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Volume XIV (2003)
Globalization and Cultural Encounters
Alvin G. Edgell,
Department of Political Science,
Kent
State University, Kent, OH 44242
Introduction
This
paper intends to frame in broad-brush fashion the huge canvas where
globalization encounters present day Third World cultures, an engagement
that will be of critical importance to Third World aspirations and
prospects. It will, of course, be hard to give a measured place
to culture in any model, given its uniqueness to every society, its
penetration of all levels of experience and because of its unconscious,
emotional and long lasting prevalence in each society. So the first part
of this paper is explicitly about the development role of
culture. My thesis is that culture is embedded in all of the economic,
political and social institutions of the Third World nations being
prescribed for. This is not to say that culture is a straight-line
determinant of where countries stand in the regularly published
development league standings. Too many other interacting variables are
present in each nation’s unique constellation of influences.
For present
purposes I will not be dealing with Third World cultures as they
were before substantial contact with cultures of the western explorers,
traders, imperialists and entrepreneurs of salvation. The cultures that
I have in mind are those we find today. But I believe that every culture
has some lingering addictions to more or less ancient traditions, most
commonly those associated with religions, in the blend.
The material on culture’s
role that I draw on in the following, is largely taken from the multiple
articles in editors Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington’s
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, a
collection of numerous conference
papers.1 While
tilted toward the editors’ point of
view, there is a wide range of positions, including some complete
opposition. In some papers the word culture seems to have been
slighted, although one can readily infer that it lurks behind many
commonly cited “determinants” such as social institutions, human and
social capital, quality of the work force, even forms of governance. The
very complexity of culture’s interactions with other variables should
challenge scholars to further work at sorting out these interactions,
since culture is too commonly only off-handedly acknowledged as present
and is of some relevance for socio-economic development.
Culture
I
define culture for my purposes as values, attitudes, beliefs, mindsets,
central tendencies, worldviews and orientations that are prevalent in a
given society. It is emotionally held and long lasting rather than
instrumental short-term behavior and “pop culture.” Orlando Patterson
contends that culture is what one must know to be effective in one’s own
environment, and it is transmitted over the generations and is
influenced by peers and evolved by trial and error.2 Michael
Fairbanks and Stace Lindsey seem to substitute “mental models” for what
I take as culture, and they claim, “Mental models are deeply
ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that
influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”3 With
equal sweep, Mariano Grandona says that by choosing a “value system,”
one chooses to develop or not.4 However,
one must ask, in what sense does a society choose a value
system?
Culture is Always
There
Culture is always there, however mediated by other, more proximate
determinants. The following citations give a sense of culture’s elusive
role, but one not to be ignored, however variously perceived. Lawrence
E. Harrison says: “There is an intense interplay of cause and effect
between culture and progress, but the power of culture is
demonstrable.”5 Nathan
Glazer notes the confusing overlap and embeddedness of culture in other
variables.6 David
Landes says, “Determinants of complex processes are invariably plural
and interrelated.”7 Among
the modifiers and dissenters, Jeffrey Sachs argues that the
macro-statistics and assumptions are unconvincing about culture having
an explanatory role.8 Earlier,
he identifies geography, “social systems” and “positive feedback” as
helpful explanations “to account for the growth puzzle.”9 Sachs
gives heavy weight to geography: its tropical diseases, degraded soils,
discouraging landforms and locations, echoing Paul Harrison.10
Sachs’s concept of social systems is more expansive,
including political, cultural and economic factors. He looks at various
large regions and concludes that in all of them, culture’s—including
religion’s slight—role is subsidiary to political and economic
determinants, and that economic success comes from increasing use of
scale, positive feedback—which seems to mean momentum and chain
reaction—and critical mass of technology and ideas.11 Thus,
he seems largely concerned with relatively proximate influences,
without looking behind these variables to check their etiology.
Sachs does admit the impossibility of “disentangling” culture’s role and
the ambiguity of its influence as he scans the major regions.12 But,
per Sachs, “[c]ontrolling for such variables [presumably politics,
economics and culture] sharply reduces the scope for an important
independent role of culture.” It seems clear that Sachs is using an
idiosyncratic definition of culture, which he never specifies. If
culture is embedded—not to be disentangled—in political and economic
institutions, as I and others maintain, it is hard to give credibility
to his separating and “controlling of such variables.”13 Sachs
seems to leave “social change” interpretable as fundamental for arriving
at the right policies for growth. Yet he concedes that we haven’t found
a “general theory of social evolution.”14
The
“designated skeptic” Richard Shweder in Harrison and Huntington (H&H),
resents any effort to measure cultures against one another on any
grounds.15 If
one must account for modernizing successes, he would point to the
following: some having guns, some having Jews, for some immigration
policy, in some freeing of serfs, in some availability of fossil fuel,
the weather, willingness to trade with outsiders, good colonial masters,
high consumer demand and luck.16 He
completely opposes “cultural developmentalism,” which he sees as the
message of most of his fellow contributors, “the new
evangelists.”17 Shweder
sees “other cultures as sources of illumination,” not as evidence of
“our moral superiority over the rest.”18 Let
me quote his definition of culture, which I find difficult to
summarize.
By culture, I mean
community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful and
efficient. To be ‘cultural,’ those ideas about truth, goodness, beauty
and efficiency must be socially inherited and customary; and they must
actually be constitutive of different ways of life.19
He
allows an alternative definition by Isaiah Berlin: “goals, values, and
pictures of the world that are made manifest by speech, laws and routine
practices of self-monitoring groups.”20 This
latter definition is very close to my own above.
While Schweder does accept some universal values, e.g., “justice,
beneficence, autonomy, sacrifice, liberty, loyalty, sanctity, duty,”—and
just “too many” more—they have many specific forms and cannot be reduced
to common denominators.21 For
Shweder, progress, or decline, is determined by more, or less,
of what is good and desired, as defined by the culture itself, and that
is arbitrary.22 He
seems to leave some room for his judgment, when he refers to
“genuine” cultures, implying that there may be cultures that are
not genuine, by his definition.23
Shweder’s
agnosticism outrages Carlos Alberto Montaner over his blindness to
suffering and oppression in some cultures. Montaner, quite willing to be
judgmental, says that it is all very well to blame national leadership
and elites, but that these reflect the norms of society, with few
exceptions.24 Note
that this contradicts Sachs’s separating of culture from
politics. Thomas Weisner, too, is ready to set criteria for judgment:
“Cultures should be judged on their ability to provide well being, basic
support and sustainable daily lives for children and families.”25 Shweder
might accept this as conforming to his idea of “genuine” culture.
Culture as Shaper and
Filter
While deep culture may be obscured in visible polities, its influence is
clear to many observers. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle of Cameroon tells us
that since culture guides institutions, cultural inhibitors of desired
change must be addressed. Among the most inhibiting and generalizable
African characteristics that he finds are fixed hierarchies of wealth
and power.26 Lindsey
offers: “Cultural values matter because they form the principles around
which economic activity is organized.”27
Fukuyama uses “social capital” as critical for economic growth, and
defines it as “informal values and norms shared among members of a
group…[which] permit them to cooperate. Trust is the ‘lubricant.’”28 He
concedes that social capital cannot be measured yet, but says that it
cannot be developed without reasonable economic distribution and civic
participation.29 Fukuyama
claims that formally prescribed institutions require undesirable
enforcement costs, not needed by informal—for which one can read
‘culture-based’—institutions.30
Lawrence Harrison, with his enthusiasm for cultural determinism, rules
out dependency and imperialism in preference for his favorite
explanation, as causing the development status among the Third World
countries.31
Harrison asserts that similar
cultural patterns have had similar consequences in different
parts of the world, for example, where British colonialism (imperialism)
has had a major role in reshaping cultures.32 Evidence
for this seems mixed at best.
Tu
Wei-Ming throughout his chapter refers to Confucian cultural influences
that underlie East Asian successes, i.e., alternative forms of
modernization. This suggests that culture often filters and modifies
imported institutions.33 Suzanne
Berger and Ronald Dore support this, saying that technological
determinism is diluted by national (may we read cultural) modes of
organization and management, institutions and structures, causing
varieties of capitalism.34 Doesn’t
this mean that modernization and westernization are
not quite the same?
Non-Cultural Variables
A
great number of variables can be strung out that have affected, and may
affect, any particular society’s socio-economic development, but I think
a few are more universally involved and can embrace many, and varied,
specifics. Aside from the always-present culture, a consensual
list should include:
• Technology, sources and access
• The world economic structure, for
which globalization now seems central
• The imbalances in world political
and military power
• The cluster of domestic
governance, leadership and policy
• The geographical location,
natural environment and resources
• History, military conquests and
colonialism
And
here are some other comments on causal elements. As noted above, Sachs
offers three broad explanations for developmental growth: geography,
momentum and social system. His more or less unique contribution is in
the importance he places on geography, and he knocks his fellow
economists for ignoring this and the rest of his big three and for being
locked into “convergence” assumptions. He goes on to spell out the more
limiting aspects of geography: soils, erosion, water control; location,
land locked, mountainous; tropical conditions with agricultural pests
and spoilage; animal and human diseases.35 Sachs
also observes that colonialism was a poor preparation for Third World
capitalistic development. However, Daniel Etounga-Manguella asserts that
Africa is no longer justified in blaming colonialism for its
plight.36 Michael
Porter also looks at locational factors, and in considering a list of
successful nations, he says that they reveal “wide and subtle cultural
differences associated with improving economic circumstances that
further belie a simple connection between culture and
prosperity.” He does see importance in the right cultural behavior at
the right time and in the right situation.37
Cultural Lag; Values That Once Worked
Probably present in every society, in greater or lesser degree and
importance, are beliefs and practices that were once entirely
functional—or believed to be. Having been deeply assimilated, they are
no longer questioned for present relevance, or even possible
self-wounding. V.S.Naipaul seems to capture some of this when he recalls
that at an “early age” in Trinidad:
wondering whether the culture—the
difficult religion, the taboos, the social ideas—which in one way
supported and enriched some of us, and gave us solidarity, wasn’t the
very thing that disposed us to defeat.
Richard Silberg
finds a basic need for “positive affect,” the comforts of secure
tradition and an unquestioned religion, which are eroded by
modernization, and which seem to account for the tenacity of cultural
lag.38 Psychologist
Kenneth Kenniston discusses social conditioning as related to social
change, and he notes the cross-generational transmission of values,
interpretable as supporting cultural lag.39
Robert Edgerton observes that all cultures are somewhat maladaptive, but
that the spectrum is broad; and that while many cultures may have
evolved originally for environmental mastery, they are also “maintaining
beliefs, values and social institutions that result in senseless
cruelty, needless suffering and monumental folly.”40 The
fact that many societies have come to assume that cultural beliefs and
practices are sacred, with religious sanction, also underpins resistance
to change. Ronald Inglehart finds that historical values color present
values in spite of changes.41 And
Weisner says since cultural traits are emotionally learned, they
resist change.42
Cultural Change
Bronislaw Malinowski told us that cultural traits exist to serve
institutional functions. If aspirations require new institutions,
traits, as central tendencies, must shift to support them, or they
become cultural inhibitors.43 Similarly,
Weisner says that successful societies must at times somehow change
culture to persist intact.44 Harrison
argues plausibly that values change more slowly than attitudes. This
seems reflected in changes in the form of governments,
particularly in ostensibly adopting “democracy,” a widespread and
applauded recent phenomenon,45 while
the content and practical effects are strongly skewed by persisting,
deeper values that undermine the ideal.46
Assuming for the moment, that culture is central to socio-economic
growth, and that it should change appropriately where and if this
aspiration and expectation is present, then, just how does culture
change and how can it be induced to change? Or is every national
context so situational, so unique, that only quite abstract strategies
and tactics can be identified, and that those generalities then need
super-sensitive, thoughtful adaptation and policy selection in each
case?
All
I offer here are some plausible suggestions of others, which may often
sound like truisms or platitudes, but could still lead to further
specification for unique, concrete national circumstances. Porter argues
that cultures are changeable through education (well, OK—but what
kind?). He adds that it also can come from the dedicated efforts of
groups, which may be small in number, on behalf of their special
interests.47 Others
have of course pointed to the cultural influence of rising minorities,
often driven by a sense of their earlier cultural disadvantages, e.g.,
the Scots in Great Britain and the Samurai in Japan. In Edgerton’s view,
“Large changes…are typically imposed by some external event or circumstance…invasion, epidemic, and drought. In the absence of such
events, people tend to muddle through by relying on traditional
solutions that arose in response to previous circumstances.” Edgerton
goes on to observe that even promising risks are often avoided; people
settling, rather, for just acceptable results;48 something
observed, to their frustration, by many an American agricultural
extensionist in Third World peasant-farmers’ fields. Sachs is one among
many to see social change usually coming from major trauma, largely
external shocks, including past defeat and oppression.49
Harrison uses the example of Singapore and Lee Kwan Yew to illustrate
how strong leadership can shape culture.50 Porter
also observes that, “A strong government can impose a productive
economic culture, at least for a time, but that these values must be
absorbed by business leaders and their allies in order to be
sustained.51 The
two Koreas illustrate how one culture can be twisted, on the surface at
least, to produce two quite different polities. But the resurgence of
the Orthodox religion in Russia after the long endured Soviet
suppression suggests how temporary or superficial the official
“disappearance” of core cultural values may be. Ataturk’s “take no
prisoners” reshaping of Turkey, culture and all, bears reflection. While
many of his secularizing reforms persist, there has certainly been major
stress on them as Islam has come back strongly, arguably held in check
only by the Ataturkist military.
China scholar Lucien Pye notes how traditional regimes in China limited
the scale of business to immediate families. Mao of course nixed all
private economic entrepreneurship. But all the while Chinese in the
Diaspora, in permissive overseas settings, were flourishing
commercially, largely by building extensive family-like trading
networks. Deng and his successors reversed the economic policy of Mao,
and China now seems to be taking off.52 This
pattern fits with Tu Wei-Ming’s assertion that Confucian cultural values
underlie an alternative approach to modernization achievement once they
are allowed to follow once suppressed aspects of that value
system.53
Sachs assumed that international contacts of the wide variety now
available would inevitably change Third World cultures, with such
camels’ noses under the tent as music, clothing, and fast food—popular
western culture in general—appearing to lead the way.54 My
question is: How superficial are these intrusions? Will deeper values on
more fundamental fronts present surprising, continuing resistance which
will catch the globalizers off guard and frustrate over-confident
initiatives, even foster angry backlash?55
George Foster held that contact with other cultures is the most common
stimulant to cultural change; but, again, imitated form (visibility)
may not have the same meaning in the new context. He cites newly
Christianized societies considering Christian saints as identified with
pagan icons of similar attributes.56 Everett
Hagen also looks at the contact variable, but he sees its influence
ranging from almost nothing to substantial, depending on cultural
receptivity or necessity.57
Berger and Dore find that cases where industrial development has taken
hold have resulted from external market and political pressure meeting
with internal “pull” to shape the particular
development,58 leaving
the impression that culture does play a ‘filtering’ role to influence
variant forms of modernization.
Cultural Traits That
Affect Development
Lucien Pye says that since many contextual variables influence cultural
effects in different ways, universal good and bad traits and weighting
of variables are impossible. To illustrate this match or mismatch of
cultural patterns with changing contextual events, Pye cites recent
Japanese experience. Economic growth based on relationships, with
a minimum of legal regulation and transparency, and accepting cronyism
and elements of corruption, worked in good times. But hard times called
for formal regulation and other (outside) economic models. However, the
Japanese ‘culture’ of faith in the long term, and even in the heroism of
suffering for the long term, inhibited prompt, necessary
adjustments.59 Fukuyama
seems to agree with Pye’s analysis.60
In spite of these wise considerations, others have had the courage, or
temerity, to present more specific cultural traits that in their view
foster or inhibit economic and/or social development. Harrison may be
the most prominent and fearless of these. He gives ten values and
attitudes of progressive cultures to consider, condensed and paraphrased
here:
1. Time orientation; future oriented,
hopeful, not fatalistic.
2. Work is a good; creativity,
achievement and self-respect ensue.
3. Frugality, saving is the mother of
investment and financial security.
4. Education is the key to progress.
5. Individual merit for advancement,
not family connections.
6. Radius of identification and trust
must go beyond family.
7. Rigorous ethics are found in
advanced countries.
8. Justice and fair play to be
objectively (law) determined.
9. Authority should be dispersed and
horizontal, not vertical and concentrated.
10. Secularism best in civil life, and
heterodoxy and dissent encouraged.61
Expanding on
Harrison’s list, Grandona gives us a typology of 20 value-attitude
categories.62
For his part, Etounga-Manguelle presents a quite grim picture of African
cultural traits, which he argues are widely generalizable:
• Hierarchies of power and wealth
are fixed generationally, even contrary to current law; overthrow is the
only alternative option.
• Uncertainty, passivity,
pro-status quo; religion the only certainty; fatalistic.
• Regarding time; follow own
relaxed rhythm, focus on fabled past; no future concern.
• Unseen powers; leaders are
sanctified or overthrown, magic used for explanations, authority figures
Lordly in manner and image.
• Family and immediate community
over the individual as chief trait, as context of identity; ancestral
beliefs fundamental, oral traditions trusted; mid-level officials least
trusted, no delegation.
• Conflict resolution evaded;
rather social celebrations and ceremonies, without thought of cost;
friendship more important than business; whenever conflict
resolution is unavoidable, it’s done in secret.
• Efficiency of little concern;
consumption favored over saving; economic success shared out with
extended family.
• High cost of irrationality;
sorcery central; narrow clan loyalty; witchcraft and magical sects
assure believers with fantasies; leaders sometimes use witchcraft
advisors.
• Metaphorical cannibalism, with
the lawmakers the violators; collective progress of no concern;
achievement through work resented, limited trust; an “authoritarian way
of life.”63
My own
experience in Africa, Nigeria and Somalia, suggests that this is hardly
a perfectly balanced view, even if there are strong elements of truth.
For example, among the Igbo, I found strong entrepreneurial qualities,
including close concern for the best use of time.
A
wide “radius of trust,” in Harrison’s formulation, seems to be most
universally recommended trait, and everything that compromises this is
seen as negative. Inglehart finds the data suggest that trust is
fostered by “horizontal institutions,” such as a common
religion.64 Trust
is the “lubricant” for Fukuyama.
Tu describes an ideal Confucian polity, to explain its constituents’
success. The principal elements of that polity include the following:
• Government leadership in the
market for well-being and order
• Law needs “organic solidarity”
for stability and for necessary “sense of shame” for misconduct
• Family structure, with
reciprocity, as core value
• Civil society with interplay
between family and state and private and public
• Education as quasi-religion to
build character for “social capital” and linkages
• Self-cultivation as core of civil
society.65
One
of the most fundamental and influential cultural antinomies is the
impersonal, exemplified by the western “rule of law,” on the one
hand, and the personal, exemplified by transcendent family/group
loyalty (labeled relational by Tarik Banuri).66 The
latter may be associated with “amoral familism,” seen by Harrison et
al. as anti-developmental. But it seems to have a place in
Confucianism, which has been linked to East Asian successes. Is it
possible that our sacred rule of law is a Western cultural
artifact, not necessarily a universally valid value, outside our
system, where indeed it may be essential? After all, sometimes, even in
the West, the “law is an ass”!
Amartya Sen, the Indian Nobel Economics Laureate, seems to take the
Western part when, under the heading “reach of reason,” he says that
Western values amount to “reasoned humanism.” However he cannot resist
noting that they were anticipated in India by the Emperor Asoka before
the Common Era and by the later Moghul syncretizer, Akbar.67 This
line of inquiry is beyond further exploration here but shouldn’t be cast
aside.
Globalization
Here
globalization is defined as the present pressure for a uniform world
economic system, primarily capitalistic, market-centered, as evolved and
practiced in, and favorable first and foremost to Westernized nations,
now spearheaded by the U.S.; and carried by apparently
unstoppable—barring catastrophic acts of nature, or mankind—marvels of
technology. This present content will evolve and might even shift
direction to counter or modify capitalism’s guarantee of great wealth
gaps. Accordingly, Huntington feels this movement should be aimed at
human progress, defined as “economic development, material well being,
social and economic equity and political democracy.”68 For
both moral reasons and practical long-term interests of the rich, I
believe that the growing enthusiasm, at least rhetorical, for reducing
poverty must be vigorously acted upon.69
Key Institutions
The
prime mover institutions in this movement of tectonic proportions are of
course the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO), all with preponderant influence
wielded by the U.S. and its followers in the rest of the capitalist
First World. (Ironically, most of the specific trade disputes before the
WTO are between the U.S. and Europe.)
There have long been rumblings that the IMF and World Bank have been
doing little but harm in the Third World, and certainly their impact on
poverty has been disappointing. The recent United Nations Conference in
Monterrey, Mexico on “Financing Development” in its “Monterrey
Consensus” report, goes some modest way in recognizing the problems,
raised by economist Dani Rodrik (see below), resulting in unfair global
wealth distribution sustained under the above definition of
globalization, the “Washington Consensus” of long practice. But this
smoothly written Monterrey report still in the main supports that
“consensus,” seeming to modify only “comparative advantage,” in favor of
diversified exports. And, of course, advocating action against
poverty.70 Some
observers see in this the emergence of a neo-Washington
Consensus.
I
will focus at this point on the WTO as the highest development of the
present globalizing institutions. The WTO, which has inherited the long
evolving GATT legacy, is the agency of concrete rule-making for
international trade, the main arena for legally enforcing globalization
through rules and procedures for adjudicating and sanctioning
violations.
The
First World has dominated the GATT rule making and does so now at WTO in
Geneva headquarters by several means, most simply by having full
specialist staffs with the expertise, information sources and detailed
studies which can overawe many weakly staffed, poorly funded Third World
missions (not even always present) there. This has resulted in the big
boys generally writing the rules, without the presumed equal weight
participation of all members, a situation recognized in the Monterrey
report.70 Usually
this results in the rule formulations being presented for the Third
World nations’ representatives’ approval. This usually is forthcoming,
because the latter’s analytical skills are often—though
improving—inadequate, and in this hesitation they feel the pressure to
go along with the powerful, or abstain, thus permitting the new rules to
pass through the process.71
The
WTO gives its purposes as sustainable economic development and reduction
of poverty for all members, approximately 140 in number, through an
open, free, equitable and fair trading system to maximize and distribute
the world’s tradeable productive potential. The economic assumptions
have been neo-classical, the “Washington Consensus,” traditionally
relying on each trading country’s comparative advantage as
leading toward convergence by everyone benefiting through “openness”
(e.g., lowered tariff and other barriers) to expanded trade via the
“market mechanisms.”
Poor nations, which typically see cheap labor and absence of regulation
as their comparative advantages, suspect the introduction of such
standards would serve as further protectionism by the First World
against Third World exports, already a source of Third World complaint.
First World protection of “intellectual property rights” (patents, etc)
is also an area of contention. However, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakti, a
Thai, is scheduled to replace Mike Moore from New Zealand as Director
General of WTO on 1 September 2002. It is understood that Supachai will
place much more concern on issues important to the poorer countries. The
“one nation, one vote” decision-making arrangements may also become more
fully realized, with growing Third World skills, perhaps shifting but
not radically changing the Western domination of WTO focus.
In
the (Manchester) Guardian Weekly (26–31 May 2000),
Gregory Palast reported on the meeting of the TransAtlantic Business
Dialog, a meeting attended by 100 of “the most powerful CEOs in the
West.” Among other matters, they provided—the reporter didn’t exactly
say dictated—agenda items for the WTO. Regular Davos-type
meetings of the Great and the Good of the world to confer on the
mega-economic issues seem influenced largely by the globe’s top CEOs and
other First World champions of unfettered capitalism.
Yes, But . . .
In
The New Global Economy and the
Developing Nations: Making Openness Work,
Dani Rodrik accepts the trend for globalization and its potential
advantages for the Third World.72 He
feels that the WTO could provide guides that might motivate the
Third World, and that openness encourages civil and political freedom.
But he is concerned over the many ways things that could go wrong,
perhaps not for the First World, but for the Third. A running concern of
his is that enthusiasm for globalization, in my first definition, is
becoming a form of uncritical “groupthink,” where it is seen as an
unquestioned, inevitable good, and must be pushed forward with
unhampered speed, brushing doubters aside.72
To
the question about who assesses and acts to critically affect the
globalized economies, their worthiness, and the quality of a Third world
nation’s economic conditions and policies, Rodrik answers, “foreign
investors, country fund managers in London and New York, and a
relatively small group of domestic exporters.” For them, assets are
valued in “expectations,” with the potential for leading to “bubbles.”
So a poor nation’s policy makers must often guess what will please the
international money movers, rather than address clear domestic needs.
Herd contagion among money managers can lead to severe cross-border
volatility.73
Whatever Happened to Sovereignty?
One
very big question is that of choice, if any, for Third World nations in
the face of globalization. Can a state follow its own development
design, or must it attempt to make the best of working within the
“rules” of the globalization regime? Dwight Perkins says,
Small and poor developing economies
can opt out of the system or can be treated as exceptions, but
the nations of East and Southeast Asia are not small and they are no
longer poor…. They want and need access to the markets of Europe and
North America.74
What may have
worked well for them in the past won’t sustain them in the emerging
world economic environment. To me, this implies that the personal
relationships (“Asian values”) way of doing business must change to the
Western designed impersonal, rule of law centered modality.
Rodrik
puts the question his own way: How can “developing nations…engage the
world economy on their own terms, not on terms set by global markets or
multinational institutions?” In answer, he argues that international
governance must recognize and allow for unique development styles if
general benefit is intended. “Countries have rights to their own
aspirations and special institutions, and these arrangements will vary
across nations because of our differences in norms (my
italics), historical traditions (mine, too) and levels of
development. A suitable international economic system is one that allows
different styles of national capitalism to co-exist with each other—not
one that imposes a uniform model of economic governance.”75
But Rodrik notes that many
policy makers claim that the Third World has no choice in the
global economy, for there is no place for idiosyncrasy; only to
“privatize, open up and attract DFI” (more commonly called FDI, Foreign
Direct Investment).76 Rodrik
tells us that investment is crucial for exports and growth, and for
this, poorer nations will need their own government’s help, and
he warns that over enthusiasm from early success with FDI can have a
dependency and vulnerability effect, perhaps leading to
a backlash.77
As
noted above, Berger and Dore see national modes of organization and
management, institutions and structures as causing varieties
of
capitalism.78 On
the other hand, Porter expects convergence in structures of
production and economic policies, a convergence on a core set of values,
attitudes and beliefs to underpin his “productive paradigm,” in which
case this culture will be important and positive.79
Challenging the ‘Consensus’
Rodrik finds overwhelming evidence that alternatives, even opposition,
to the Washington Consensus (on openness, privatization, market freedom,
etc.) have worked quite successfully, notably in East Asia. South
Korea’s government in the 1960s directed and led in high domestic
investment policies. The government of Taiwan similarly led internal
investment, in their case largely by tax breaks. Both governments were
very controlling and centrally directive, and many industries were
publicly owned.80
Compared to more open policies, import substitution (ISI)
was found by Rodrik to have worked well in East Asia until the mid1970s.
Even today, “Experimentation with a certain dose of import substitution
policy in a few sectors of the economy may also prove productive,”
especially until a “mature” (his term, used elsewhere) economy is
achieved.81 The
downturns there came from external shocks, mainly oil prices; ISI had
little to do with the crisis. However, the failure to promptly
adjust macroeconomic policies led for a time to the following:
inflation, foreign exchange shortages, external payments imbalances,
black markets in currencies, and debt. Is this cultural lag persisting
in the economic, perhaps via the political? From Rodrik, I
understand that privatization works best in economies that have already
become mature and modern, as demonstrated by Hong Kong, present day
South Korea and Taiwan.
It
occurs to me that for Taiwan and South Korea, earlier import
substitution policies probably prepared the way for later success with
more open, export-led policies. This interpretation supports the view
that different economic policies, rather than a universal prescription,
must be appropriate for different domestic and macro contexts. But the
ability and willingness to quickly make difficult policy shifts
seems critical. In my own view, cultural lag may play a spoiler role
here.
Domestic Conflict Management
Institutions
A
major prescriptive theme appearing regularly in Rodrik concerns a
developing nation’s ability to manage domestic conflict arising from
inevitable external shocks; when harsh policy decisions are faced, which
often lead to, devaluation and reduced social expenditures, and the
resultant unfair distribution of pain (among other things). “It is the
quality of the domestic institutions of conflict
management that determines a country’s capacity for [such] macroeconomic
adjustment” when necessary.82
To escape such conflict and pain in the 1970s, Turkey (where I lived in
the late 1960s), for one, perhaps insecure about the adequacy of their
domestic conflict management institutions, borrowed heavily and soon
faced collapse, leading to very distasteful IMF medication, which
arguably encouraged the military coup in 1980.
South Korea did manage to recover quickly at that time with IMF aid,
apparently because, despite protests, they did have better quality
institutions for conflict management. For Rodrik, domestic conflict
management capability is a sine qua non for
sustained economic development, not least where there is uneasiness
between different ethnic groups. It is not hard to see the roots in
culture of the relative presence or absence of this capacity.
Over-Confident Prescriptions
Rodrik finds the neo-liberal economists’ mantra of “openness,” to
be dangerously over simple. At the very
start of his book he announces, “The relationship between growth rates
and indicators of openness—levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers or
controls of capital flows—is weak at best.”83 He
notes that the East Asian shocks of l997 were most painful in open
trading countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, but that
democratic Korea and Thailand did best at recovering with civil
society’s acquiescence, while openness itself contributed little.
Openness must be fitted, he says, as only one part, into an embracing
national development strategy.84 And
he warns us that openness can widen inequality by powerful special
interest groups or those highly skilled at appropriating the benefits,
and that openness to trade can trap a nation in low growth
specialization.85
Rodrik’s first priority, by far, regarding imports is capital goods and
others related to production, but he quickly adds ideas, institutions
and services to capital in his list of priority imports, the first two
of which are somewhat less proximate.86 He
offers a cautionary note, that capital imports by foreign investors can
crowd out domestic investment, and credits, especially short term, when
pushed by international lenders. This played a role in the earlier debt
crises such as are still not resolved; and more recently played a
significant role in the East Asian crises of the late 1990s.87
Obviously, as Rodrik observes, high tariffs on investment goods
are a “fatal mistake.” Trade widens the possibility of
technological capability and growth, but does not guarantee it, and it
can trap a Third World nation in low technology production.88 Lindsey
and Fairbanks agree that a presumed comparative advantage strategy of
keeping wages low as a competitive device is to simply stay poor.89 Porter
says that to become effectively competitive, cheap labor is not a
resource.90 Endowments
for comparative advantage are of course notoriously unequal, and
comparative advantage can easily change (be lost or gained) through new
technology, raw materials demand, and other factors.
Final Reflections
Although I have pointed to the underlying influence of culture on many
of the globalization issues discussed, I suspect that readers are able
to make the connections noted and others on their own, however
convoluted and still imprecisely mapped the paths of linkage. Given this
imprecision, plus the multitudinous other dimensions of globalization,
it is “too soon to tell” (in the words of Cho En Lai on the effects of
the French Revolution) where the tracks of globalization will lead.
Will convergence be advanced on the rules favored (and imposed?) however
subtly, and indirectly, by the First World policies, or will
distributional injustice persist, or even worsen and fester until some
disaster eventuates? Of course we may get some degree of convergent
justice sooner by other means, a genuine commitment to raise those in
poverty to security in their basic needs. Whatever the handicaps
impeding the economic development of Third World nations, there seems no
absolute bar to escaping perpetual poverty. The few countries which have
fairly recently left that condition behind are the exemplars of that
possibility.
Asymmetry
The
uneven starting points and advantages are obvious: great disparities in
wealth, market power, information, experience, technology, science,
natural resources, along with cultures with fundamentally different
worldviews. Whose “World” is being asked to change most quickly and
wrenchingly? The Third World must move (more likely, lurch) to become
compatible with the First World’s system: the latter having had two
centuries to reach this presumed pinnacle. Berger and Dore recognize
that: “Everywhere asymmetries of information and power, organizational
factors, different social infrastructure and effects of scale” mark the
economic constraints on convergence.91 As
Rodrik noted, only mature, modern economies are likely to benefit from
the policies prescribed by globalization a la the
Washington Consensus, and most of the Third World is at a youthful,
early stage regarding modernization. To quickly conform and be at all
competitive, in many cases they probably cannot afford efforts at
poverty reduction and social programs, even those necessary to build the
essential human and social capital.
The
prescribed openness may simply become a welcome to the First World to
pursue its own competitive interests with fewer restraints, with the
Third World salvaging what little it can in the neutral market
process. After all, the market is only concerned with process, not the
results. As to the blind, unbiased application of the rule of law, the
law is usually drawn with a tilt to and by the most powerful. Where then
is the symmetry?
Really Final Reflections
If I
have a ‘policy’ message in all this, it is that globalizers of all sorts
should deeply assimilate the cautionary tales and issues sketched above;
that without the closest understanding of cultures, including one’s own,
efforts to push global change on others—and on one’s own—may encounter
unexpected setbacks and even conflict, in one form or another.
My
own wish is for a “capitalism with a human face.” For our
time, capitalism has proven the most productive general paradigm.
It would be best partnered with a democratic socialism similar to that
pursued in northern Europe—until today’s rightward drift there. That is,
let us use capitalism’s productive superiority for its capacity to make
the goods needed in a more just distribution of its benefits and a
higher level of general welfare. It would still be nice for alternative
experiments to have room if capitalism cannot bend to accommodate
justice along with its, often abused, freedom.
Appendix: Apologia
About my own credentials for my presumption to address these issues, I
was 69 years old before coming to teach (and that part time—actually, I
prefer “Adjunct”)—in academic USA. Immediately before coming to Kent
State, I did teach college, for the first time, full time, for six years
in Belize, part of the Third World. For some 25 years before my Belize
teaching, I was involved in specific, on the ground, projects in the
Third World: Korea (in the 50s), Turkey, British Honduras (becoming
Belize in1981, six years before my teaching there), Nigeria,
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belize again, Somalia, and Belize again.
My
bent toward the relevance of cultures in development evolved almost
unconsciously, and I believe I never articulated it until, in the
library of the University College of Belize, I found and read Lawrence
Harrison’s Underdevelopment Is a State of
Mind. That seemed to kick all my subliminal observational learning
into consciousness. A review of my field experience, with this new
consciousness, significantly advanced my understanding of my years
working in Third World polities. Having personally continued to spend
time analyzing my own and other recorded observations in this cultural
context, I have come to feel Harrison’s insights opened the door to more
sophisticated analysis of culture’s very complicated influence in the
Third World’s efforts to benefit from globalization, or somehow come to
terms with it.
Endnotes
1. Lawrence E
. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Culture Matters:
How Values Shape Human Progress (New
York: Basic Books, 2000). (Back
to Paragraph)
2. Orlando
Patterson, “Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and Afro-American
Illustration,” in Culture Matters, pp. 208ff. (Back
to Paragraph)
3. Michael
Fairbanks, “Changing the Mind of a Nation: Elements in a Process for
Creating Prosperity,” p. 271; and Stace Lindsey, “Culture, Mental Models
and National Prosperity,” in Culture Matters, p. 282.
(Back
to Paragraph)
4. Mariano Grandona, “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development,” in Culture
Matters, p. 200. (Back
to Paragraph)
5. Lawrence E.
Harrison, “Promoting Progressive Cultural Change,” in Culture
Matters, p. 300. (Back
to Paragraph)
6. Nathan
Glazer, “Disaggregating Culture,” in Culture Matters, p. 22.
(Back
to Paragraph)
7. David Landes, “Cultures Make Almost All the Difference,” in Culture
Matters, p. 20. (Back
to Paragraph)
8. Jeffrey
Sachs, “Notes on a New Sociology of Economic Development,” in Culture
Matters, p. 40. (Back
to Paragraph)
9. Ibid., p.
43. (Back
to Paragraph)
10. Paul Harrison, Inside the Third World, 2nd ed.,
(London: Penguin, l981), pp. 1ff. (Back
to Paragraph)
11. Sachs, in Culture Matters, pp. 40ff.
(Back
to Paragraph)
12. Ibid., p. 40.
(Back
to Paragraph)
13. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
(Back
to Paragraph)
14. Ibid., p. 36.
(Back
to Paragraph)
15. Richard A. Shweder, in Culture Matters, pp. 160ff.
(Back
to Paragraph)
16. Ibid., p. 168.
(Back
to Paragraph)
17. Ibid., p. 160.
(Back
to Paragraph)
18. Ibid., p. 161.(Back
to Paragraph)
19. Ibid., p. 163.
(Back
to Paragraph)
20. Ibid.(Back
to Paragraph)
21. Ibid., p. 164.
(Back
to Paragraph)
22. Ibid., p. 165.
(Back
to Paragraph)
23. Ibid., p. 166.
(Back
to Paragraph)
24. Carlos Alberto Montaner, “Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin
America,“ in Culture Matters, pp. 57–58. (Back
to Paragraph)
25. Thomas S. Weisner, “Culture, Childhood and Progress in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” in Culture Matters, p. 148. (Back
to Paragraph)
26. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, “Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment
Program?” in Culture Matters, p. 66. (Back
to Paragraph)
27. Stace Lindsey, in Culture Matters, p. 282.
(Back
to Paragraph)
28. Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital,” in Culture Matters, p. 98.
(Back
to Paragraph)
29. Ibid., p. 101.
(Back
to Paragraph)
30. Ibid., pp. 102ff.
(Back
to Paragraph)
31. Lawrence E. Harrison, in Culture Matters, pp. 296–97.
(Back
to Paragraph)
32. Ibid., p. xxxii.
(Back
to Paragraph)
33. Tu Wei-Ming, “Multiple Modernities: A Preliminary Inquiry into the
Implications of East Asian Modernity,” in Culture Matters, pp.
256ff. (Back
to Paragraph)
34. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, National Identity and
Global Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1999), p. 5. (Back
to Paragraph)
35. Sachs, in Culture Matters, pp. 31ff.
(Back
to Paragraph)
36. Etounga-Manguelle, in Culture Matters, p. 46.
(Back
to Paragraph)
37. Porter, in Culture Matters, p. 15.
(Back
to Paragraph)
38. Richard Silberg, The Devolution of the People
(New York: Brace and World, 1967) passim. (Back
to Paragraph)
39. Kenneth Kenniston, “Psychological Development and Historical Change,” in
Explorations in Psychohistory, ed. Seymour Martin Lifton
and Eric Olsen (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1974), pp.150–51. (Back
to Paragraph)
40.
Robert E. Edgerton, “Traditional Beliefs
and Practices—Are Some Better than
Others?” in Culture Matters, pp. 126ff. (Back
to Paragraph)
41. Ronald Inglehart, “Culture and Democracy,” in Culture Matters,
p. 91. (Back
to Paragraph)
42. Weisner, in Culture Matters, p. 148.
(Back
to Paragraph)
43. Bronislaw Malinowski, The Dynamics of Cultural
Change (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961). Chapter
4, passim. (Back
to Paragraph)
44. Weisner, in Culture Matters, p. 148.
(Back
to Paragraph)
45. Lawrence E. Harrison, “Introduction: Why Culture Matters,” in Culture
Matters, p. xxx. (Back
to Paragraph)
46. See Fareed Zakaria, “Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs,
November–December 1997. (Back
to Paragraph)
47. Porter, in Culture Matters, p. 24.
(Back
to Paragraph)
48. Edgerton, in Culture Matters, p. 137.
(Back
to Paragraph)
49. Sachs, in Culture Matters, p. 30.
(Back to Paragraph)
50. Lawrence E. Harrison, in Culture Matters, p. xxvi.
(Back
to Paragraph)
51. Porter, in Culture Matters, p. 27.
(Back
to Paragraph)
52. Lucien Pye, in Culture Matters, p. 251.
(Back
to Paragraph)
53. Tu Wei-Ming, in Culture Matters, p. 258.
(Back
to Paragraph)
54. Sachs, in Culture Matters, p. 35.
(Back
to Paragraph)
55. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone Press,
1997). (Back
to Paragraph)
56. George Foster, Traditional Cultures (New York: Harper, 1962).
Chapter 2, passim. (Back
to Paragraph)
57. Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social
Change (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962), pp. 348–52.
(Back
to Paragraph)
58. Berger and Dore, National Unity and Global
Capitalism, p. 245. (Back
to Paragraph)
59. Pye, in Culture Matters, p. 252.
(Back
to Paragraph)
60. Fukuyama, “Social Capital” in Culture Matters, p. 98.
(Back
to Paragraph)
61. Lawrence E. Harrison, in Culture Matters, pp. 296–99.
(Back
to Paragraph)
62. Grandona, in Culture Matters, pp. 48-53.
(Back
to Paragraph)
63. Etounga-Manguelle, in Culture Matters, pp. 68–75.
(Back
to Paragraph)
64. Inglehart, in Culture Matters, p. 91.
(Back
to Paragraph)
65. Tu Wei-Ming, in Culture Matters, pp. 262–63.
(Back
to Paragraph)
66. Tarik Banuri, “Modernization and Its Discontents, ” in Dominating
Knowledge, ed. F.A. Margalin and S.A. Margalin (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991). (Back
to Paragraph)
67. Amartya Sen, “East and West; The Reach of Reason,” in New York
Review of Books, 20 January 2000. (Back
to Paragraph)
68. Samuel P. Huntington, “Forward; Culture Counts,” in Culture Matters,
p. xv. (Back
to Paragraph)
69. United Nations, “Report of the Monterrey Conference on Finance in
Development,” 18–22 March 2002. (Back
to Paragraph)
70. Ibid. (Back
to Paragraph)
71. Information on the World Trade Organization (WTO) was in key parts
provided by a student of mine, Jason Dunick, who had just returned in
January 2000 from an internship at WTO headquarters in Geneva, with a
desk just outside the “green room.” (Back
to Paragraph)
72. Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and
the Developing Nations: Making Openness
Work (Washington, DC: The Overseas Development Council, 1999).
(Back
to Paragraph)
73. Ibid., p. 30.
(Back
to Paragraph)
74. Dwight H. Perkins, in Culture Matters, p. 243.
(Back
to Paragraph)
75. Rodrik, The New Global Economy, p. 152.
(Back
to Paragraph)
76. Ibid., p. 147.
(Back
to Paragraph)
77. Ibid. (Back
to Paragraph)
78. Berger and Dore, National Unity and Global Capitalism, p. 10.
(Back
to Paragraph)
79. Porter, in Culture Matters, p. 27.
(Back
to Paragraph)
80. Rodrik, The New Global Economy, p. 53.
(Back
to Paragraph)
81. Ibid., p. 64.
(Back
to Paragraph)
82. Ibid., p. 74. (My emphasis).
(Back
to Paragraph)
83. Ibid., p. 64.
(Back
to Paragraph)
84. Ibid., p. 68.
(Back
to Paragraph)
85. Ibid., p. 83.
(Back
to Paragraph)
86. Ibid., p. 1.
(Back
to Paragraph)
87. Ibid., pp. 92–93.
(Back
to Paragraph)
88. Ibid., pp. 12ff.
(Back
to Paragraph)
89. Lindsey, in Culture Matters, pp. 285–86.
(Back
to Paragraph)
90. Porter, in Culture Matters, p. 17.
(Back
to Paragraph)
91. Berger and Dore, National Unity and Global
Capitalism, p. 6. (Back
to Paragraph)
Volume XIV |