitudes, appears in written documentation describing the people as primitive and “tribal.” Although acknowledging that comparisons to the Holocaust have given the massacres “legitimacy” in Western countries, Eltringham discusses at length both the similarities and the differences between the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. For instance, like the Holocaust victims, people in Rwanda often did not know why they were being targeted, and many were killed for who they were and not for what they did. Unlike the Holocaust, in Rwanda the speed of the slayings was much quicker and more of the population participated in the killing. Despite the differences or similarities, Eltringham writes:

the Holocaust has played a central role as comparator in discussions of the 1994 genocide. Although this is natural and there are significant comparisons to be made, making the Holocaust preponderant not only obscures significant divergent characteristics of the Rwandan genocide, but may undermine our ability to detect, prevent and/or swiftly stop future genocides that do not adequately resemble the Holocaust. (pp. 180–81)

By concentrating specifically on the Rwandan genocide, Eltringham argues that the prosecution of those previously responsible for the bloodshed in Rwanda should be the focal point.

To focus on “the individual criminal responsibility intrinsic to the crime of genocide” (p. 181), Eltringham asserts that the term “moderate Hutu” needs closer scrutiny. The author suggests that Hutu moderate could be replaced with “‘Hutu opposing Habyarimana and his power’.” Such a change in phrasing would give clarity and accuracy in meaning that could lead to accountability of individuals responsible for the killings. Eltringham discusses the “subliminal impact” of “Hutu moderate” in maintaining “collective guilt,” which undermines the reparations and reconciliation needed in Rwanda (p. 181). Because the use of

Hutu moderate “disguises great complexity” and perpetuates “a binary framework” in which a Hutu can only be “qualified as either moderate or extremist”(p. 76), Eltringham argues that greater accuracy and specificity in references made about people, their actions, and time is necessary for Rwanda to reconcile and maintain peace.

In the process of reconciliation, Eltringham warns of the intrinsic dangers in appealing to history for solutions. Since the “structure of power” in Rwanda has been “constructed on the construction of history” (p. 148), history has been used to create and perpetuate divisions in Rwanda, and Eltringham writes that to believe

a single, absolute history is attainable (and preferable) has not only proved to be deadly, but overestimates the capacities and misunderstands the nature of historiography. While there may be a non-negotiable *chronicle of events*, the narratives that actors recognise (and value) as history are the product of an interpretive exercise that inevitably generates different narratives. While Rwanda has a single past, a single, definitive history is unattainable. (p. 182)

To illustrate the variations in perspectives, Eltringham presents several narratives collected from Rwandans speaking on the past events. Eltringham admits the collection is not fully representative of as many “‘ethnic’ narratives” as possible, but that the accounts illustrate the differences found in human perceptions. From his narrative research, Eltringham concludes that

we should not allow our faith in a single, “real” history to prevent us from accepting and exploring competing narratives that reflect contemporary concerns in Rwanda. If we strive to isolate one version of Rwandan history such concerns will remain Hidden. (p. 179)

To remember respectfully the victims of the Rwandan genocide, Eltringham writes that humanity must resist adopting a single historical narrative, but instead must seek a “dogmatic, tenacious and transparent” (p. 181) into the “*modern, premeditated*” (p. 64) killings of human against human.

Book Review: The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective

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John Quigley. *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005.

The Case for Palestine is a concise, well written book with invaluable summary of historical background for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. John Quigley's dispassionate analysis and presentation of unbiased historical facts from credible sources overwhelmingly serves to educate and inform any reader. In the midst of the current global disorder, Quigley's book comes out as a reminder for us all for the importance of international law in resolving international conflicts. In addition, this book contribute greatly to inform the misinformed reader and to deal with the total lack of knowledge of the average American on this subject. Given the central role of this issue in world politics this volume could not come at a more important time in our world history.

Quigley's discussion of international law is, in large part, overwhelmed by historical narratives of the conflict. Nonetheless, Quigley's historical narrative, interwoven with applicable international law is a success and a must read for those seeking a short, accessible, and copiously documented book.

Quigley, who is a distinguished Professor of Law at The Ohio State University College of Law, attempts to bring an international law perspective to what has become one of history's longest running and most fundamentally misunderstood conflicts. Through out the volume Quigley's mastery of this topic is evident. His consistent citation to credible sources from the Arab (both Christian and Muslim) and Jewish communities serves to legitimate his propositions.

Quigley's volume is broken into five parts: the first part examining the origins of the Zionist movement in Europe and its influence on the British Mandate in Palestine. In addition, to questioning the jurisdiction of the United Nations over mandated Palestine prior to 1948 and whether the UN General Assembly has the legal authority to adapt resolution 181 that calls for the partition of Palestine (Part 1, p. 47).

The chapters in part 1 focus on the Zionist goal of creating a Jewish state in Palestine and the steps taken by "one of the most successful colonizing instruments in history" (the Jewish Agency) (p.23) to ensure the realization of this singular goal. Herein, Quigley describes how the power vacuum created by the British departure after the failed

Mandate and the subsequent UN recommendation of partition (Resolution 181) presented ideal circumstances for the Zionist movement to realize its ultimate goal. It is in this section of the volume that the reader first becomes aware of the underlying history of this conflict and how the massive immigration of European Jews into Palestine played a central role in the tensions that arose between Arab and Jews, where in fact, none had previously existed. Moreover the reader is exposed to the lengths at which the exceptionally well funded and organized pro-Zionist group were willing to go to ensure that the dream of a Jewish state come to fruition.

Part two includes an intimate description of the war in 1948 and is based largely on the recollections of those on the ground. Quigley quickly dispels any myths that the so-called "Israeli war of Independence" was anything but a war of aggression against a largely unarmed population waged by Zionist machine cloaked in an outdated colonialist mindset and focused on the singular goal of a purely Jewish state in Palestine. The mental picture of unarmed Arab fleeing their towns and villages just ahead of the Zionist forces, the descriptions of psychological warfare and the disparity between the fighting forces leaves the reader shocked and in utter despair.

Due to the significance of 1948 and the central role it is destined to play in this conflict, in parts two and three, Quigley appropriately devotes detailed attention to the legitimacy of Israeli and Zionist claims to the territory of Palestine, to the dispossession of Palestinians during the 1948 war, and to what become of Palestinian towns and land in and after that fateful year. It is disarming to learn how the Israeli leadership, with predetermination, forcibly removed a native population from its homeland. Reinforced by quotes from prominent Israeli leadership such as Golda Meir, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Menachem Begin, the author clearly establishes the fact that Israel was always intended to be a purely Jewish state encompassing all of Mandate Palestine to the exclusion of its native population and in contradiction to Palestinian's fundamental right to self-determination.

In the remainder of Part three, Quigley analyzes Israeli national institutions and ethnic distinction in the law of Israel (described as "legal apartheid" p.181), and thereby provides important information not easily accessible to the average reader. It is here that the reader becomes fully aware of the fact that the policy and practice of martial law, check

points, home demolitions, curfews, travel permits and other various constraints on Palestinian life were not implemented to combat “terrorism”, which is a relatively recent phenomenon, but were in fact implemented very early on. Moreover, he exposes the reader to the strangulation of Palestinian society both economically and socially as a direct result of these policies. It becomes painfully obvious throughout this section that Palestinian in Israeli society are accorded second class citizen status and are denied the basic and fundamental rights that Americans take for granted.

Discussion of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its consequences takes up all of part four. Relying almost exclusively on the words of Israeli political and military leadership to substantiate his proposition, Professor Quigley dispels any misconception that Israel was in “mortal danger” (p.161) of invasion in June 1967. Professor Quigley also summarizes the harsh realities that Palestinians have faced under Israeli occupation, including what the UN Human rights Commission, using the *IV Geneva Convention’s* provisions, has found to be “war crimes” (p.205). He goes on to describe how the years since 1967 have served to complete what Zionism began in 1948 and the years preceding, by continuing settlement activities and removing native populations. Herein, Quigley devotes special attention to the validity of the Pal-

estinians’ claim of a “right” (pp.181, 193, 203) to resist occupation. A right recognized by the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

In the book’s final part, Quigley suggests how Jerusalem (with regard to which Quigley observes that Palestinians, not Israeli, have the stronger legal claim, p.226), Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (which violate countless UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions), and the Palestinian refugee problem might be adjudicated in any Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

Surely this book will not please many of those who want to believe otherwise. However, if as Quigley states, “applicable international norms inform the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, the parties might achieve a negotiated solution that can lead to long lasting durable peace” (p.238).

Although a volume could be written on each of the book’s five parts, and some the arguments leave the reader wanting more information, the volume is an overall success, and should be considered a must read for all those interested in a comprehensive overview of the legal issues surrounding this conflict and for all those interested in bringing about a long-lasting, durable peace and justice in the holy land.

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